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Abstract 
The research examines the transformative effects of the 2004 Indian Ocean 
Tsunami on the Malaysian government’s disaster management structure and 
mechanism and on affected local communities in Penang Island. Was 2004 
tsunami the catalyst for transformative adaptation in disaster management 
mechanism? The thesis explores how the government responded to the 
tsunami by evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the response. It also 
provides a review of how this experience affected the government’s disaster 
response services that led to drastic change to the existing disaster 
management mechanism. The thesis also focuses on the transformative 
effect of the tsunami on a specific government agency, in this case, the 
National Security Council (NSC) as the main coordinating agency for disaster 
management in Malaysia to accommodate the feedback and reaction of 
affected local communities, as well as better prepared for emergencies and 
disasters in the future. The thesis also discusses on the technical reforms and 
transformative adaptation introduced in the aftermath of the tsunami and 
changes to standard operating procedures, emergency drills, early warning 
systems, and amendment of National Security Council (NSC) Directive No. 
20. The thesis explains and discuss the reaction of affected local communities 
to the government’s response and recovery programmes, and speculates on 
the possible indirect effects on politics in these communities, as illustrated by 
election results and based on my observation as the Penang State Security 
Secretary responsible for coordinating disaster response. This research uses 
the case study approach and applies mixed research methods, both 
quantitative and qualitative, and the case study areas are from Tanjung 
Bungah, Batu Feringhi, Teluk Bahang and Kuala Sungai Pinang. The 
transformative adaptation took place in policy (in the amendment of NSC 
Directive No. 20 and the formulation of new SOP’s for tsunamis), structure 
(setting up a new National Disaster Management Agency-NADMA), laws 
(Disaster Management Bill), rules and regulations (embedding disaster risk 
reduction in the development planning) and technical (establishing a new 
Malaysia Tsunami Early Warning System). The tsunami also has indirect 
political effects in the case study areas. 
   
 
1 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Problem 
In recent years there has been an increase in academic interest in the social 
and political impact of major disasters and the consequences for resilience of 
how governments respond, or fail to respond, to these disasters (Arceneaux & 
Stein, 2006; Pelling & Dill, 2009; Sobel & Leeson, 2006; Tarcey, 2004). There 
is a widespread assumption in the literature that natural disasters can, if 
poorly responded to by authorities, result in major, even transformative effects 
to the affected governments (Redlener, 2012; Revi et al., 2014; Tarcey, 2004; 
Zelizer, 2011). Natural disasters have the potential to trigger changes in 
disaster management policy and mechanisms of a stricken country due to the 
perceived incompetence of the government in managing the aftermath. 
Among the most notable recent natural disasters were the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami (2004), the earthquake in Port au Prince, Haiti (2010), the 
earthquake and tsunami in Sendai, Japan (2011), the Christchurch 
earthquake, New Zealand (2011), and Typhoon Haiyan in The Philippines 
(2013). During the last ten years, natural disasters have claimed more than 
3.4 million lives, with a billion more effected directly or indirectly, and a huge 
resources have been devoted to   rebuilding and reconstructing lives (Hogan 
& Burstein, 2007). Large scale and unpredicted natural disasters often 
overstretch the capabilities and resources of affected countries. 
 
The Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004 (magnitude 9.1) was amongst the most 
devastating disasters at the beginning of 21st century. It caused a great loss of 
lives across the region, with about 227,898 people killed or missing, leaving 
massive physical damage and disrupted socio-economic activities. In terms of 
scale, the earthquakes were felt widely across the Indian Ocean from 
Indonesia to Maldives (Figure 1.1). The most affected areas being in 
Indonesia (Banda Aceh and Meulaboh) and parts of Bangladesh, India, 
Malaysia, the Maldives, Myanmar, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand (USGS, 
2010). The worst hit area was Banda Aceh that was totally wiped out by 
tsunami wave (Figure 1.2), which demonstrated the extent of the tsunami 
impact and consequences that accounted for the loss of life of 128,645 
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 Figure 1.1: 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami-Affected Countries 
 
Source: Finney (2005) adapted from US Agency for International Development (USAID). 
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Figure 1.2: The Devastated Impact of 2004 Tsunami in Banda Aceh 
                  Banda Aceh, Indonesia – Before 
Banda Aceh, Indonesia - After 
 
Source: Finney (2005) 
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people, 37,063 missing, and displaced 532,898 of Banda Aceh population 
(Rofi, Doocy, & Robinson, 2006).  
 
The tsunami created a humanitarian crisis, and national and international aid 
agencies found it difficult to reach the affected communities in countries due 
to various factors. For example, a weak central government, insecurity 
because of an active insurgency as in Jaffna, Sri Lanka, and infrastructure 
collapse such as in Aceh, Indonesia. The interplay between natural disasters 
and their impact on the government’s disaster management structures and 
mechanisms, however, are not well studied. Is a natural disaster a catalyst for 
transformative change in government’s policy, structures and mechanisms?  
Transformative adaptation can be distinguished from ‘traditional’ and 
‘transitional’ adaptation. According to Q.E.D Foundation1 (2014);  
“Traditional adaptation is where change is about making 
improvements to current practices, thus effectively maintaining 
the status quo. Transitional adaptation, where change aims to 
change current practices to improve outcomes, with tangential 
impact on the status quo. Transformational adaptation, where 
change aims to change not only practices, but outcomes, thereby 
disrupting the status quo” (Q.E.D Foundation, 2014, para 2).  
Dow et al. (2013) argue that discussion of transformation in the literature is 
focus on the role of adaptation that accelerate drastic change (rather than 
gradual process) to the current practices. Pelling (2010) and Revi et al. (2014) 
suggest transformation adaptation is either voluntary (such as resettlement of 
vulnerable populations in flood prone areas) or forced by unexpected events  
(Revi et al., 2014). I argue that government is the only body responsible for 
deciding upon and implementing changed policies. 
The 2004 tsunami was an unprecedented event that challenged the 
government’s response and recovery mechanism and policy; the 
government’s response relied  on its  disaster management agencies to 
                                                          
1 Q.E.D. Foundation is a non-profit organisation (NGO’s) established in the USA that focus on 
conducting research, training and promoting best practices on transformative change and adaptation. 
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respond effectively and efficiently but these mechanisms were not designed 
for a tsunami or disaster on this scale. The affected local communities 
naturally expected government to deliver an effective response to the tsunami 
and, conversely, to take responsibility and be accountable for an ineffective 
response. Failure meant the government risked public anger, frustration and 
dissatisfaction. Therefore, this thesis explores and examines the 
government’s response to the tsunami, the affected population’s feedback 
and the reaction that led to the transformative adaptation of the government’s 
disaster management mechanism in order to address government 
weaknesses, accommodate affected people’s expectation and avert 
discontent. 
Significance 
Previous studies have examined  the impact of natural disasters on land use 
(Colbourne, 2005), the environment (Horton et al., 2008), and politics 
(Blocker, Rochford, & Sherkat, 1991) (Pelling & Dill, 2009). These studies 
concentrate on the recovery and rehabilitation phases of disaster 
management, although the response phase is equally important and crucial in 
determining the effectiveness of government agencies. This research repeats 
this approach by exploring the transformative effects of 2004 Indian Ocean 
Tsunami on the Malaysian government’s disaster response mechanism. 
This research will offer a better understanding of a local community’s 
expectations and reactions in the aftermath of a disaster, in this case, the 
2004 tsunami. These expectations are part of government intervention 
programmes, such as Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDRR) in 
the response and recovery phases of the disaster management cycle. 
Further, the research will contribute to the streamlining of disaster 
management policy and standard operating procedures (SOP’s) by taking into 
consideration the strengths and weaknesses of such changes. The research 
indicates governments should focus on strengthening resilience by enhancing 
social cohesion and political stability by identifying and neutralising factors 
associated with natural disasters that might trigger social and political unrest. 
This requires the close involvement of potentially affected communities in the 
development and implementation of CBDRR programmes and establishing 
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transformative adaptation policies and strategies. This also requires an 
effective and legitimate state. 
Hypothesis 
The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami can be considered the catalyst that triggered 
transformative adaptation in the government’s disaster management structure 
and mechanisms. In order to test the hypothesis, the following research 
objectives and questions are put forward:  
Research Objectives and Questions 
There are three objectives. The first objective is to explore the tsunami as an 
unprecedented event that placed stress on the effectiveness of government 
responses and recovery. The corresponding question is how did the 
government respond to the 2004 tsunami?  
 
The second objective is to examine affected population’s feedback and 
reaction towards government’s response and recovery programmes in the 
case study areas. Is there any evidence of a high level of population 
frustration and dissatisfaction towards the three main programmes:- 
a) Distribution of ‘Wang Ehsan’ (Emergency Monetary Aid); 
b) Allocation of ‘Rumah Tsunami’ (Tsunami Housing Scheme); and, 
c) Distribution of fisheries assistance. 
 
The third objective is to examine the tsunami as the trigger for the 
transformation of disaster management structure and mechanism in Malaysia. 
Is there any evidence that the 2004 tsunami triggered a transformative 
adaptation to the disaster management mechanism? 
 
Table 1.1 shows the relationship between research objectives, research 
questions, data and evidence to answer the questions and sources of data 
and information. The next section discusses the methods used for this 
research.
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Table 1.1: Matrix of Research Objectives, Research Questions, Data/Evidence and its Source 
Research Objective Research Question Data/Evidence Source 
First Objective: 
To explore the tsunami as an unprecedented 
event that place stress on the government’s 
disaster management machineries.  
First Question: 
How did the government respond to the 2004 
tsunami? 
 
Feedback from 
affected local 
population. 
 
Fieldwork 
 
Second Objective: 
To examine affected population’s feedback 
and reaction towards government’s response 
and recovery programmes in the case study 
areas. 
 
 
 
Second Question: 
Is there any evidence of a high level of 
population frustration and dissatisfaction 
towards the three main programmes:- 
a) Distribution of ‘Wang Ehsan’ (Emergency 
Monetary Aid); 
b) Allocation of ‘Rumah Tsunami’ (Tsunami 
Housing Scheme); and, 
c)    Distribution of fisheries assistance. 
 
 
 
Effectiveness of 
government 
mechanism and 
policy. 
Level of 
dissatisfaction 
and issues 
regarding 
tsunami 
response and 
recovery 
programmes. 
 
 
a) Tsunami post 
mortem report by 
National Security 
Council 
b) Interview with 
politicians/ 
incumbents of 
2004 in tsunami 
affected 
constituencies. 
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Table 1.1 (cont.): Matrix of Research Objectives, Research Questions, Data/Evidence and its Source. 
Research Objective Research Question Data/Evidence Source 
Third Objective: 
To examine the tsunami as the 
trigger for the transformation of 
disaster management structure and 
mechanism in Malaysia. 
Third Question: 
Is there any evidence that the 2004 tsunami 
triggered a transformative adaptation to the 
disaster management mechanism? 
 
Comparing the 
structure and 
mechanism before 
and after the 2004 
tsunami.  
 
National Security 
Council 
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Research Methodology 
This section discusses briefly research paradigms, research methods, data 
collection, and the conceptual framework.  This research applies the mixed 
methods approach of a pragmatic research paradigm, gathering both 
quantitative (using a questionnaire to produce descriptive statistical data) and 
qualitative data (interviews for further information and explanation) as shown 
in Figure 1.3.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Research Design 
 
 
Research Paradigm: Pragmatism
Quantitative
Qualitative
Research Approach: Mixed Method
Sampling
Interview
Secondary
Data
Collective Case Study
Case 
Study 1:  
Tanjung 
Bunga
Case 
Study 2: 
Batu 
Feringgi
Case 
Study 3: 
Teluk 
Bahang
Case 
Study 4: 
Kuala 
Sungai 
Pinang
   
 
8 
 
The research applies Mixed Methods Sequential Procedures as described by, 
for example, Creswell et.al (2006), Creswell (2013), Ivankova et.al (2006), 
and Leech and Onwuegbuzie (2009). In the pragmatic paradigm, each 
research objective may have a different research method depending on the 
most suitable approach needed to address the specific research question. 
Since the  research questions involve both exploration (qualitative) and causal 
relationships (quantitative), pragmatism is most appropriate because 
pragmatism provides freedom to researcher to derive knowledge about the 
problem from multiple approaches in an effort to understand it better 
(Creswell, 2013). The quantitative element involved administering confidential 
questionnaires to elicit information on, for example, the popular reaction to the 
government’s response and recovery programmes. The qualitative method 
focused on interviews in order to elicit explanations or detailed information of 
the disaster management officials and politicians’ experiences during the 
2004 tsunami. I use mix-method instead of a single method in order to 
compliment and overcome weaknesses in both methods.  
The weaknesses or limitation of qualitative methods as argued by Creswell 
and  Poth (2017), Bowen (2006) and Carr (1994) are time and resources 
consuming, overlook important information, researcher bias  in interpretation 
and observation, and verification issues. In order to overcome these 
limitations, Sandelowski (1993), Long and Johnson (2000), Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) and Morse et al (2002) suggest that  researchers take into account 
personal biasness and personal experience by using, personal self-reflexivity, 
systematic record keeping and research journals, validating the transcripts of  
respondents through cross checking and triangulating data from other sources 
such as official government documents and mass media reports. Weaknesses 
and limitation in quantitative methods as argued by  Creswell (2013), Bryman 
(2006) and Carr (1994) are misrepresented population, requires time and  
resources because of large sample size and limited flexibility for respondents 
to provide detail answer due to close-ended questionnaire.  
This research methodology is a case-study approach. A case study is used to 
analyse and describe extensively social phenomenon or system for themes, 
patterns and issues in its setting that is defined by place or time (Creswell, 
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2013; Meriam, 1998; Wolcott, 1995). According to Yin (2011) a case study is 
an appropriate method to explore  research questions in their context and 
environment. Therefore, the case study approach has been chosen because 
my research is context specific and bounded by place (geographical location) 
and community (tsunami affected). The case study method enables the 
researcher to investigate phenomenon from multiple angles and employ 
different data sources, both qualitative and quantitative (Yin, 2011). 
 
To pull various sources of information and methods together the research 
uses data triangulation. Data triangulation is a method of validating data by 
using multiple data collection techniques from different sources on the same 
case study such as interviews, questionnaires, observations, and secondary 
data (government reports etc.). The collected data is then cross checked to 
ensure rigour and validation. For the purpose of this research, participant 
behaviour during the administration of the questionnaires session was 
observed as part of the triangulation process and written up as ‘critical 
incident reports’ in an effort to cross check the data and promote self- 
reflexivity. Further, elite interviews with government officials (3 persons), 
politicians (3 persons) and NGO’s leader (1 person) were conducted to 
validate the outcome of questionnaires. Interviewing different people on the 
same subjects, collecting and evaluating documents will reinforce the validity 
of the evidence and achieve triangulation. The purpose of conducting a 
sampling questionnaire in affected constituencies is to gain insights into the 
electorate’s reaction to, and perception of, the government’s response and 
recovery programmes, the issues and problems during and after the tsunami 
that lead to frustration and dissatisfaction towards government, and the 
degree to which anger influenced constituents’ votes. The objective of 
interviewing politicians and officials from disaster management agencies is to 
obtain information from the other side in the interests of balance. Politicians 
interviewed were incumbents and candidates in the 2004 and 2008 General 
Elections (Appendix 1.1). An interview was also conducted with NGO’s leader 
of PERKASA (‘Pertubuhan Pribumi Perkasa’), an NGO’s that focused on 
preserving Malays rights and privileges. The interviews are crucial for data 
regarding effectiveness of response mechanism and recovery programmes, 
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issues and the problems faced by government, identified shortfalls and 
weaknesses of disaster response mechanism, and, perceived factors that can 
be attributed to the frustration and dissatisfaction of the affected people.  
To triangulate the information and data gathered from sampling and interview, 
secondary data from official reports of disaster management agencies such 
as post mortem report of the tsunami response, Community Based Disaster 
Risk Reduction (CBDRR) programmes, Tsunami Awareness Programmes, 
and Tsunami Drills in Penang (from the National Security Council-NSC and 
Malaysia Meteorology Department-MMD) were also used in the research . For 
example, information about the effectiveness of the awareness programme 
from the MMD report was cross checked and corroborated with the 
awareness level of affected communities. Information about issues and 
problems identified by politicians and constituents will be compared to the 
tsunami post mortem reports. The MMD report was important both as an 
indicator of official response not only to the 2004 tsunami but also to public 
disquiet and disaffection as manifested in the election results. 
Data Collection 
Mixed Methods Data Collection Procedures by Exploratory Sequential Design 
was used for this research. The method is a step by step process which 
begins with quantitative approach using questionnaires based on random 
sampling. In this case 50 participants were chosen randomly by stratified 
sampling (every odds number based on list of 100 people in the NSC Penang 
database of tsunami affected people) and based on availability during the 
fieldwork from four settlements located within two State Assembly 
constituencies of Tanjung Bungah and Teluk Bahang, which were the most 
severely affected by the tsunami on Penang Island, Malaysia (Figure 1.4). 
The list of respondents was retrieved from the database of National Security 
Council (NSC) Penang Office because NSC coordinates the development and 
relocation of tsunami housing scheme in Penang. Respondents were selected 
randomly: 12 of odds number from each of four blocks
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apartment that total up to 48 and another two respondents were the Head of 
‘Rumah Tsunami’ Community Association and his Assistant. The high 
percentage of female respondents was due to the time of sampling conducted 
(in the morning when most males were at work). The majority of respondents 
were Malays and then Indian because they were the majority of tsunami 
affected people in the NSC database. Most of the respondents were from the 
low income group because a majority of them were squatters, residing along 
the beaches during the tsunami.  
 
The semi-structured interview method allows the researcher to have flexibility 
to adjust the way of asking questions according to interviewee behaviour and 
in line with ethical considerations. Thus, the interview data is complimentary 
to the questionnaire in a mixed methods approach of data collection. 
Moreover, interviews are useful for specific research qualitative and 
interpretive objectives and questions that cannot be answered through 
quantitative sampling. Data and information from multiple sources (primary 
and secondary) were cross checked for validation and triangulation purposes. 
Primary data also included interviews (with politicians, policy makers, and 
disaster management officials) and the questionnaire sampling that 
administered in tsunami affected communities. Secondary data from official 
reports, Parliamentary debates and official statistics were collected from 
relevant public and governmental agencies such as the National Security 
Council, the Election Commission, the Statistics Department and the 
Meteorological Department. Table 1.2 gives the type of data, materials and 
data sources used. 
 
Authors such as  Yin (2011), Creswell (2013), and Baxter and  Jack (2008) 
have suggested defining boundaries on a case study in order to make it 
context specific and within a defined scope of study. Suggestions on how to 
define a case include: (a) by time and place; (b) by time and activity; and (c) 
by definition and context. I define the boundaries of this research as follows:
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Table 1.2: Data Source and Collection Methods 
Type of Data Materials Source/Respondents 
Primary Survey (Questionnaire) to get the 
satisfaction level of affected 
communities on government’s response 
and recovery programmes. Any issue 
pertaining tsunami recovery such as 
tsunami resettlement programme, 
monetary aid. Is it bias to any political 
preference of affected people? 
Local community in 4 tsunami 
affected coastal villages. 
Primary Interview Politician: 
1. Former Member of Parliaments 
and Penang State Assemblymen 
of Tsunami Affected areas in 
2004. 
2. Member of Parliaments and 
Penang State Assemblymen of 
2008 General Election Term. 
Policy Makers: 
1. Senior Officials of disaster 
management agencies. 
Secondary Hansard of Parliament and Penang 
State Assembly 
Parliament and Penang State 
offices. 
Secondary Official reports on Tsunami Drills Department of Meteorology 
Primary Post Mortem report of Community Based 
Disaster Risk Reduction Programme 
National Security Council 
Secondary Statistics of Demonstration by political 
parties and community based NGO’s in 
Penang 
National Security Council 
Primary General Election results of 2004 and 
2008 
Election Commission 
Secondary Population Statistics Department of Statistics 
Secondary Racial statement and sensitive issues 
manipulated by politicians in mass 
media (newspaper & blogs). 
Printed newspaper, Online 
newspaper, Blogs 
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1. Geographic Areas: 4 Coastal settlements severely hit by the 2004 
Indian Ocean Tsunami. 
2. Social Group: Coastal Communities in four settlements.  
3. Type of Evidence to be collected: experiences and perceptions 
regarding the 2004 tsunami in terms of reaction and feedback to the 
government’s response and recovery programmes. 
The rationale for selecting the four areas is straightforward:  these areas were 
the most severely hit in terms of loss of life and property damage by the 2004 
tsunami compared to other areas in Malaysia. 
Reliability and Validity of Recall Data 
My research partly uses recall or retrospective data, in particular data from 
interviews and close-ended questionnaire sampling of the case study areas. 
Limitations of recall data are interpretation and explanation of previous 
experience and phenomena are subjected to the memory of respondents that 
may lead to inaccuracy. Brenna et.al (1996) argue that it tend to “over-
reporting, typically attributed to ‘forward telescoping’, where respondents 
report events that occurred outside of the time period under consideration, 
thereby inflating the results”  (Brennan et.al., 1996, p. 1). Therefore, I impose 
triangulation methods in order to validate the interviews and sampling results 
as suggested by Brennan et.al. (1996) and Dex (1995). Dex argues:  
To establish whether recall data is valid or not, an independent 
record must be available. Interview responses on retrospective 
questions can then be compared with this record or some 
independent criteria. Independent records in studies of the 
validity of recall have come from Government administrative 
records, personnel, companies' and individuals' records (p. 61). 
Brennan et.al (1996) and Dex (1995) also proposes to use landmark or 
phenomenal events, cues or clues and design a simple sequential questions 
in order to remind respondents about the particular event of interest. These 
techniques “reduce telescoping, that is, substantially reduced inaccurate 
reports of the activities” (Brennan et al., 1996, p. 3). For my research, I use 
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government official documents and put landmark event (the 2004 tsunami) to 
validate and cross-checked the outcome of interviews and samplings. 
Figure 1.4 shows Tanjung Bungah and Batu Ferringhi located in the northeast 
of Penang Island and dominated by a squatters’ settlement along the beach, 
which exposed them to the tsunami, in which make them the most vulnerable 
communities as evidenced in 2004 tsunami. Teluk Bahang and Kuala Sungai 
Pinang are located in the northwest of the island and are populated by 
fishermen and farmers with their houses located inland, which spared them 
from the tsunami in terms of loss of life but they suffered the loss of income 
due to damage to their boats and fishing equipment. The detail locations of 
the case study areas are shown in Figure 1.5 (Tanjung Bungah), Figure 1.6 
(Batu Ferringhi), Figure 1.7 (Teluk Bahang) and Figure 1.8 (Kuala Sungai 
Pinang) respectively. The main economic activities of the villagers are fishing, 
farming, construction, and small scale trading. Geographically, the 
communities are located in the northeast and northwest of Penang Island, 
which is exposed to the threat of tsunami from the Andaman Sea and this 
vulnerability is critical. By the time of the fieldwork (12 July – 29 August 2014), 
all tsunami affected people in the four case study areas, whose houses were 
completely destroyed had been relocated to the new tsunami resettlement 
permanent housing area in Tanjung Bungah known as ‘Rumah Tsunami’. 
These houses accommodated 100 families, of which half (50) were chosen as 
respondents by random sampling. 
 
The ‘Rumah Tsunami’ is a housing complex with four blocks of apartment 
(three bedrooms, a kitchen and a living area), playground, a mosque and a 
multi-purpose hall. The demography of respondents was 24% male and 76% 
female; 78% Malays, 18% Indian and 4% Others (including Chinese); 8% (20-
30 years), 10% (31-40 years), 22% (41-50 years), 36% (51-60 years) and 
24% (61 years and above). In terms of education, 34% had completed 
primary school and 66% secondary school. With regards to occupation, 50% 
were not in paid employment (mostly housewives), 38% were employed in 
private companies; 10% in business, and 2% were government employees. 
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Figure 1.4: Case Study Areas: Tanjung Bungah, Batu Ferringhi, Teluk Bahang and Kuala Sungai Pinang of Penang 
State, Malaysia 
 
Source: Digital Globe, 2013 
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Figure 1.5: Case Study 1: Tanjung Bungah 
 
Source: Digital Globe, 2013 
Note: The squatters’ settlement located at the low level along the shoreline can be seen (in the red dotted line). Houses built 
up from zinc and plywood that made them fragile to tsunami wave as opposed to the housing areas that were properly built 
with concrete. 
 
The most affected areas in 
Tanjung Bungah 
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Figure 1.6: Case Study 2: Batu Ferringhi 
 
Source: Digital Globe, 2013 
Note: Batu Ferringhi dominated by squatters, restaurants, chalets, hotels and small scale tourism operators.  
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Figure1.7: Case Study 3: Teluk Bahang 
 
Source: Digital Globe, 2013 
Note: Teluk Bahang is populated by traditional Malay houses made up from wood and fisherman’s boats and jetty (the blue 
strip on top left). 
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Figure 1.8: Case Study 4: Kuala Sungai Pinang 
 
Source: Digital Globe, 2013 
Note: Houses in Kuala Sungai Pinang suffered little damage due to their inland location. However, tsunami wave ran up 
through Pinang River until 3Km inland that caused damage to fishing boats, jetty and paddy fields.   
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A  majority of respondents (54%) were in the low income group (RM9,601-
RM24,000 or £1,745 - £4,363 a year), 38% were  below poverty line (below 
RM9,600 or £1,745 a year), 6% were middle income (RM24,001- RM48,000 
or £1,745 - £8,727 a year), and only 2% were high income earners (above 
RM60,000 or £10,909 a year).  
 
Ethics 
Participants were identified through the database of coastal areas 
communities in Penang Island accessed from the National Security Council, 
State of Penang Office. I use the term ‘local people affected by tsunami’ 
instead of ‘victim’ to address the participant in order to avoid any traumatic 
connotations. Further, local people who lost family members during the 
tsunami were not interviewed. The sampling was undertaken from house to 
house through the medium of semi-structured questionnaires in seven weeks 
of fieldwork in four affected areas from 12th July to 28th August 2014.  
 
A consent form was handed to the participants to be signed before conducting 
any survey. The purpose of the project was explained to the participants and 
they were assured that their participation would remain anonymous. All 
information gathered during the sampling was accessed only by the 
researcher and was kept in a safe place. Data and information were coded 
and saved in the researcher’s laptop with password protected. The hard 
copies of questionnaires were destroyed. Information collected from 
individuals was undertaken with duly informed consent from the participating 
individuals and treated with confidence and was used for research purposes 
only.  The survey, interview, and research were conducted in line with the 
University of Sheffield’s ethical research policies and this research was 
approved under these procedures. 
Outline of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is divided into 6 chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction to the 
dissertation that consists of the research background, aim and objectives, 
research questions, research methodology, data collection methods, and case 
study approach. Chapter 2 discusses the concepts of disaster, risk, 
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vulnerability, resilience, transformative adaptation and conceptual framework 
that underpin this dissertation. Chapter 3 then explains the Malaysian disaster 
management structure and mechanism that include National Security 
Directive (NSC) No. 20, the government agencies’ response to the 2004 
tsunami, and applies it to the case study areas. Chapter 4 focuses on the 
local population’s feedback and reaction in the case study areas towards 
government’s response and recovery programmes; ‘Wang Ehsan’ (Monetary 
Aid), ‘Rumah Tsunami’ (Tsunami House) and Fisheries and Agricultural 
Assistance. Chapter 5 discusses indirect effects to politics in the case study 
areas, in which the ineffectiveness of government agencies’ response to 
tsunami indirectly influence the voting pattern of affected people in these 
communities. Chapter 6 explores the transformative adaptation to disaster 
management mechanism as a drastic improvement to overcome the response 
weaknesses and to accommodate the affected people’s feedback that 
consists of preparedness, tsunami early warning systems, tsunami drills and 
table top exercises, community based disaster risk reduction programmes, 
mitigation, embedding disaster mitigation in development planning, response, 
amendments to the NSC No. 20 and new standard operating procedures 
(SOP’s) for tsunami. It also discusses indirect effects to local politics in the 
case study areas. Chapter 7 summarises the findings, research claims and 
presents the dissertation’s conclusions and contributions. 
Conclusion 
The relationship between natural disasters and the transformative adaptation 
of a government’s structure in managing unexpected disasters such as 
tsunami is not fully or easily understood because of the dynamism of political 
and social conditions. Central to disasters is the fact that they are context 
specific, localised and subjected to influence from the affected population’s 
perceptions, in this case towards government’s ability to respond rapidly and 
provide shelters and basic needs and avoid ‘red-tape’. This research explores 
the consequences of the tsunami and to what extent it contributed to the 
government’s decision to transform the disaster management structure and 
mechanism. The main research question is centred on the effect of 2004 
tsunami that triggered transformation.  
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The proposition and hypothesis are based on the evidence from the 
secondary data that demonstrates there was a drastic and significant change 
of government’s disaster management procedures and structures. Therefore, 
in order to validate this claim, it is essential to conduct fieldwork in the most 
affected areas using the case study approach by applying the mix-methods 
approach captured by qualitative and quantitative data. Open-ended 
Interviews (qualitative) were conducted with six politicians (Members of 
Parliament and State Assemblymen in the case study areas), senior 
government officials and an NGO leader. Random sampling (quantitative) 
using a semi-structured questionnaire as a tool for capturing quantitative data 
from 50 respondents of affected areas. This research methodology is most 
appropriate for this study because it offers rigorousness through triangulation 
of qualitative and quantitative data, such as information from the 
questionnaires was cross checked with the interviews and official reports from 
relevant government agencies. The fieldwork was also suitable since the 
research about disaster, as suggested by the literature is context-specific, 
case-base and localise.  
In summary, this research contributes to the understanding of transformative 
change concepts and adaptation of government’s disaster management 
mechanism due to unprecedented natural disasters such as a tsunami. The 
next chapter is a literature review and conceptual framework which discusses 
the concept of disaster, risk, vulnerability, resilience and transformative 
change and adaptation. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 
Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is, first, on the literature’s definition of disaster; 
second, it explores key concepts underpinning disaster management (risk, 
vulnerability and resilience), and; finally, it examines transformative change 
and how it differs from incremental change.  
Any review of the natural disasters literature is complex due to the range of 
disciplines from the natural and social sciences that are involved, such as 
geography, geo-physics, geology, sociology, politics and economics. Natural 
disaster management can be viewed historically as well as through 
governance (law, policies and administrative procedures), the stakeholders 
involved, different approaches (top-down and bottom-up); phases of disaster 
(risk assessment, mitigation, response, recovery, and preparedness), and 
type or class of disaster (natural, or a result of human interference with the 
natural environment). This diversity poses a complex analytical problem. I 
propose to focus on addressing the response and recovery stages because 
the vulnerability of communities to disaster and the capabilities of government 
agencies in dealing with unexpected disaster can be best assessed during 
these stages. This is also the phase when local politics is likely to begin to 
manifest itself. I begin by defining a natural disaster. 
Defining a Natural Disaster 
There are three broad schools of thought with regards to natural disaster 
definition and classification; (i) natural phenomena (Bankoff, Frerks, & 
Hilhorst, ,2004; Quarantelli, 1986; UNISDR, 2009c). (ii) man-made (Shaluf, 
2007),and (iii) interaction between nature and human activities (Hooke, 2000; 
Picou, Marshall, & Gill, 2004; Shrivastava, 1994).  
 
Bankoff at.al., (2004) describe disasters as a natural phenomenon of the 
Earth that leads to harmful effects on populations. Examples of the most 
frequently occurring natural disasters are floods, earthquakes, tsunamis, 
volcanic eruptions, and tornadoes. However, UNISDR (2009c) separates 
natural hazard and disaster. Thus, natural hazards are prerequisites of 
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disasters, although they agree that both emerged from the natural process of 
the Earth. Hazard is defined as:  
A potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human 
activity that may cause the loss of life or injury, property 
damage, social and economic disruption or environmental 
degradation. Hazards can include latent conditions that may 
represent future threats and can have different origins: natural 
(geological, hydro meteorological and biological) or induced by 
human processes (environmental degradation and technological 
hazards) (UNISDR, 2009a, p. 17).  
 
Quarantelli (1986) claims that the term natural disasters was originally 
attributed to Acts of God in contrast to man-man disasters, events that are 
directly attributed to the acts of humans, intentionally or unintentionally 
(Shaluf, 2007). Examples include building collapse, Chemical, Biological, 
Radioactive and Nuclear (CBRN) incidents, industrial pollution, and acts of 
terrorism. However, current thinking indicates that the difference between 
natural and man-made disasters is increasingly difficult to distinguish due to 
the rapid encroachment into natural habitats by human activities for 
development purposes. Since the 1970’s researchers in the disaster field 
begin to widen the scope of studies by shifting the attention to the interaction 
of human and natural resources and the environment that produces disasters. 
 
This ‘disaster-state’ situation, as defined by Mitchelson (2011) is a physical 
and social situation of a disaster-affected community prior to the disaster 
striking. For example any community could be considered to be in a ‘disaster-
state’ if its population living in poor-structured buildings or houses built with 
materials that do not conform to building code standards, without proper 
urban planning layout and design (particularly in slum and squatters areas). 
Another example is a population constructing houses on hilly terraces without 
reinforcement, massive land cultivation and deforestation without good 
agricultural practices, and housing areas located in disaster-prone areas such 
as near riverbanks that usually overflow due to heavy rainfall. These 
conditions, if uncontrolled will cause a deterioration of the environment that 
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may contribute to the more frequent occurrence of natural disasters such as 
floods and landslides (Hooke, 2000; Picou et al., 2004; Shrivastava, 1994). 
Therefore, natural disasters have been seen as a ‘triggering agent’ 
accelerating ‘disaster-states’ into actual catastrophes (Mitchelson, 2011). 
 
According to Turner and Pidgeon (1997)  disasters are produced by the 
interaction of misplaced of energy and misinformation (Disaster = Energy + 
Misinformation). Natural disasters stem from geophysical sources of energy 
from the earth and atmosphere collided such as landslides, or energy 
discharge from meteorological, hydrological and biological source such as 
typhoon, flood and epidemics. Man-made disaster rooted in war, the collapse 
of man-made structures, explosions, or derived from chemical and biological 
sources. Hence, from the perspective of disaster affected peoples, disasters 
(natural and man-made) are disordered and undesired energy. From the 
insider’s perspective (individuals who have knowledge or access to the source 
of disasters), disaster occurrences maybe deliberately or unintentionally 
released due to human errors such as substandard maintenance of building 
structures and machines or failure to issue early warning of incoming 
disasters (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997).  
 
Based upon these arguments, Turner and Pidgeon (1997) classified natural 
disasters into four categories of natural phenomena:  
First, natural phenomena beneath the earth’s surface (such as 
earthquake, volcano eruptions and tsunami); second, natural 
phenomena of complex physical at the earth’s surface (such as 
landslide and avalanches); third, meteorological or hydrological 
phenomena (such as cyclones, typhoons and hurricane, 
tornadoes, floods, sea surge, and drought); and fourth, 
biological phenomena such as locust swarms, epidemics or 
communicable diseases. Man-made disaster are classified into 
two categories: first, caused by warfare; conventional and non-
conventional (nuclear, chemical and biological); second, caused 
by accidents, vehicular (planes, trains, ships and cars), collapse 
   
 
26 
 
of buildings and other structures, explosions, fire, biological and 
chemical including poisoning by pesticides and pollutions (p. 9).  
 
However, any effort to discriminate between natural and man-made disasters 
is challenging as the interaction between humans and the environment is 
extremely complex. Sociologists distinguish disaster from hazard, by virtue of 
its social effects on human life. Therefore, an earthquake or flood in areas 
without population is not a disaster (Tironi, Rodriguez-Giralt, & Guggenheim, 
2014).Bolin and Stanford (1998) argue that disaster has two paradigms: 
behavioural, and structural. They argue that the behavioural paradigm 
analyses social effects and reactions to disaster derived from ‘natural’ 
phenomena such as a typhoon or cyclone. The structural paradigm has a 
wider perspective on disaster through the lens of the affected communities’ 
traditional interaction with environment such as farming practices and 
deforestation. 
 
There are considerable debates among disaster researchers regarding the 
status of famine, epidemics and droughts (FED’s), as whether to categorise 
them as disasters or social problems. Quarantelli (1986) argues that famine, 
epidemics and droughts are not disasters because FEDs do not conform to 
the essence of natural disasters, which are unexpected, unpredicted, and 
sudden events, FEDs are therefore considered as a social problem. Dynes 
(2004) argues that famine, epidemics and droughts can be differentiated from 
a natural disaster in terms of location and rapidity.  
 
FEDs mainly occurred in African rural areas, conflicted areas and takes place 
gradually. Sen (1981) argues that famine is a social problem derived from the 
failure of a state to distribute food to affected populations rather than caused 
by low precipitation or the infertility of crops. I argue that drought is a natural 
disaster stemming out of hot temperatures and low precipitation that 
contribute to soil infertility, which is unsuitable for farming, hence shortages of 
food supply lead to famine. So, famine is a by-product of drought that triggers 
a social problem. However, I agree with Sen (1981) that the drought and 
famine can be attributed to political malfunction particularly in conflicted 
   
 
27 
 
African countries that made it impossible to implement effective agricultural 
programmes with systematic irrigation systems. Therefore, I argue that the 
famine is a man-made disaster because it is controllable and can be avoided 
if an effective and efficient government is in place to address the distributional 
problems associated with drought and famine problems. While, I argue that 
epidemics can be categorised as social and health problems due to the 
outbreak of disease because of natural disasters such as flood that triggered 
cholera and malaria or dengue. However an effective response to disease rest 
on effective and efficient government.  
 
This research is focused on the 2004 tsunami, which I define as a natural 
disaster because tsunami events are triggered by sub-sea earthquakes. In 
this case, the triggering agent is an earthquake (a natural cause) creating a 
‘disaster-state’ in the areas affected (the impact).Moreover,, if the natural 
disaster (tsunami) occurs in a region or country that is already afflicted by 
social conflict and political tension, or lacks effective government, the natural 
disaster may trigger man-made disasters such as ethnic and/or religious 
conflict or hostility towards the authorities that may lead to an extended and 
extensive humanitarian crisis. Even in the absence of such conflict, a natural 
disaster such as a tsunami can generate enormous political tensions if 
governments are perceived to have prepared inadequately or their response 
and recovery programmes are felt by affected populations to be ineffective. 
Disasters are therefore stress factors that can trigger transformative change 
and adaptation of government’s disaster management structures and 
mechanism. 
Risk, Vulnerability and Resilience 
I shall now discuss the concepts underpinning disaster management:  risk, 
vulnerability, and resilience. UNISDR defines risk as,  
the combination of the probability of an event and its negative 
consequences. The word “risk” has two distinctive 
connotations: in popular usage the emphasis is usually placed 
on the concept of chance or possibility, such as in “the risk of 
an accident”; whereas in technical settings the emphasis is 
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usually placed on the consequences, in terms of “potential 
losses” for some particular cause, place and period. It can be 
noted that people do not necessarily share the same 
perceptions of the significance and underlying causes of 
different risks (UNISDR, 2009a, p. 25). 
Beck argues that “…highly developed institutions of modern society; science, 
state, business and military attempt to anticipate what cannot be anticipated” 
(2006, p. 329). Beck differentiates risk and catastrophe arguing that “risk 
means the anticipation of catastrophe” (Beck, 2006, p. 332), giving the 
example of the invention of the CFC cooling agent that nobody anticipated 
would contribute to global warming. Beck (2007) argues that, “risk concerns 
the possibility of future occurrences, the moment risk become real such as 
terrorist attack or nuclear power plant explodes, risk become catastrophes (p. 
9). I offer a different argument regarding Beck’s statement, “we are also trying 
to anticipate and prevent risks whose existence has not been proven” (Beck, 
2006, p. 333), because some risks have been proven or, in the case of 
disaster risk, some anticipated hazards have become disasters. We can 
anticipate tsunamis to some extent by developing sub-ocean early-warning 
systems that detects the earthquake but the systems cannot make the correct 
prediction because not all earthquakes trigger a tsunami, so the risk remains 
and has to be mitigated and resilience improved. While a specific event may 
not be expected, the risk can be understood, thus the likelihood of it 
happening at some point can be anticipated at least to some degree. Also, the 
rapid travel time of a tsunami is a factor that limits the early warning of 
tsunami. As for the 2004 tsunami, it was unexpected and so could not have 
been anticipated so this shifts the focus to how the unexpected is handled by 
public authorities after it happens.  
Beck (2007) and Agamben (2005) argue that the world of risk is changing 
because of the prediction of calamity, such as the war on terror led to the 
modification of civil aviation that applies strict regulation such as tight security 
inspections at airports and prior to departure as preventive measures to 
counter-terrorist plots. The passengers are forced to accept this new security 
situation at the expense of their freedom. In my case study, I argue that the 
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Malaysia Government uses the tsunami threat as the reason to introduce 
National Disaster Management Bill in 2010 that limited the freedom of its 
citizens. The debate on the Bill (now an Act) is ongoing  because of the strong 
protest and objections from the opposition parties and human rights NGO’s 
that claim the Bill abuses civil liberty since it may allow disaster management 
agencies to take pre-emptive measures such as forcibly evacuating 
vulnerable people . 
Risk is a socially constructed phenomenon where different communities 
define risks differently according to their socio-cultural background (Beck, 
Adam, & Van Loon, 2000). Beck (1999, p. 135) argues that “it is cultural 
perception and definition that constitute risk” and so communities who live 
with risk find that risk shapes their knowledge, based on previous experiences 
of dealing with it. For the purpose of my research, the real risk is not the 
tsunami but the state of disaster preparedness by agencies concern that a 
disaster could become a serious crisis if triggered by an unexpected incident 
such as a tsunami. Therefore, the risk is the readiness of the disaster 
management agencies and vulnerable communities in the wake of a disasters 
such as a tsunami, and efforts by the authorities to predict a tsunami.  
Many studies of post disaster communities found that society does not always 
become conflictual, but adapts to the new situation as argues by Carr (1932) 
and supported by Tironi et.al., (2014) who propose the communities become 
innovative, involving and cooperate well together. Solnit (2010) argues that 
disaster affected people became altruistic immediately after disaster struck by 
helping each other. She introduces the ‘grass roots democracy’ concept 
during a disaster combine in the ‘altruistic society’ and ‘ephemeral 
government (a concept introduced by Taylor et.al, 1970) and civil society (in 
particular NGOs) in order to describe the sudden emergence of informal 
structures that voluntarily govern and manage the disaster affected 
communities promoting their resilience. This ‘utopian’ view of transitional 
structures are parallel to formal government’s mechanism and challenge the 
political institutions and disaster management agencies, with less 
bureaucracy, acting as decision-making institutions such as demonstrated 
during the Hurricane Katrina (2005 ) in the US (Solnit, 2010). Barten (1969) 
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defines ‘altruistic society’ as a society that are unselfishly helping and look 
after each other’s welfare (in Solnit, 2010). Taylor et.al (1970) argue that this 
condition of the affected provides a platform for the appearance of ‘ephemeral 
government’, as opposed to the formal government mechanism as they 
discovered during tornado in Topeka, Kansas in June 1966, where leaders of 
civic societies worked together in response and recovery plans. This  
ephemeral government dissolved after the disaster subsided and as the 
situation returned gradually back to normal with traditional political institutions 
and government structures undertaking long term planning that required 
highly trained disaster management and rehabilitation agencies   (Hannigan, 
2012). However, I argue that Solnit’s claims cannot be generalised because 
my research shows that ethnic relations played a significant role in the 
aftermath of disasters, in which 57% stated that they helped neighbours 
based on ethnic preference during the 2004 tsunami. Therefore, I argue that 
the socio-political arrangements of a disaster-affected community depends on 
factors such as the historical background of relationships among different 
ethnic groups, social class inequality, and a multicultural society. 
These considerations are also complicated by the response of government. 
The nature of the 2004 tsunami as an unexpected event imposed enormous 
stress on government, which was found wanting by the affected population 
because its policies were not suited to handling an unforeseen event and the 
result was radical transformative change as the government was perceived to 
have failed to deliver an effective response, or relief and recovery 
programmes. Therefore, the government introduced transformative adaptation 
in order to streamline the weaknesses during the tsunami response and to 
take into account affected population’s grievance, dissatisfaction and 
frustration and deal with a potentially serious political crisis. 
Vulnerability 
UNISDR defines vulnerability as “the characteristics and circumstances of a 
community, system or asset that make it susceptible to the damaging effects 
of a hazard.” (2009c, p. 30). O'Keefe and Westgate (1977) were among the 
first to identify the significance of vulnerability as a product of the interplay 
between a natural disaster and  communities that leads to the loss of lives 
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and damage to physical structures and economic activities. The level of 
vulnerability in communities is determined by many factors, such as their 
physical, social, political and economic characteristics, as well as improperly 
designed and poorly constructed houses, lack of government disaster risk 
reduction programmes, limited access to disaster early warning information, 
and lack of awareness (Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis, 1994; Bogardi et al., 2005; 
UNISDR, 2009c). As Hannigan (2012) provides example of the lower income 
group of Nicaraguans that built their houses on improperly developed 
mountainous slopes that exposed them to the danger of floods and 
earthquakes. 
This argument differs from technical perspectives that define vulnerability from 
a natural forces point of view. I define vulnerable communities as communities 
that are located in disaster-prone areas and which are pluralistic in nature 
(multi-ethnic and/or multi-religion), are politically divided; and where disaster 
management agencies are not well prepared to respond effectively. These 
communities are prone to social and political tensions that may escalate into 
conflict under the impact of a natural disaster. The situation can worsen in the 
wake of disaster if the government response is ineffective or perceived to be 
based on racial preferences or practices nepotism, cronyism, and lack of 
transparency and accountability. As we shall see, this type of ‘disaster 
response mechanism’ and ‘social’ vulnerability is central to the transformative 
change and adaptation explored in this research. 
Resilience 
Concepts of sustainable and resilient communities, resilient livelihoods and 
building community resilience became prominent in disaster studies after the 
2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction (WCDR) in Kobe, Japan 
(Manyena, 2006). Resilience can be defined as “the ability of a system, 
community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to 
and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, 
including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic 
structures and functions” (UNISDR, 2009b, p. 24).  
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Kaplan (2005) categories resilience into, first, outcome oriented, and second, 
process oriented. Outcome-oriented resilience activities depend on existing 
bureuacracy that seek to  mantain status quo and produce reactive 
contermeasures. Vickers and Kouzmin (2001) argue that process-oriented 
outcome resilience acts  as a ‘shock absorber,’ or buffer, that minimises the 
negative outcomes. They argue that adaptation is part of disaster mitigation 
strategy, such as Zambezi Valley’s communities of Zimbabwe cultivating 
‘nzembwe’, a drought-resistant crop to replace maize as response to a long 
dry season. Manyena (2006) proposes that resilience and vulnerability are 
opposite ends of a continuum, where the nearest distance from the vulnerable 
point demonstrates more vulnerable and vice versa. O’Keefe et.al., (2015) 
argue that resilience is the ability of any community to quickly recover and 
absorb stress with minimum assistance from outside, by adapting and 
adjusting its culture, knowledge and practices.  
 
For the purpose of the dissertation, I define resilience as a feature of disaster 
knowledgeable and close-knit communities that have an ability to respond 
using their own resources immediately during and after disaster (such as food 
supplies and clean drinking water) and enjoy a good rapport with government 
agencies. Resilience is central to these communities’ relationship with political 
and governmental authority. One of the concerns of this dissertation is 
exploring how resilience could be used and improved in the aftermath of the 
tsunami through transformative adaptation. I argue that a homogenous 
society is likely to be more resilient than a heterogeneous society due to the 
former possessing a basic common understanding. In the absence of these 
common understandings, greater reliance will be placed on government and 
public authorities to ensure resilience but these may be perceived by different 
sections of the community to be biased against, or in favour of, some groups. 
These perceptions mean that a natural disaster can trigger serious conflict 
between communities and between communities and the public authorities. 
Government attempts to improve resilience, therefore, address not only the 
humanitarian consequences of the disaster but also seek to avoid any repeat 
of the disaster’s political effects. It is clear that there is a shift away from 
looking at the cause of disasters as ‘natural’ forces to seeing disasters as a 
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complicated and complex interplay of human activities and the environment. I 
propose that whether disaster follows hazard (or vice versa), is only a matter 
of semantics, the consequences are still largely dependent on its scale and 
magnitude as well as how vulnerable or resilient of communities are to 
disaster. The next section examines the concept of transformative change 
and adaptation. 
 
Transformative Change and Adaptation 
Pelling (2010) proposes terms of “resilience (maintaining the status quo), 
transition (incremental change) and transformation (radical change)” to 
differentiate the process of changes in disaster-prone society, in which “no 
one pathway necessarily leads to ‘progressive’ or more equitable and efficient 
outcomes than the others. The evaluation of pathways and subsequent 
outcomes will be a function of context and the viewpoint of individual actors” 
(Pelling, 2010, p. 10).  
Smit and Wandel (2006) and Smit et.al., (2000) differentiate between 
unplanned  and planned adaptation (such as proper planning by the 
government or society). Smith et al. (2000) also argue that adaptation can be 
categorised “according to the form of action (technological, behavioural, 
financial, institutional or informational), the actor of interest (individual, 
collection), the scale of the actor (local, national, international) and social 
sector (government, civil society, private sector); and the costs and ease of 
implementation” (p. 225). 
Q.E.D Foundation argue that there are three type of changes: Traditional, 
Transitional, and Transformational. “Traditional change is to improve existing 
practices and maintain the status quo, Transitional change focuses on change 
in the current practices to improve outcomes with tangential impact on status 
quo, while Transformational change aims to change both practices and 
outcomes, thus realigning the status quo” (Q.E.D Foundation, 2014, para 2). 
Thus transformative change can be differentiated from traditional change, in 
which the transformative change is a drastic and radical counter measures in 
order to overcome unexpected problems (as opposed to the traditional 
change that incrementally take place). 
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While Transformative adaptation is when the measures taken to respond to 
any disaster or climate change push the boundaries of the existing practices 
and transcend beyond the gradual adaptation (Dow et al., 2013). Revi et al. 
(2014) argue that transformative adaptation is either forced or chosen. Forced 
adaptation, such as distress migration triggered by disasters while an 
example of chosen adaptation is the relocation of vulnerable communities that 
are exposed to the rising sea level. 
Pelling (2010, p. 114) argues that; 
transformative adaptation is to shift existing systems (and their 
component structures, institutions and actor positions) onto 
alternative development pathways, even before the limits of 
existing adaptation choices are met. This positioning of 
transformation pushes decision makers and those assessing 
adaptive capacity and action to extend their concerns from the 
proximate causes of risk (e.g., dwelling quality, livelihood 
structure or demographic characteristics) to its structural or root 
causes (e.g., social, cultural and economic relationships, power 
hierarchies). 
 
IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) (2014) offers three narratives of 
transformation: “(1) transformation inciting foundational change by escalating 
of adaptation through technical interference; (2) transformation is possible 
when the gradual adaptation extended its boundary; (3) transformation 
explores root cause of development failures, such as increasing of 
greenhouse effects and how to address it” (Pelling, 2010, p. 115). 
Transformative adaptation requires cooperation and mutual understanding 
from each parties’ concern to be succeeded. For example, dispute and 
conflict of interest between law makers and local politicians hinder the 
process of legislation review in Quintana Roo, Mexico in an effort to protect 
the mangrove swamp as the natural coastal defence instead of coastal 
tourism development at the expense of mangroves (Pelling, 2010).  
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It is crucial to note that transformational adaptation challenge the  standard 
operating procedures (SOP’s) of an organisation, that may lead to unexpected 
and undesired outcomes (Pelling, 2010). Folke et al. (2010) discuss the 
integration of resilience, adaptability, and transformability across multiple 
scales. Resilience is the ability of a system to incrementally adapt within its 
limit. As part of resilience, adaptability is the ability to make adjustments in 
responding to changes within the current limit. Transformability is the ability to 
move into new trajectories. A crisis or disaster provides a window of 
opportunity for transformative adaptation as, for example, in the case of 
Hurricane Sandy (2012). Previously, the New York Metropolitan Region 
applied incremental adaptation to minimise interventions (and disruptions) of 
existing systems. However, Hurricane Sandy shows that transformative 
adaptation is required to address the threat of rising of sea levels as projected 
by the NPCC (Rosenzweig & Solecki, 2014).  
 Transformative change occurs when adaptation reached beyond its limits. 
Dow et al (2013) argue that the adaptation can be categorised into three types 
according to its risk level: acceptable risk, tolerable risk and intolerable risk. If 
the risk is acceptable, the community or organisation will adjust to current 
practices within the limits. If the risk is tolerable, adaptation will take place 
along the limits. However, if the risk is intolerable, the community or 
organisation will make fundamental changes in current practices, or undertake 
transformative change. Dow et al (2013) provide the example of farmers 
facing drought. First, the farmers will try to adapt by providing irrigation. 
However if this fails, the farmers may abandon the farm and change to other 
alternative activities for a living. For my research, the unprecedented 2004 
Indian Ocean Tsunami can be seen as a trigger for transformative adaptation. 
The tsunami clearly challenged the existing government agencies’ disaster 
management mechanisms, which though extensive were designed for 
monsoon floods, and pushed the adaptiveness  of current SOPs to their limits, 
I argue that the government’s disaster management agencies led by National 
Security Council took counter-measures in addressing the ‘tolerable risk’ 
posed by a tsunami by implementing transformative adaptation through 
various programmes, such as the national tsunami early warning systems, 
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community based disaster risk reduction, amending the NSC Directive No. 20, 
formulated  new standard operating procedures (SOP’s) for tsunami, and, in 
the long term, set up a new Disaster Management Act (2015) and National 
Disaster Management Agency (NADMA) (2015). Therefore, I conclude that 
the tsunami triggered the transformative adaptation of the government’s 
mechanism to cater for new challenge. 
Conclusion 
The current literature suggests that discriminating between natural and man-
made disasters becomes difficult due to the complex interaction and 
encroachment of human activities that may induce disasters. Conversely, 
natural disasters may produce man-made disasters, for example earthquakes 
may trigger extensive structural collapse. In my research into the 2004 
tsunami, the disaster was a compound of the natural and the man-made. 
Thus, an earthquake triggers a tsunami (natural) and the tsunami destroys 
weak-structured buildings and produces a significant loss of life (man-made).  
The impact of a disaster on a local community depends on their vulnerability 
and the resilience factors that determine level of risk. For my research, risk is 
associated with several interrelated factors, for example, low risk community 
(low vulnerability and high resilience) is defined as a community that has an  
efficient and effective response mechanisms, conformity to disaster-resistant 
building standard, regular maintenance of structures and equipment, combine 
with indirect factors such as good governance (in particular, high level of 
integrity and accountability). When disaster strikes, it challenges the regime’s 
effectiveness and response mechanisms; in particular, can the ruling party 
mobilise and deploy rapid and swift response and rehabilitation to the affected 
community? In sum, resilience depends on the quality of the public authorities 
and the adaptiveness of the affected communities. 
However, the question remains: Do natural disasters, such as droughts, 
earthquakes, floods, and storms, trigger transformative change and 
adaptation? This study engages with this question. It revisits an on-going 
debate over the nature of association between disasters and their after effects 
on politics, and in particular on the effectiveness of the government’s disaster 
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response structure and mechanism. The crucial factor is the pre-existing 
specific conditions, including the resilience of a state’s institutions to crisis. 
Once the characteristics of a state’s socio-political environment is taken into 
account, the effect of disasters weakens or disappears completely suggesting 
that natural disasters become catalysts of change only in  states, which are 
already in a ‘vulnerable state’. 
Disasters create enormous social tensions and place stress on government 
and potentially can change the socio-political situation of an affected country if 
the government has been perceived not to swiftly respond to, and decisively 
manage, its aftermath. The consequences could be magnified if the disaster 
occurs in a country already afflicted by a long standing social tension, 
Disasters are therefore stress factors and may trigger transformative change.  
The interplay between natural disasters, politics and a government’s disaster 
management mechanisms, however, are not well studied. Thus, this research 
explores the interaction of a natural disaster and the socio-political condition 
of affected communities that may accelerate transformative adjustment of the 
government’s disaster management.  In this research, the real risk is not the 
event itself but the ‘state of disaster preparedness’ that could become part of 
a serious crisis if triggered by an unexpected event. Therefore, the 2004 
tsunami could be seen as a catalyst that strikes vulnerable communities in a 
‘disaster state’, located in disaster-prone areas and which are pluralistic and 
socio-politically divided, and where government is not well prepared.  
Communities are vulnerable to turmoil that may turn to profound political 
conflict under the impact of a natural disaster. The situation can worsen if the 
government response is perceived to be acting on racial preferences or in 
favour of some groups. A homogenous society is potentially more resilient 
than a heterogeneous, so a natural disaster can trigger serious conflict 
between communities and between communities and the public authorities.  
Next Chapter explores Disaster Management Mechanism in Malaysia.
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Chapter 3: Disaster Management Mechanism in Malaysia 
Introduction  
This chapter explores in detail the disaster management structures and 
mechanisms in Malaysia and applies the concepts of risk, resilience, and 
vulnerability in the wake of tsunami, into the case study areas in Penang, 
Malaysia. 
Disaster management in Malaysia is under the purview of the National 
Security Council (NSC) chaired by the Prime Minister. This chapter outlines 
the NSC’s creation, purposes, strengths and weaknesses in managing 
disaster response and recovery as it is the main coordinating agency. The 
NSC was established in 1971 as a successor to the then National Action 
Council (Majlis Gerakan Negara, or MAGERAN). MAGERAN was set up to 
manage the consequences of the 1969 civil unrest that stemmed from ethnic 
riots between the Malays and the Chinese. These followed the p the 1969 
General Election, in which the Chinese dominated opposition parties 
(Democratic Action Party-DAP, and Malaysian People Action Party/Parti 
Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia-GERAKAN) won a majority of the urban seats and 
formed up a new state government for the first time since independence 
(1957) in Penang, Selangor and Kuala Lumpur.  
However, the main function of NSC shifted thereafter  to national security, 
while disaster matters is managed by the local government until the shocking 
case of the high rise Highland Tower condominium building collapse in 1997, 
where the Federal Government  intervened in the response and recovery 
process due to a shortage of resources in  local government The Federal 
Government realised the need for central agency to consolidate and 
coordinate the resources and expertise of the various agencies. The Federal 
Government decided to expand the NSC’s functions to include disaster 
management by forming a   Disaster Management Division. In the same year 
(1997) the NSC formulated NSC Directive No. 20 in 1997, an executive order 
intended to coordinate the various agencies concern in managing disaster. I 
shall now discuss NSC No. 20 in detail. 
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National Security Council (NSC) Directive No. 20  
The government’s basic ‘top-down’ structure and mechanisms in terms of the 
roles and responsibilities of Federal and State’s agencies in dealing with 
natural disasters were constituted in National Security Council (NSC) 
Directive No. 20 of 1997 that sought to minimise the impact of a disaster after 
its occurrence on people and property.   NSC Directive No. 20 was formulated 
following the collapse of the Highland Towers in 1993. Prior to the Highland 
Tower tragedy, there were no clear and comprehensive guidelines, or 
standard operating procedures (SOP’s), for managing disaster. After the 
incident, government realised that a complete disaster preparedness and 
response mechanism should be formulated. Subsequently, NSC Directive No. 
18: (Establishment of Special Search and Rescue Teams), and NSC Directive 
No. 20: (Disaster Management Mechanism) were approved. Both were 
regulated by executive power of the Prime Minister as the Chairman of 
National Security Council in May 11, 1997.2 Directive No. 20 stated that the 
NSC was responsible for coordinating the response and recovery 
programmes and all related activities (Abdullah et al., 2005). However, prior to 
the 2004 tsunami, NSC Directive No.20 did not mention tsunamis and so 
tsunami SOP’s were could not be developed. Thus, I argue that a great deal 
of disaster planning is reactive and as a response to a disaster. 
Disaster management in Malaysia is generally a ‘bottom-up’, decentralised 
approach, because disasters are usually highly localised and so are better 
handled at local level, but are coordinated by the National Security Council 
(NSC) District office through the District Disaster Management Committee, 
chaired by a District Officer. When disasters strike, and if the district has a 
shortage of capability and capacity in term of assets, human resource and 
financial, then the State and Federal governments will provide assistance. 
However, if the disaster’s effects are spread over, or involves, two or more 
districts, the NSC State office takes over and activates the State Disaster 
Management Committee, chaired by State Secretary and with heads of 
                                                          
2 Interview with the former Deputy Secretary of National Security Council, Che Moin Umar on 7th 
August 2014. 
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relevant agencies at state level as members of the committee. Where a 
disaster involved two or more states, the NSC federal headquarters in 
Putrajaya will take over, and the Deputy Prime Minister will chair the National 
Disaster Management Committee.   
l The procedure for disaster management at state level is for, for example, the 
NSC Penang office, with direction and assistance from NSC Headquarters in 
Putrajaya, to immediately set up a State Disaster Committee and activates 
Level 2 (State Level, as the disaster involves two or more districts) of the 
disaster response mechanism, according to procedures in NSC Directive No. 
20 (Figure 3.1). Relevant government agencies such as Police, Fire and 
Rescue, the Welfare Department, the Health Department, the Public Works 
Department, Civil Defence, and the Marine Police are called to meetings to 
conduct and coordinate search and rescue efforts. As stated in NSC Directive 
No.20, each agency has specific roles and responsibilities during disaster 
management episodes. For example, as shown in Figure 3.2, the Police role 
is to ensure public order and security and smooth traffic flows and ensure 
access for first responders (such as ambulances and fire brigades), Fire and 
Rescue leads the search and rescue activities with the assistance of Civil 
Defence, Marine Police and NGO’s, such as Red Crescent and St. John’s, the 
Welfare Department responsibility is to provide temporary shelter, drinkable 
water and food to the affected people (National Security Council, 2012).3 
NSC Directive No. 20 has been reviewed two times (the latest was in 2012) to 
take into account the dynamism and complex nature of disasters, which 
includes new types of disaster such as tsunamis. Furthermore, natural 
disasters involved many different stakeholders, such as NGO’s, private 
companies and political parties that required total disaster risk management 
strategies. Government realised the importance of engaging vulnerable 
populations in disaster-prone areas in order to empower them to be more 
prepared and resilient, through the implementation of Community Based 
Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDDR). Government also subscribed to current 
                                                          
3 Interview with Principle Assistant Secretary of Disaster Management Division of NSC Putrajaya on 5th 
August 2014. 
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Figure 3.1: Structure of Disaster Management in Malaysia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from NSC Directive No. 20 (2012) 
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Figure 3.2: Command and Control System during Disaster Occurrences 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from NSC Directive No. 20 (2012) 
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changes in policies at local, regional and international levels, such as 
AADMER and the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005 – 2015 (HFA). Directive 
No. 20 outlines the policy and processes on disaster and relief management 
by establishing a management mechanism in the pre-, during and post 
disaster periods; and determining roles and responsibilities of various 
agencies involved in disaster management (see Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2).  
Directive No. 20 defined disaster as;  
“an event that constitute a serious disruption of the functioning of 
a community or national affairs involving widespread human, 
material, economy or environmental losses and impacts which 
exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope 
using its own resources and requires extensive mobilization of 
resources” (National Security Council, 2012, p. 2).  
 
Disaster Risk Reduction means “the concept and practice of reducing 
disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the 
causal factors of disasters, including reduced exposure to hazards, 
lessened vulnerability of people and property, sustainable management 
of land and the environment and improved preparedness of individuals, 
community and agencies to face disasters” (National Security Council, 
2012, p. 2). Since the 2004 tsunami, the NSC has coordinated various 
workshops and seminars in order to review NSC Directive No. 20 and to 
include response and recovery structures and processes for 
earthquakes and tsunamis. Two new standard operating procedures 
(SOP’s) were formulated specifically for tsunamis and earthquakes (will 
be discussed in details in Chapter 5). 
 
However, at the time of the 2004 tsunami, the ‘bottom-up’ approach 
dominated because of the absence of any early warning of, or experience 
with, tsunamsi. For example, in 2004 the Balik Pulau District Fire and Rescue 
Station in Penang received an anonymous distress call from Pasir Panjang 
between 1.30pm to 2.00pm, followed by several other calls from various 
locations in Penang’s coastal villagers concerning the tsunami. The officer in 
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charge at Balik Pulau District Fire and Rescue Station informed Penang State 
Fire and Rescue office but there was no effective response because they had 
no plan for such an event.  According to my sample of respondents affected 
by the tsunami in Batu Ferringhi, Tanjung Bungah, Teluk Bahang and Kuala 
Sungai Pinang, 50% described the responders’ agencies as slow and arriving 
late (Figure 3.3). In a similar vein, my interviews with the Secretary of NSC 
(he was the Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister in 2004) and the then Deputy 
Secretary NSC (he was then Under Secretary Disaster Management Division 
during the 2004 tsunami incident) on 7th August 2014 confirmed the late 
response of government agencies because: first, many civil servants were 
away on year-end holidays; second, the tsunami was an unanticipated 
incident because the agencies concerned perceived it as ‘normal’ earthquake; 
third, the disaster management agencies, including the first responders 
(police, fire department, civil defence and ambulance services) did not have 
any experience dealing with tsunamis; and, fourth, there was no early warning 
system .  
The Tsunami 
The tsunami could be considered as a ‘black swan’ incident because it was 
unforeseen and unpredictable. The black swan theory was introduced by 
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, and is a metaphor of ‘surprise’ event that has 
significant and major impact.  It stems from the  proposition  that  holds  all 
swans are white and so black swan do not exist until the unforeseen black 
swan was discovered found in Australia (Taleb, 2007). Taleb uses the black 
swan analogy to explain unpredictable and unprecedented events that have a 
transformative effect  and to show that one single observation can challenge 
and invalidate an hitherto widely accepted generalisation (Taleb, 2007). In the 
case of 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the impact would be less devastating if 
the earthquake and tsunami had  the early warning systems been built and 
the affected areas were not highly urbanised and populated. The key point is 
that communities had no prior experience of this type of event. Malaysia is
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Figure 3.3: Perception on Government’s Response to Tsunami 
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located on a stable tectonic plate and flanked by neighboring counties 
(Indonesia and The Philippines) that act as natural buffers to tsunamis despite 
frequent sub-ocean tremors. Although tremors from earthquakes in Indonesia 
were experienced by the Penang population nobody expected the tsunami 
because nothing like it had happened previously. However, this most 
unexpected event radically changed Malaysian disaster management 
landscape. 
 
The tsunami was triggered by a magnitude 9.3 earthquake at 0:59 GMT 
(08.59 Malaysian time), with its epicenter about 160 km from Banda Aceh and 
900 km southwest of Penang (Horton et al., 2008). The most devastated area 
in Malaysia was Penang. The State of Penang is composed of two regions: 
Penang Island (293 square kilometers) and Seberang Prai (753 square 
kilometers) on the mainland of Peninsular Malaysia. Penang Island is the 
most urbanised (80.9%), with a high population density (1,537 people per 
square kilometre) and is a tourist island. Penang’s population in 2012 is 
estimated 1,611,100 with 41.3% Malays and Bumiputra (‘son of the soil’, or: 
indigenous people), 42.1% Chinese, 10% Indians, and 0.2% other 
(Department of Statistics, 2010).The northern coast of Penang is a significant 
tourism belt with sandy beaches, international hotels, restaurants, shops and 
local tourism service providers with Tanjung Bungah as the centre of tourism. 
Traditional Malay villages scattered around Tanjung Bungah along the north-
south coast line are without protection from coastal defense systems, hence 
the villagers were fully exposed to the tsunami and became  the most affected 
communities of 2004 Tsunami (Horton et al., 2008). 
 
The tsunami was preceded by abnormal low tide and then by a two to three 
meter high wave. These near shore waves raised  river levels by up to 2 
meters above the banks confining villagers within their houses (Abdullah, Tan, 
& Ghazali, 2005). Penang's tsunami was captured in amateur videos, for 
example, as shown in documentaries aired by U.K Television on Channel 4 
such as ‘Tsunami: Ten Years On’ (Tiley, 2014), ‘Tsunami Caught on Camera’ 
(Sutherland, 2009), ‘Japan Tsunami: How it Happened’ (Nicholson, 2011), 
Tsunami: The Aftermath’ (Nalluri, 2006) and ‘The Impossible’ (Bayona, 2012). 
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As in other places hit by the 2004 Tsunami (Aceh, Indonesia; Galle, Sri 
Lanka; Tamil Nadu, India, and Phuket, Thailand) there were reports of  
unusual behaviors  by animals, the dramatic receding of seawater, which was 
compared to the sound of ‘jet engines’(Dengler & Preuss, 2003; Dudley & 
Lee, 1998; Tibballs, 2005). Initially, many ran to the beach out of curiosity to 
see the unusual phenomenon of the first wave of tsunami without knowing of 
the incoming devastating second wave. This was corroborated by interviews 
with Secretary of National Security Council, Mohamed Thajudeen Abdul 
Wahab and former Deputy Secretary of National Security Council, Che Moin 
Umar  (interviews conducted on 7th August 2014), who claimed that the 
problem was that the public had never heard about the  ‘tsunami’, and 
referred to it as ‘high and big wave’. Unfortunately, many who went to the 
beach out of curiosity were then washed away by the tsunami. In Penang, the 
second wave extended up to maximum of 1.5 km of the seabed at Pulau 
Betong (Horton, 2005). 
A second wave travelled from the northeast of Penang at 2.04PM and 
accounted for the extensive damage (Figure 3.4).  It destroyed the jetties of 
the fishermen in Tanjung Tokong with fishing boats thrown 300m from 
seashore, smashed 1 meter high concrete road dividers at Gurney Drive, 
swept away villagers’ houses at Tanjung Bungah, and caused serious coastal 
flooding that wiped out paddy fields up to 1 km inland (Abdullah et al., 2005; 
Colbourne, 2005; Horton et al., 2008; Krishnaswamy, Subramaniam, Indran, 
& Low, 2012). Panic became   apparent in the hardest  hit   areas  in   Penang  
as  stated  by  my respondents (60% stated panic and a chaotic situation 
existed and 20% stated individuals were only looking after him/herself) during 
the fieldwork in Tanjung Bungah, Batu Ferringhi, Teluk Bahang and Kuala 
Sungai Pinang (Figure 3.5). The tsunami accounted for RM100 million 
(approximately £550 million) in losses, claimed 68 lives, 6 missing, and 
affected 8,292 people  in Malaysia  (Table 3.1) (Saw, 2012). In Penang, there 
were 52 deaths, 5 missing, 206 injured, 521 houses and 1,430 boats were 
destroyed (Table 3.2) 
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Figure 3.4: Example of Devastated Impact of Tsunami in Batu Ferringhi and Tanjung Bungah, Penang 
 
Source: Adapted from Saw (2012). 
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Figure 3.5: Reasons of No Coordinated Efforts during Tsunami 
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Table 3.2: Tsunami Statistics for Penang 
Overview 
Deaths Missing Injured Damage 
52 5 205 
521 houses  
1430 boats 
Deaths by district 
District Sites of casualities Deaths 
Northeast Batu  Ferringhi and Tanjung Tokong 23 
Soutwest Teluk Bahang and Pulau Betong 27 
Seberang Prai (Central) Bukit Mertajam Hospital 0 
Seberang Prai (North) 
Jalan Padang Benggali and Teluk Air 
Tawar 2 
Total                                                                                                                       52 
Source: Adapted from Horton et.al (2008) 
 
Table 3.1: Tsunami Statistics for Malaysia 
Deaths 68 people 
Missing 6 people 
Affected people 8,292 people 
Property Damages (approximately) RM100 million 
Source: Adapted from Saw (2012) 
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(Horton et al., 2008). In total 2949 people were evacuated to various 
emergency shelters that included nine village halls, six schools and one fire 
station (National Security Council Penang Office, 2005). The state’s efforts 
were focused on response, which is not surprising as this was an unexpected 
event. Most of the dead were fishermen at Tanjong Tokong, picnickers at the 
Pasir Panjang and Miami beaches, and villagers in the Tanjung Bungah 
areas. The local picnickers were killed by tsunami because they did not run to 
higher ground immediately after the first wave but stood watching out of 
curiosity, whereas international tourists on the nearby hotel beaches received 
an early warning from hotel personnel who received news of tsunami from 
their counterparts in Langkawi where the second wave struck one hour before 
it arrived in Penang (Table 3.3) (Abdullah et al., 2005; Horton, 2005).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Table 3.3: Tsunami Arriving Time 
Location Tsunami arriving time 
Langkawi, Kedah 3 hour 
BalikPulau, Penang 4 hour 
Batu Ferringhi, Penang 4 hour 24 minute 
Kuala Kedah, Kedah 4 hour 30 minute 
Gurney Drive, Penang 4 hour 30 minute 
Bagan Datok, Perak 5 hour 30 minute 
Sabak Bernam, Selangor 6 hour 
Source: Adapted from Saw (2012) 
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Many local people had no prior knowledge on tsunami and its dangers as 
illustrated by my research sample, 98% of them never heard of tsunami 
(Figure 3.6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The next section discusses the government responses, divided into short term 
(within 3 months after the tsunami) that focus on immediate rescue and relief, 
 
Figure 3.6: Prior Knowledge on Tsunami 
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and long term (more than 12 months) on recovery and rehabilitation (Yasin, 
2009). 
Short Term Government Responses 
This section examines Malaysian experience in dealing with the tsunami’s 
immediate effects. How did the government and local communities respond? 
This will be explored by comparing a 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' perspective to 
disaster response. The 2004 Tsunami generated major new challenges for   
Malaysian government agencies, policy makers, natural disaster scientists, 
and local communities, in other words, it was a transformative event. 
Government agencies confronted a new form of natural disaster without clear 
mechanisms and standard operating procedures (SOPs) because the existing 
SOP’s were developed for monsoon flooding and landslides, which was not 
surprising as there had been no previous similar event.   
The Secretary of NSC (the then the Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister) 
claimed in an interview that, when he went to the hardest hit areas in Penang 
to survey the extent of damage, the NSC was not in the picture during the first 
and second day of the tsunami. He was only able to contact the Police in 
order to move around the affected areas. Only a few days after the tragedy, 
the Prime Minister, who had rushed back from a year-end holiday, had a 
meeting with disaster management agencies to discuss and coordinate 
recovery and rehabilitation. Subsequently, the relevant agencies coordinated 
by NSC began to relocate affected population to temporary shelters and 
transit houses. He remembered clearly that the affected population was very 
angry with the government because of the late response, and the Governor’s 
visit to the areas that was not welcomed by the people. This was corroborated 
by mass media reports, such as Malaysiakini (2005), in a comment section, 
one of the affected population claimed that local NGO’s arrived quicker than 
government agencies. For example, in Pulau Betong, Penang, religious 
groups such as from a Buddhist temple responded very quickly and without 
discrimination on the grounds of race or religion. This claim is in line with my 
research in term of the local communities’ initiatives in responding to the 
tsunami:  40% of my sample stated there were no coordinated government 
efforts because of the panic caused by tsunami that had never been 
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experienced before, as pointed out by 60% of respondents (Figure 3.7). Only 
32% claimed that the coordinated efforts took place during the response and 
this was dominated (60%) by local NGO’s such as association from Buddhist 
Temple in Penang (Figure 3.8). However, the recognition of coordination at 
local level increased to 36% in the post reconstruction period. The perception 
was of government agencies with limited capacities in term of personnel, 
transportation and equipment, for instance, the Balik Pulau Fire and Rescue 
Station, had only six officers on duty during the tsunami on 26 December 
2004 and one rescue boat. Nevertheless, after the State Disaster Committee 
was set up under NSC 20, assistance came from other agencies such as the 
Malaysian Air Force to support the search and rescue efforts.  Initially, the 
total   personnel   involved were 24 but this increased to 50 on 27th December, 
including five divers and more search and rescue equipment such as speed 
boats, jet-ski, and helicopters on 28th December (Horton, 2005).  
After the 2004 tsunami, the NSC coordinated efforts to develop two new 
SOPs for earthquakes and tsunamis (discussed in detail in Chapter 5). NSC 
Directive No. 20 was also amended in order to include provision for the 
‘Kumpulan Wang Amanah Bantuan Bencana Negara, or KWABBN’ (the 
National Disaster Relief Trust Fund) which was managed by the NSC and 
received a financial allocation annually from the Government, as well as 
public donations, and contributions from multi-national companies. KWABBN 
is also used for operating expenditure of various agencies for recovery and 
reconstruction after a disaster.4 
                                                          
4Interview with Principle Assistant Secretary of Disaster Management Division of NSC Putrajaya, Mr. 
Norhisham Kamarudin on 5th August 2014. 
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Figure 3.7: Percentage of Coordinated Efforts during Tsunami Response and Post-Tsunami Reconstruction 
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Figure 3.8: Percentage of Coordinated Efforts by NGO and Political Party 
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Long Term Programmes 
The Malaysian Government executed three long term recovery and rehabilitation 
programmes for tsunami affected people. First; ‘Bantuan Wang Ehsan’ (Monetary 
Aid) managed by National Security Council, ‘Rumah Tsunami’ (Tsunami 
Resettlement) developed by SPNB (‘Syarikat Perumahan Negara Berhad’ - National 
Housing Company Limited) and Fisheries and Agricultural Assistance managed by 
Fisheries Development Authority of Malaysia (‘Lembaga Kemajuan Ikan Malaysia’ -
LKIM). Social Welfare Department responsible for providing and managing 
temporary shelters. I outline the structure and purpose of these organisations in the 
next sections. 
 
Among the responsibilities of National Security Council in Disaster Management as 
stated in the NSC Directive No. 20 are (National Security Council, 2012, p. 18); first, 
NSC is the Lead Agency for Disaster Management that  is responsible for 
coordinating and monitoring the disaster management policies and mechanisms; 
second, coordinate disaster management drills, search and rescue operations; third, 
monitor the implementation of Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDRR); 
fourth, to educate public and disaster management officials by conducting training 
and awareness programmes; fifth, to manage Disaster Management Trust Fund 
(‘Kumpulan Wang Amanah Bencana Negara’ - KWABN). During the tsunami, NSC 
disseminates ‘Bantuan Wang Ehsan’ which is a one-off monetary handout from the 
Federal Government through National Security Council (derive from KWABN) to 
ease the burden of the affected people. However, it was not a compensation scheme 
because its objective was to hand over marginal amount of RM500 (GBP90.90) to 
RM1000 (GBP181.81) immediately after the tsunami for petty cash expenditures. 
 
National Housing Company Limited (‘Syarikat Perumahan Negara Berhad’ - SPNB) 
is a Malaysian government owned company set up in August 1997 under the 
Ministry of Finance. Its main purpose is to build affordable houses for low and 
medium income families in Malaysia (Syarikat Perumahan Negara Berhad, 2005). 
The affordable housing projects are known as ‘Rumah Mampu Milik’ with price 
starting from RM 42,000 to RM 60,000 (approximately GBP 7,636 to GBP 10,909) 
selling for specific target group such as low income groups. SPNB also partnered 
with Armed Forces Fund Board (‘Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera’ - LTAT) to 
   
58 
 
develop 6,550 unit houses for army in the armed forces camps. SPNB also entrusted 
by the government to redevelop abandoned housing projects in the country.  
 
During the post-tsunami period, SPNB has given the task to implement tsunami  
relocation housing scheme (known as ‘Rumah Tsunami’) to relocate tsunami 
affected people and vulnerable communities in tsunami-prone areas into new well-
planned settlement with modern facilities, particularly in Penang (Syarikat 
Perumahan Negara Berhad, 2005). Priority was given to the people whose houses 
were completely destroyed by the tsunami. The housing price is below market price 
because it is subsidised by the Federal Government for the affected people, who 
only have to pay a nominal monthly instalment of RM100 (GBP18). The ‘tsunami 
houses’ were built with 3 bedrooms, living room and kitchen, in a housing complex 
with amenities such as mosque, children playground and kindergarten 
 
Fisheries Development Authority of Malaysia (‘Lembaga Kemajuan Ikan Malaysia’ -
LKIM) is an agency under the supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Agriculture Base Industry that was incorporated under Act 49, Malaysia Fisheries 
Development Board Act 1971 (Fisheries Development Authority of Malaysia, 2005). 
Among the LKIM function is to ease the burden of disaster affected fishermen 
through Natural Disaster and Welfare Assistance (NDWA) Scheme of Fishermen, 
introduced on January 16, 2009. The NDWA Scheme provides assistance to the 
affected fishermen by allocating fund to repair damaged boats, buy new boats, 
fishing equipment and funeral expenses (Fisheries Development Authority of 
Malaysia, 2005).The fishermen have to register with LKIM and a members of the 
Area Fishermen's Association in order to be considered for assistance (Fisheries 
Development Authority of Malaysia, 2005). 
 
The Social Welfare Department was established in April 1946 during the Second 
World War and emergency period to support the welfare of families affected by the 
war. The department’s function expanded to include rehabilitation services of social 
issues and community development (Department of Social Welfare, 2005). 
According to NSC Directive No. 20, the roles and responsibilities of Social Welfare 
Department during disasters are (National Security Council, 2012, p. 41); 
1. To prepare and manage evacuation centers for disaster affected people. 
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2. To provide and distribute food, drinking water, clothing and other basic needs to 
disaster affected people. 
3. To register disaster affected people. 
4. To provide advice and counseling to the disaster affected people. 
Temporary evacuation centres are defined as buildings declared by the government 
through National Security Council to accommodate affected people. The evacuation 
centre equipped with basic facilities such clean water and electricity supplies. 
(Department of Social Welfare, 2005). Every centre run by a manager that assisted 
by several committees take in charge of registration, food, water supply, health and 
hygiene, security and safety, activity and volunteer. 
 
The reaction and feedback from the affected communities on the government’s short 
and long term programmes are varies, that will be the subject of discussion in details 
in Chapter 4.  
 
Conclusion 
Malaysia is not seriously vulnerable to earthquakes and tsunamis due to its 
geographical location outside of the ‘ring of fire’. This tended to encourage 
complacency on the part of populations and government. However, the 2004 Indian 
Ocean Tsunami challenge this ‘complacency condition’, when the Malaysian 
government and its citizens were surprised by an unprecedented event that 
transformed disaster management practices.  
The tsunami exposed the weaknesses of the existing disaster response machinery 
and level of preparedness of the government agencies led and coordinated by NSC 
because the agencies focused on the monsoon flood that usually occurred from 
November to January annually. Therefore, when the unexpected tsunami struck the 
Malaysian shore, the agencies concerned and the vulnerable communities by the 
seashore panicked. The absence of government agencies (in particular NSC) in the 
wake of the tsunami and their late response of first responders’ agencies (fire and  
rescue department, ambulance services, and civil defense forces) stirred anger and 
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frustration of the affected people. However, the government led by NSC gradually 
took in charge and coordinate short term and long term recovery and rehabilitation 
programmes. The reaction and feedback of the affected people on this initiatives that 
reflect the strength and weaknesses of NSC will be the subject of discussion.
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Chapter 4: Reaction and Feedback of the Tsunami Affected People 
 
Introduction 
This chapter concentrates on the tsunami's aftermath, in particular the 
effectiveness of, and reception by, the population in the case study areas of 
the government’s recovery and rehabilitation programmes led and 
coordinated by NSC: ‘Bantuan Ehsan’ (Monetary Aid), ‘Rumah Tsunami’ 
(Tsunami House), and Agricultural and Fishing Assistance. This is followed by 
an examination on how these reactions affected government policies and 
transformed the disaster mechanism.  
 
The tsunami and its effects represented a new challenge to Prime Minister 
Abdullah’s administration because the existing disaster management structure 
and response mechanisms were designed for frequent (and therefore familiar) 
disasters such as monsoon floods and landslides, and not for the 
unexperienced tsunami.  Several issues undermined the government’s efforts 
in responding to the tsunami, in particular the late response of the disaster 
management agencies (as perceived by 50% of my sample in most areas), 
the late distribution of monetary aid, the perception of mismanagement of 
disaster relief funds and allegations of nepotism, cronyism and favouritism, 
(as perceived by 60% of the sample). This finding was supported by the 
interview with a former Deputy Chief Minister of Penang, a State Assembly 
person for Teluk Bahang Constituency. The next section discuss the affected 
population reactions to the government’s response and rehabilitation 
programmes. 
 
Case Study Areas in Penang State 
Malaysia is a heterogeneous society consisting of about 80 ethnic groups 
and, as argued by Singh, “Politics in Malaysia has usually been portrayed as 
an extension of ethnic relations” (Singh, 2001, p. 42). There are three major 
ethnic groups: Malays (60% of the population), Chinese (25%) and Indian 
(7%) (Wan Husin, 2012). However, in Penang, the Malays and Chinese are 
almost equal with 636,146 (40.7%) and 670,400 (42.9%) respectively 
(Department of Statistics, 2010). The State of Penang is also a highly 
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urbanised as well asmulti ethnic. The ethnic composition of Penang is 
important because it suggests a vulnerability in political and ethnic relations. 
In contrast to the Malay dominated State of Kelantan, the Chinese assimilated 
into Malay Kelantanese culture, many speak the Kelantanese dialect and, as 
a consequence, there is no racial conflict recorded in Kelantan. In Penang this 
type of assimilation is out of question due to the more or less equal numbers 
of Malay and Chinese, which has led to ethnic political conflict. Surveys 
indicate that  36% of Chinese understand Malay culture and customs and 
likewise for Malay (36%) (Merdeka Centre, 2006);  Malays, however, often 
perceive the Chinese to be opportunist, chauvinist, racist and ‘ultra kiasu’ (this 
term originated in the Hokkien dialect and means behaving selfishly and 
disregarding others, an attitude that stems from greed and promotes envy and 
selfishness) who dominated the economy. Some 71% of Malays describe  
Chinese as ‘greedy’ and some Chinese (26%) declare themselves to be ‘not 
proud to be Malaysian’ (Merdeka Centre, 2006).  
 
Penang is divided by political parties based on racial lines. The major political 
parties are the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the Malaysian 
Chinese Association (MCA), the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), and 
GERAKAN (majority Chinese). UMNO, MCA and MIC (later joined by 
GERAKAN in 1974) established a coalition for elections known as the Barisan 
Nasional - National Front (formerly known as Perikatan from 1957 to 1974) 
that has formed successive Federal Governments since independence 
in1957. While on the opposition side, Democratic Action Party (DAP) is 
dominated by the Chinese, both the Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) and the 
Parti Islam Semalaysia (PAS) are majority of Malays and form an alliance, the 
Pakatan Rakyat - PR or People’s Alliance (formerly known as Barisan 
Alternatif - Alternative Front until 2008) to contest in the General Elections. 
Elections are held every 5 years as stated in the Federal Constitution but the 
Prime Minister has the right to dissolve the Parliament earlier (with the 
consent of the King), normally after 4 years. Both Federal and State 
Government (except for Kelantan) were dominated by the Barisan Nasional 
until the 2008 General Election, when unexpected political change (frequently 
described as a result of ‘tsunami politics’) occurred. In the 2008 General 
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Election, for the first time in 39 years, the ruling party (Barisan Nasional) failed 
to form the Penang State Government (winning only 11 out of 40 seats) 
(Table 3.5 and Table 3.6) (Election Commission, 2008).  
Socially Penang’s population is multicultural composed of Malays (Malay 
Language, religion: Islam), Chinese (language: Mandarin and Hokkien, 
religion: majority Buddhist) and Indian (language: Tamil, religion: majority 
Hindu). Malays dominated rural areas; Chinese dominate in urban and major 
town centres, whereas the Indian population is concentrated in rubber and oil 
palm estates (Table 4.1).  
 
Social segregation is aggravated by the education system, in which majority 
of Malay students (87,012) go to national schools with the Malay Language 
(national language) as the  medium of teaching and learning, whereas a 
majority of Chinese (50,314) and Indians (6,303) opt for vernacular schools 
that use Mandarin and Tamil as their medium of learning (Penang Institute, 
2013). This polarised education limits interaction and communication of multi 
ethnic pupils from the early age that is crucial for nourishing integration by 
learning and embracing each other’s culture. Consequently, it has produced 
societies that are subjected to cultural and religious misunderstanding, 
sceptical and stereotype towards other ethnics. 
Geographically, Penang State consist of two parts: Penang Island dominated 
by Chinese (53%), and the mainland, Seberang Prai, populated by Malays 
Table 4.1: Socio-economic Background of Three Main Ethnic Group in  
                 Malaysia 
Ethnic Language Religion Location Occupation 
Malay Malay Islam Rural areas Farmers and fisherman 
Chinese Mandarin 
and 
Hokkien 
Confucius 
and Buddha 
Urban areas Business sector ranging 
from public listed 
company to petty traders  
Indian Tamil Hindu Rubber and 
oil palm 
estates 
Rubber tappers and 
estate workers 
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(49%) (Department of Statistics, 2010). This complexity sometimes results in 
clashes and misunderstandings and the worst case of inter-ethnic violence in 
Malaysian history were the riots of 13th May 1969 where hundreds of Malays 
and Chinese were killed and thousands went missing (MAGERAN, 1969).  
After the 2004 tsunami, several studies were conducted to assess the 
affected communities’ views on the governments’ response and recovery 
programmes. Horton et.al (2008) interviewed 30 respondents in Penang 
(Tanjung Tokong, Tanjung Bungah, Teluk Bahang and Pulau Betong); a study 
on public awareness on the tsunami disaster and early warning systems was 
conducted by Zainal et.al (2011); Krishnaswamy et.al (2012) studied early 
health care interventions and the role of NGO’s in providing moral and 
psychological supports to the affected people; Colbourne (2005) explored the 
impact of the tsunami on physical and land use; and  Abdullah et.al (2005) 
focused on the tsunami’s impact  on environment, irrigation systems and on 
government agencies’ response in general.  To complement and expand 
these studies, I conducted a mixed method study combining quantitative 
(semi-structured questionnaire, 50 respondents) and qualitative (semi-
structured open-ended interview questions with 7 interviewees) during a 10 
week fieldwork trip (July – September 2014) in Penang and Putrajaya.  
 
The purpose was to obtain information regarding the reactions of tsunami 
affected people to the government’s response. The intention was to 
investigate the extent of the tsunami’s impact on government’s disaster 
management structures, machinery, procedures and local electoral politics 
and specifically whether the affected people change their voting from 
supporting the ruling to the opposition party because of dissatisfaction with 
the tsunami rehabilitation programmes, through a comparison of the 2004 
general elections (before the tsunami) and 2008 (after the tsunami).  Studies 
by researchers such as Ming (2008),  Case (2010), Chin and Huat (2009), 
Ghazali (2009) have not indicate that the tsunami had the hypothesised effect 
because their studies focus on other factors that contributes to the changes in 
voters preference in 2008 due to socio-economy (cost of living, housing price 
and fuel price), the former Deputy Prime Minister’s Mr. Anwar’s charismatic 
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(now a Chairman of Opposition Alliance) factor and internal conflict of the 
ruling party coalition ‘Barisan Nasional’ (National Alliance) between UMNO 
and MCA, in which the MCA disagrees with UMNO plays the racial card 
during the election campaign. Hence, my studies explores the effect of 
tsunami as another potential factor influencing voters in 2008 election. 
In response to the tsunami, a technical and financial team from NSC 
assessed and evaluated property damage (particularly houses) and put 
recommendations to the Disaster Committee for house rebuilding and 
renovation, as well as house relocation programmes (Rumah Tsunami). 
Another technical team from Ministry of Agriculture evaluated the extent of the 
damage to fishermen’s boats and equipment. Based on the evaluations and 
recommendations from the NSC and the Ministry of Agriculture, the Disaster 
Committee decided to implement short, medium and long term response and 
recovery programmes. Short term programmes were Bantuan Wang Ehsan 
(Monetary Aid), of RM500 to RM1000 (approximately £90m to £181m), and 
House Repair; the medium term programmes were the Tsunami Transit 
House and, Agricultural and Fishery Assistance Programmes. The long term 
programmes were Rumah Tsunami (permanent housing relocation 
programmes), The recovery programmes focused on monetary aid and 
housing repair assistance in an effort to rehabilitate affected people, for which 
the government established a trust fund, Kumpulan Wang Amanah Bantuan 
Bencana Negara-KWABBN (the National Disaster Relief Trust Fund).  
Bantuan Wang Ehsan (Monetary Aid) 
KWABBN was set up by Ministry of Finance but managed by the Disaster 
Management Division of the National Security Council with one of its main 
objectives being to give immediate monetary support as compassionate aid 
(not compensation), ranging from RM500 to RM1000 (equivalent to £90m to 
£181m) to affected people, whose houses suffered minor or major damaged 
and RM20,000 (£3,636) per family, who suffered a loss  of any family 
member, as quickly as possible, to  the recipients (Table 4.2). It is better 
known as ‘Wang Ehsan’ and help is normally given in the temporary shelters 
and so is immediate post-disaster aid. At the federal level, the government, 
via the National Security Council (NSC), formed the Tabung Wang Amanah 
   
66 
 
Bantuan Bencana Negara-KWABBN’ (the National Disaster Management and 
Relief Trust Fund) but due to a lack of confidence in KWABBN because of 
perceptions of the mismanagement of funds, donors handed aid directly to 
NGO’s such as Mercy Malaysia or the Red Cross/Crescent, and other 
religious organisations. Table 4.2 provides the categories of Wang Ehsan’s 
activities.  
 
 
 
Table 4.2: Category of ‘Bantuan Ehsan’ Disbursements 
Category of ‘Bantuan Ehsan’ Total Recipient Total Cost (RM) 
Death of Family Members (68 in 
Malaysia & 6 oversea) 74 people RM 74,000.00  
Death compensation 76 people RM 1,520,000.00  
Injury (warded) 116 people RM 23,200.00  
Relocation  2,876 families  RM 1,425,100.00  
Fishermen Loss of Income  3,987 families  RM 1,989,700.00  
House severely damaged (cannot 
be repaired) 133 houses RM 665,000.00  
House damage (can be repaired) 751 houses RM 1,498,000.00  
Large boats (outside engine) 547 houses RM 1,641,000.00  
Small boats (inside engine) 3,129 houses RM 3,128,420.00  
Shellfish breeders 39 people RM 19,500.00  
Fish breeders 194 people RM 302,200.00  
Aquaculture entrepreneurs 129 people RM 64,500.00  
Home appliances damage (minor) 552 houses RM 552,000.00  
Home appliances damage (major) 512 houses RM 1,030,000.00  
Missing person 5 people RM 100,000.00  
Source: Kamarudin (2010). 
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However, there were allegations of mismanagement of Bantuan Ehsan during 
the dissemination process (particularly over the donation of food and clothing 
by various organisations), which were not received by the evacuees at 
temporary shelters, due to lack of monitoring  (Gan, 2005). These sentiments 
were the reason for dissatisfaction and in my sample, of 86% recipients of 
‘Wang Ehsan (Figure 4.1),  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Percentage of ‘Wang Ehsan’ Recipients 
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26% of them were not satisfied with the amount of (Figure 4.2), 91% claimed 
the amount was insufficient and 9% believed that it had not been fairly 
distributed (Figure 4.3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Percentage of Satisfaction on ‘Wang Ehsan’ 
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In terms of recipients by ethnic group, a majority who did not receive it were 
Indian (76%) (Figure 4.4), and this contributed directly to the Indian voter 
retaliation against the Barisan Nasional in the 2008 election when 78% voted 
for opposition Pakatan Rakyat (PR), compared to only 22% for the PR in the 
2004 election5. 78% out of 26% respondents who were not satisfied was the 
lowest income group (below poverty line) (Figure 4.5); 88% claimed the 
amount was insufficient, and 12% believed it was unfairly distributed (Figure 
4.6). Another issue was that aid was distributed late even though many 
tsunami relief funds  (such as The Star/Maybank Tsunami Relief Fund) had 
been created by January 1, 2005 (only 6 days after the tsunami) and had 
collected RM567,304.26 (£103,146.23) in donations from the Malaysian
                                                          
5 This claim was corroborated by Dr. Hilmi Yahya (former Deputy  Chief  Minister  of Penang during 
the 2004 tsunami) in an interview on 17th July 2014 and Faridah Arshad (former State Assembly 
Representative of Teluk Bahang in an interview on 21st July 2014. 
 
Figure 4.3: Reason of Dissatisfaction on distribution of ‘Wang 
Ehsan’ 
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Figure 4.4: Recipient of ‘Wang Ehsan’ by Ethnic 
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Figure 4.6: Satisfaction on ‘Wang Ehsan’ by Income 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Satisfaction Level on ‘Wang Ehsan’ by Income 
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public, private companies and NGO’s. Another fund, ‘Tabung Bencana Alam 
Tsunami’,   organised   by Melaka State,   reached   RM750,000   (£136,364) 
donations (Malaysiakini, 2005). Donations from both had still not been 
delivered to the tsunami affected people over a week after tsunami. The 
dissatisfaction with the late distribution of monetary aid (Wang Ehsan) was 
corroborated by the Secretary of NSC (interview on 7th August 2014), who 
stated that the affected people were questioning why the donation money 
from the public and private sectors was not distributed and questioning where 
the money went to, because they knew a substantial amount of money was 
donated by the public but they had not seen how it was used to ease their 
burden. The then Prime Minister Abdullah who visited the incident areas on 
the second day (27th December 2004), was giving away money from his 
personal resources to the population, amounting RM1,000 (£181) to RM2,000 
(£383) for each family.  Bureaucracy was identified as stumbling block in 
distributing donations because the secretariat at the temporary shelters (from 
the Welfare Department) had to wait for politicians from the ruling party to 
officially deliver them to the affected people.6 As was normal practice, this 
also involved the delivery of a political message as this aid was delivered by 
the party, which it used to appeal for support. In contrast, the opposition 
leader, Anwar Ibrahim was allegedly denied access to the shelter at Kuala 
Muda. This reflects the political bias in giving access to the politician to meet 
evacuees and thereby be identified with the delivery of aid (Gan, 2005). 
Further investigation on distribution revealed that ‘red tape’ was blamed for 
the late delivery because the main problem was validating the list of tsunami 
affected people. Several lists were produced by different groups (political 
parties, NGO’s government agencies), even though the main agency 
responsible for producing validated list was the District Office, as stipulated in 
NSC Directive No. 20.  Consequently, the District Office was facing problems 
of competing claims from different parties and organisations who insisted their 
list was the most reliable, claims that often lead to disputes among them. 
There were also false claims cases and confusing claims, as revealed by the 
                                                          
6As revealed by Assistant Secretary of Disaster Management of National Security Council (NSC) 
Penang Office on 17th June 2014 and corroborated by Principle Assistant Secretary of Disaster 
Management Division of NSC HQ Putrajaya in an interview on 5th August 2014.   
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then Deputy Secretary NSC, such as between landlord or tenants, duplicating 
claims such as the whole family submitted claims for the entire family, despite 
by right only one claim for each family. Despite a high level of concern about 
the management of donations from the public, the government insisted that 
KWABN was managed with accountability and transparency. For example, it 
underwent a thorough audit by the Auditor General’s Office and this report 
was presented to parliament in January 2005. KWABN was established 
according to the provision in Section 10 of Financial Procedure Act 1957 
(Revised 1972) and the details of KWABN transactions were tabled in Dewan 
Rakyat (the equivalent to House of Commons) by the then Deputy Prime 
Minister Najib Razak on 17th January 2005 and accepted by the Members of 
Parliament (Parliament of Malaysia, 2005). Consequently, public confidence 
in KWABBN appeared restored. Other short term programme included the 
House Repair programme; aimed at repairing lightly damaged houses.  Table 
4.5 shows 251 unit houses were repaired in Penang by district: Northeast 
District (126), Southwest District (109) and North Seberang Prai District (16). 
In terms of the ‘Wang Ehsan’, a substantial minority (32%) proposed an 
increase in the amount of disaster relief money, 6% stated that the assistance 
was not biased towards certain groups, ethnic or cronies, and 6% demanded 
long term assistance from the government. Only 30% were satisfied with the 
current situation and 32% gave ‘no comment’ (Figure 4.7).7 With regards to 
Rumah Tsunami, only 48% were satisfied and 62% offered various 
comments, such as needing greater speed in allocation (6%), including 
business premises , and 22% gave ‘no comment’ (Figure 4.8). As for the 
fisheries and agricultural assistance, a majority (56%) were reluctant to give 
any comments, but 8% suggested an increase in the amount of assistance to 
fully cover the cost of repairing or replacing boats and equipment, and 6% 
indicated the importance of impartiality and not biased to ethnic groups (three 
Malay respondents claimed that Chinese entrepreneurs received more 
financial assistance than Malay fishermen). Only 26% were satisfied with the 
current situation (Figure 4.9).    
                                                          
7 From my observation during the questionnaire sampling, the respondents who stated “no 
comment” are either shy, doubtful of my intention, in a hurry or reserve their comment. 
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Figure 4.7: Suggestions to Improve Distribution of ‘Wang Ehsan’ 
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Figure 4.8: Suggestions to Improve ‘Rumah Tsunami’ 
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Figure 4.9: Suggestions to Improve Fisheries and Agricultural Assistance 
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Fishery and Agricultural Assistance 
Fishing communities were amongst the hardest hit by the tsunami which 
swept away boats, jetties and fishing equipment. Lembaga Kemajuan Ikan 
Malaysia-LKIM (the Fisheries Development Authority of Malaysia) estimated 
that 1,430 boats were damaged. According to the NSC, 1,333 fishermen 
received RM 1,000 (£181) in financial assistance for repairing their boats and 
97 received RM 3,000 (£545) to buy new boats (Kamarudin, 2010). However, 
Horton et.al (2008) argue that fishermen claimed to receive amounts less than 
those reported by NSC, one fisherman claimed to have received RM 2,000 
(£363) and not RM 3,000 (£545) for his destroyed boat. The Chairman of the 
Fishermens’ Association in Sungai Burong (Barat Daya District) claimed that 
the association distributed RM 1,000 (£181) to each of its members 
regardless of boats amounted to RM 5,000 (£909) or RM 6,000 (£1,090). 
LKIM also offered mechanics to repair boats and engines but some  
fishermen claimed repairs were  not done properly, they still had to pay more 
than expected and took a longer time (up to four months) to resume fishing, 
which seriously affected their livelihoods (Horton et al., 2008).These were 
aggravated by a shortage of financial assistance.  
Fishermen had to apply for loans from LKIM of about RM10,000 (£1,818), with 
a repayment period 5 to 6 years, in order to fully cover the cost of repairing 
boats and engines. Horton et.al (2008), corroborated by mass media reports 
contended that few affected fishermen claimed they had not received any 
assistance from government, while others claimed the aid was distributed very 
late. One  stated he waited for six months for a government  loan of about 
$6,000 (RM 91,800 or £3,600)  to buy new boat and fishing equipment (Kent, 
2005). Another pointed out that government broke its promise by offering a  
loan ranging from $250 (RM 825 or £150) to $800 (RM 2,640 or £480) as 
compared to earlier promise of $6,500 (RM 21,450 or £3,900) and $18,000 
(RM 63,000 or £11,454) to replace wooden or fibreglass boats respectively 
(Kent, 2005).  These claims were corroborated by my sample. Of the 68% 
who received fisheries and agricultural assistance (Figure 4.10), 25% were 
not satisfied because the amount was insufficient (Figure 4.11). A majority of 
respondents (72%) who had not received assistance, claimed that they did 
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Figure 4.11: Satisfaction on Fisheries and Agricultural   
Assistance 
 
Figure 4.10: Percentage of Recipient of Fisheries and 
Agricultural Assistance 
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not know the reason why their names had been overlooked by the 
government agencies, in this case LKIM (Figure 4. 12).  
 
 
 
These discontents were the result of organisational inefficiency, which 
stimulated further resentment and opposition. The delay, from my experience 
as a government official, is due to bureaucracy and ‘red tape’ that hampered 
government’s objective of easing the burden of the affected people as quickly 
as possible. This then raised public anger and frustration, which resulted in 
two hundred people sending a petition setting out their dissatisfaction on the 
Figure 4.12: Reason Perceived by Respondent Who Did Not Received 
                    Fisheries and Agricultural Assistance 
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management of the tsunami rehabilitation programmes to the Penang State 
government. However, the petition was rejected by the government on the 
grounds that many of the claimants had received assistance (see Table 4.3)  
for  loss  of  
 
 
income, for repairs, and for the purchase of new boat, engines, and trawls), 
and not to mention cases  of false claims (Gan, 2005). Many fishermen 
resorted to personal loans from other sources, such as family, relatives, bank 
and loan sharks (with a far higher interest rate).  This financial burden due to 
loss of income and repayment of loans undoubtedly created dissatisfaction 
and frustration amongst tsunami affected fishermen. Meanwhile, a few 
affected farmers, whose paddy fields had been destroyed by the sea water 
Table 4.3: Assistance from Ministry of Agriculture and SPNB 
(National Housing Company Limited- a subsidiary of Ministry of Finance) 
 
Details Unit Total (RM) 
Ministry of Agriculture 
Farmers/fishermen 
who lost source of 
income 
189 people 94,500.00  
Repairs and purchase 
of new boatengines, 
boats and trawls. 
2,881 units 11,407,316.96  
SPNB (National Housing Company Limited- a subsidiary of 
Ministry of Finance) 
Repairs of damaged 
houses 
450 units 1,921,038.00 
Building of temporary 
houses  
245 units 4,524,608.00 
Building of permanent 
houses 
727 units 65,187,642.00 
             Source: Kamarudin (2010). 
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received monetary assistance from Ministry of Agriculture without any issues 
raised. 
The impact of the tsunami on business can be divided into two categories: 
first, international hotels; and second, small local businesses (such as 
restaurants, tourist souvenir shops and aquaculture entrepreneurs). While 
international hotels on the beaches were not affected significantly by the 
tsunami due to their concrete construction. Hotel residents were spared 
because hotels owners and staffs manage to convey tsunami threat after 
receiving an early warning by telephone and fax from their counterparts in 
hotels in Langkawi. Meanwhile, small local businesses suffered significant 
damage and losses because of wooden-made stalls and restaurants. For 
example, one oyster farmer claimed that he lost of income because 150,000 
oysters (estimated RM20,000 or £3,636 loss) washed away and he was  
unable to take precautions because he received no early warning) and it took 
him four months to recover.  
These small local businesses were overlooked by the government in the early 
stages of the response and only received RM1000 (£181) of financial 
assistant ‘Wang Ehsan’ after two months of tsunami (Horton et al 2008). This 
was corroborated by the former Deputy Secretary of NSC (the then Director of 
Disaster Management Division during the tsunami), in an interview on 7th 
August 2014, that the government only offered assistance to small business 
owners in 2006 (two years after the tsunami) in the form of interest-free bank 
loans. A restaurant owner in Batu Ferringhi interviewed during fieldwork on 
16th July 2014, noted that he received no compensation from the government 
(federal or state) and only obtained RM2,000 (£363) financial assistance from 
NGO’s. Horton et.al (2008) identified the same situation in Tanjung Tokong, 
where restaurant operators received minimal financial assistance from the 
government (RM200 or £36 through Welfare Department) and NGO (RM100 
from Penang Foundation).  One restaurant owner claimed that although state 
government provided her with building materials to rebuild her restaurants, 
this was insufficient and had to top up the official aid with RM 60,000 
(£10,909) from her savings and through loans.   This perceived   
discrimination   between business owners and fishermen created anger, 
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frustration and dissatisfaction among local small business operators towards 
government’s response and recovery programmes. 
Rumah Tsunami (Tsunami Housing Resettlement Programme) 
A major focus of the Disaster Management Committee in the recovery phase 
was the relocation of vulnerable communities, particularly in Tanjung Bungah, 
Batu Ferringhi and Teluk Bahang. While waiting for the completion of the 
permanent houses, tsunami affected people were relocated to 100 units of  
houses that were built at a total cost of RM 1,226,369 (£222,976) in Batu 
Ferringhi and Pantai Miami in the northeast of Penang island (National 
Security Council Penang Office, 2005). Table 4.4 indicates 126 houses were 
repaired in Timur Laut District (Northeast District) which contains the worst 
stricken areas in Tanjung Bungah and Batu Ferringhi.  
 
 
The transit houses were planned to be built in hilly areas in Tanjung 
Bungahwith 100 units and during the construction of the transit houses 
displaced persons were to live in temporary shelters that many of claimed 
were of poor quality because of cheap building materials such as plywood for 
the walls, and lacked security.8People in temporary shelters were frustrated 
                                                          
8 Interview with three influencers; the former Deputy Chief Minister of Penang, the former State 
Representative of Teluk Bahang Constituency, and, the Youth Chief of PERKASA (a Malay NGO’s). 
      Table 4.4 Houses Repaired in Penang by District 
DISTRICT UNIT 
TIMUR LAUT (Northeast District) 126 
BARAT DAYA (Southwest District) 109 
SEBERANG PRAI UTARA (North Seberang Prai 
District) 
16 
  TOTAL 251 
      Source: (Kamarudin, 2010) 
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by  the slow progress of permanent house building, which had not started six 
months after the tsunami  (Gan, 2005). Complaints over the speed of 
response are common one in disaster management so the discontent might 
reasonably have been foreseen by the government.  
Many thought that the temporary house, with two bedrooms, one living room, 
a kitchen and one bathroom, was inadequate compared to the houses that 
were damaged or destroyed. Several people were so dissatisfied with the size 
and condition of the temporary houses they decided not to leave their existing 
houses (Horton et al., 2008). This claim was supported by my sample, in 
which 30% indicated that their new house was too small and could not 
accommodate an extended family, and its quality was poor. However, 
according to the National Security Council Penang Office, temporary houses 
were deliberately designed with basic facilities by the Federal Government as 
temporary shelters while waiting for the construction of permanent relocation 
housing to be completed. According to the NSC (Kamarudin, 2010) 133 
houses that were severely damage could not be repaired, 751 houses could  
be repaired. As only 100 houses were built in contrast to 251 damaged in 
Penang, resulting a housing shortage. Horton et.al (2008) suggests that the 
remaining 151 damaged house residents moved to relatives’ houses. 
However, the NSC explained that 100 were built for those living in severely 
damaged houses and subsequently 561 permanent houses were built in 
Penang to provide for all the tsunami affected people. Furthermore, 100 units 
were built at Pangsapuri Masjid Terapung, Tanjung Bungah, and 461 at Kuala 
Muda, Seberang Perai (Table 4.5). Permanent houses in Tanjung Bungah 
were built to modern designs and with facilities and amenities such as 
mosques, parks, playgrounds, and taking into account security issues by 
providing 7 feet fencing surrounding the compound and tidal wave break walls 
(Figure 4.13).  
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      Table 4.5: Tsunami Permanent House Development in Penang 
LOCATION UNIT 
TAMAN PERMATANG KATONG, KOTA KUALA 
MUDA, KEDAH 126 
TAMAN ARA JAYA, KUALA TRIANG, LANGKAWI, 
KEDAH 40 
PANGSAPURI MASJID TERAPUNG, BANDAR    
TG. BUNGAH, PULAU PINANG  
100 
KUALA MUDA, SEBERANG PERAI, PULAU    
PINANG 
461 
TOTAL 727 
      Source: Kamarudin (2010). 
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Figure 4.13: Layout Plan of ‘Tsunami House’ in Tanjung Bungah, Penang Island. 
Source: Kamarudin (2010) 
 
 Muka hadapan rumah Balai 
Taman Kerja Lanskap Benteng 
Rumah 
Rumah 
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Horton et.al (2008) argues that the amount of compensation received by 521 
owners of damaged houses was not standardised: 323 of them received less 
than RM2,000 (£363) and 198 more than RM2,000 (£363). The Welfare 
Department argued the amount varied depending on the extent of a house’s 
structural damage and did not include furniture and appliances. The NSC 
stressed this was compassionate aid, not full compensation. Consequently, 
house owners resorted to extra financial assistance from family, relatives and 
friends for renovation and rebuilding their houses. My sample shows that 94% 
received ‘Rumah Tsunami’ and 68% of them were satisfied. Another 32% (all 
of them Malays. See Figure 4.14) expressed dissatisfaction with ‘Rumah 
tsunami’ for various reasons. For instance, 70% of them were dissatisfied by 
delays (ranging from one to two years) in the distribution of permanent 
housing and 20% were unhappy with the low quality of the houses that led to 
high maintenance cost and extra burdens on the household.  
 
 
Figure 4.14: The Reason of Dissatisfaction on ‘Tsunami House’ 
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In terms of allocation of the houses, 20% believed the houses were allocated 
improperly, such as to people whose houses were not severely damaged or 
destroyed. Further investigation revealed that all of the 20% respondents’ 
perceptions were based on rumours and hearsay. In terms of dissatisfaction 
by income group, the low income groups (below the poverty line) saw high 
maintenance costs and poor build quality as the main reasons for 
dissatisfaction (Figure 4.15).  
 
 
A majority of the middle income group (RM9,601-RM24,000/year or £1,745-
£4,363/year) stressed the late distribution of the houses (63%) and all high 
income respondents (above RM24,000/year or £4,363/year) expressed 
 
Figure 4.15: Dissatisfaction on ‘Rumah Tsunami’ by Income 
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concern about house size. Interviews with Secretary and former Deputy 
Secretary of NSC revealed that there was an issue of affected people who 
were reluctant to pay for the house although the Federal Government 
subsidised a considerable amount from RM52,000 (£9,454) to only RM18,000 
(£3,273) with monthly a nominal monthly payment of RM50 (£9) per month. 
The reason they did not want to pay was because they were unfortunately hit 
by the tsunami, therefore the government should replace their damaged 
house that they have been living before tsunami for free. They also perceived 
that the government should use the donation money from the National 
Disaster Relief Trust Fund (-KWABBN) to cover the cost of building the 
houses. However, the former Deputy Secretary of NSC argues that the 
amount of the KWABBN was not enough to build the houses because the 
land cost (over RM1 million / £181,818) for development was significantly 
higher than the building cost, and the donation money also was planning to be 
distributed for other assistance, such as for fisheries. Some of the claims were 
genuine from the lower income group and vulnerable people such as disable 
or older people, that the government decided to give them free houses. 
Another issue was false claims by applicants who submitted more than one 
application for the whole family members, but the government policy was one 
house per family only. 
Perception of Bias in the Distribution of Government Assistance 
This section discusses the perception of bias in tsunami reconstruction 
programmes by occupation, education level, ethnic group and income level. It 
then explores the reasons put forward to account for this bias by the affected 
population.  
Figure 4.16 shows 42% of respondents believed the tsunami reconstruction 
programmes were administered impartially, but a substantial minority, 32%,
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believed that there was discrimination in the programmes: a majority of this 
group (58%) were unemployed, and 26% gave ‘no comment’ In terms of 
education, all who perceived bias were secondary school leavers, whereas 
those with a primary education gave ‘no comment’. Perception of bias by 
ethnic group was dominated by Malays with 69% (Figure 4.17) whilst a 
majority of Indians (66%) answered the question with ‘no comment’. In terms 
of occupation, a majority (56%) who perceived bias were unemployed and 
58% of government employees answered ‘no comment’ (Figure 4.18). This 
implies that a substantial number of respondents perceived the government’s 
response was flawed by discrimination but were extremely reluctant to state 
whether or not they believed bias was a factor in the operation of the 
programmes. From my observation and experience, the high percentage of 
respondent who stated “no comment” is due to several reason such   as   shy,  
 
Figure 4.16: Perception on Tsunami Reconstruction Programmes 
 
   
90 
 
 
 
Figure 4.18: Perception of Bias in Post-Tsunami Reconstruction 
                  by Occupation 
 
Figure 4.17: Perception on Biasness in Post-Tsunami 
                  Reconstruction by Ethnic 
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reserve their comment, afraid of being labelled as government’s opponents, 
doubtful of my intention and in a hurry or busy doing their chores. 
Figure 4.19 shows that 40% of the sample believed the programmes favoured 
 
 
certain political groups, and 20% claimed nepotism and cronyism influenced 
the distribution of aid (particularly financial assistance and the allocation of 
‘tsunami houses’). Another 20% of respondents were not satisfied regarding 
the perceived different treatment by government agencies of affected people 
particularly those who did not go to the evacuation centres and so received 
less aid than people who moved there. Analysis shows that all ethnic Malays 
believed mismanagement accounted for the maldistribution of tsunami 
housing and the allocation of monetary aid, whilst all ethnic Indians (out of 
20%) blamed cronyism and favoritism, in which priority was given to delivering 
disaster assistance to families, friends and relatives. In terms of income 
group, all below the poverty line group (family income less than RM9,600 per 
year) out of 20% believed that the post-tsunami programmes were not fairly 
Figure 4.19: Reason for Bias in Post-tsunami    
ReconstructionProgrammes 
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managed, particularly regarding to distribution of monetary aid between those 
who went to the evacuation centres and those who went to family and 
relatives. 67% (out of 40%) of low income groups (RM9,000 to RM24,000 per 
year) believed that disaster aid was prioritised for certain political groupings. 
This sparked serious anger among people who preferred to move into a 
relative’s house. However, it can be argued that it was difficult for disaster 
management agencies to figure out the scale and scope of assistance needed 
by people who did not move to the temporary shelter (or evacuation centres) 
because of a lack of information as compared to in evacuation centres which 
were coordinated by Social Welfare Department, where every affected person 
was registered on a database for the distribution of aid.  
There clearly existed widespread dissatisfaction with the government’s relief 
programmes. The data revealed that the discontent was concentrated on the 
mismanagement of funds, the ‘red tape’ that hampered the delivery of disaster 
aid, and allegations of nepotism, cronyism and favouritism. The complaint 
mostly came from the lower income groups for the simple reason that they 
were the most affected by the tsunami. 
An important contributing factor to the  unrest is a perception of resources 
being distributed to some ethnic groups and not to others, so we now move to 
consider the ethnic dimension (Horowitz, 2001) and  ethnic relations during 
and after tsunami  to identify the potential for the activation of ethnic tension 
as a result of  the population’s dissatisfaction and frustration with the 
government’s response and recovery programmes. 
Ethnic Relation and Tsunami 
Ethnic relations are commonly known as ‘thorn in the flesh’ (Malay proverb) in 
Malaysian society, particularly in Penang because the distribution of the 
Malay and non-Malay (particularly Chinese) population is nearly equal (Malay 
40.9% ; Non-Malay: Chinese 41.5%, Indian 9.9%, Non-Citizens 7%) and 
Others 0.3%) (Department of Statistics, 2013). This equality is aggravated by 
spatial segregation, whereby the non-Malays are concentrated in the city 
areas, such as Georgetown (63%) and Butterworth (52.7%) and Bukit 
Mertajam (73.5%), whereas the Malays are concentrated in the rural areas 
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such as in Seberang Prai Utara (58.5%) and Barat Daya (57.8%) (Department 
of Statistics, 2010). This segregation is also present in the education system, 
in which the non-Malays, particularly Chinese and Indian students, usually go 
to vernacular schools whereas the Malays opt for national schools, which 
leads to less interracial interaction which can contribute to cultural and 
religious misunderstanding.  
 
An interview with the former Penang State Representative of Teluk Bahang of 
Penang, Faridah Arshad on 21st July 2014, emphasised that some Chinese in 
Penang are more ‘kiasu’ (selfish), impertinent and racist than Chinese from 
other states,. A Kedah Chinese respondent said he heard Penang Chinese 
saying that they will never be satisfied until the Chinese take power from 
Malay and govern the country. This argument was corroborated by the then 
Deputy Chief Minister of Penang, Dr. Hilmi Yahya in an interview on 17th July 
2014, who pointed out that the Penang Chinese now dominate the country’s 
economy and their ambition is to take control of politics as reflected in 2008 
and 2013 election, where the trend of Chinese voting  was to support  the 
ruling party BN, in his Parliamentary constituency of Balik Pulau keep 
decreasing from 51% in 2008 to only 4% in 2013, despite the government 
providing a lot of assistance to the Chinese community such as monetary 
assistance to Chinese vernacular schools. 
How did this ethnic segregation impact on perceptions of the government’s 
response to the tsunami? Figure 4.20 shows that more than half (57%) of 
respondents preferred to help neighbours of the same ethnic background both 
during the tsunami response period and the post-tsunami rehabilitation. Out of 
the 57%, 35% of them are Malay, 34% Indian and 31% (Others, includes 
Chinese) (Figure 4.21). This data implies strongly that the affected 
communities are divided by racial lines reinforced by spatial segregation. 
During the sampling in the tsunami housing scheme in Tanjung Bungah, the 
resident’s representative claimed that the government gave extra attention to 
the Chinese and so they voted for the opposition parties in the 2008 election. 
This claim was corroborated by Dr. Hilmi Yahya (former Deputy Chief  
Minister  of Penang during the 2004 tsunami) in an interview on 17thJuly 2014, 
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Figure 4.21: Ethnic Preference in Giving Assistance during  
                  Response and Recovery by Ethnicity 
Figure 4.20: Ethnic Preference in Giving Assistance during 
Tsunami Response and Recovery 
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Faridah Arshad (former State Assembly Representative of Teluk Bahang in an 
interview on 21stJuly 2014 and Riduad Azuddin (Perkasa Penang Youth 
Chief) in an interview on 22nd July 2014, in which they unanimously agreed 
that the Chinese were looking for political power after they secured an 
economic advantage.  
With regards to the ethnic conflict, some 12% of respondents claimed there 
were both ethnic stress and some conflicts before the 2004 tsunami. 
However, only 3% of respondents stated this occurred constantly (more than 
12 cases a year) and a large majority, 97% described it as a rare occurrence 
with one to three cases a year. Analysis by ethnic group shows that all groups 
shared the same perception, in which, 32% of Malays, 34% of Indians and 
34% of others (including the Chinese) perceived ethnic conflict to be 
occasional (Figure 4.22).  
  
Figure 4.22: Perception of Ethnic Clash by Ethnic Group 
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This condition satisfies a basic component of a dormant complex political 
emergency in the case of Penang. In terms of the state of ethnic relations 
during and after the tsunami, 12% respondents (81%  Malay and 19% Indian) 
perceived inter-ethnic relations were  deteriorating immediately after tsunami 
and with a marginal  increase to 14% ( 76% Malay and 24% Indian) in the 
years after the tsunami (Figure 4.23 and Figure 4.24). Another 20% indicated 
they believed that relations between ethnic groups remained largely 
unchanged.  
The evidence indicates  a substantial deterioration in ethnic relations in the 
minds of some respondents immediately after tsunami and this evidence is 
corroborated the evidence of ethnic preferences when it came to giving 
assistance in the response and recovery phases (see Figure 4.20). Some 
10% of respondents identified no particular problem in ethnic relations before 
tsunami changed their perception to deteriorating after tsunami, and another 
4% who described ethnic relations as good before tsunami perceived it to be 
deteriorating after the tsunami (Table 4.6). However, 19% of respondents (all 
Malays) believe relations improved, and 20% respondents suggested the 
same in the tsunami recovery and rehabilitation phases. This suggests that 
approximately 1 in 5 of the population retained an optimistic view of ethnic 
relations and this group acted as an important stabiliser during a period of 
major stress, perhaps helping prevent ethnic tensions running out of control, 
although 4:5 of the respondents did not believe the situation improved. A 
second inhibiting factor is the role of elections as ‘safety valves’ to ease ethnic 
tensions by channeling discontents democratically into polling box. The state 
of ethnic relations is haunted by the legacy of the May 13, 1969 tragedy 
despite many attempts by the government to respond by introducing and 
implementing various preventive measures policies such as New Economic 
Policy-NEP (1970-1990), with the objective of restructuring ethnic relations, so 
that the politics, social and economy are not identified or characterised by 
ethnic interest, and to eradicate poverty irrespective of race. However, I argue 
that NEP policies were not adequately implemented and were subject to 
several weaknesses such as realignment of employments into two main 
categories; public sector dominated by Malays and private sector
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Figure 4.23:  Perception of State of Ethnic Relation During and 
After Tsunami 
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Figure 4.24: Perception of State of Ethnic Relation During and After Tsunami 
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Table 4.6: State of Ethnic Relations Before and in the Years Since the Tsunami 
Cross-tabulation 
% of Total   
 
State of ethnic relations in the years since the tsunami? 
Total Improving Deteriorating 
Status 
quo/same as 
before 
No 
comment 
State of ethnic 
relations before 
tsunami 
Good 62.0% 4.0% 16.0% 4.0% 86.0% 
No 
particular 
problem 
 10.0% 4.0%  14.0% 
Total 
62.0% 14.0% 20.0% 4.0% 100.0% 
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predominantly non-Malays, particularly Chinese. This, in turn, aggravated the 
ethnic tensions between the Malays and non-Malays. NEP also failed to 
integrate ethnic groups through one system of education with the national 
language as the medium of learning, by the continuation of vernacular schools 
that hindered the integration process, although the Reid Commission (tasked 
for formulating the Federal Constitution before independence in 1957) made a 
recommendation that the vernacular schools should be reviewed after 15 
years of independence. The weaknesses of NEP in terms of its 
implementation was corroborated by Secretary NSC in the interview on 7th 
August 2014, argues that the NEP benefited the ‘greedy Malays’ instead of 
the ‘needy Malays’.  
This fragile ethnic condition, was tested and challenged by the 2004 tsunami 
and this is reflected by the willingness of the affected populations who 
admitted that they preferred to give help to the neighbor from the same ethnic 
group. It implies that ethnic relations, which were dormant during the normal 
and peaceful times became apparent when the  disaster struck that the action 
taken by every ethnic groups were determined and influenced by their  racial 
prejudices, which contributed to the resentment towards the government and 
which was reflected at the polling stations. The next chapter will consider this. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the effects of the tsunami that was one of the 
largest in history that affected coastal countries across the Indian Ocean 
region from Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Myanmar, Indian, Sri Lanka to 
Somalia in the African continent. In Malaysia, the total loss of life was 68 and 
8,292 people affected and approximately RM100 million losses due to 
property and infrastructure damaged. In Penang, the tsunami destroyed 521 
houses and 1,430 boats. Subsequently, the government realised the urgency 
of developing an early warning system and an effective response mechanism 
by reassessing NSC Directive No. 20. The Abdullah administration introduced 
various response, recovery and rehabilitation programmes such as ‘Rumah 
Tsunami’ (housing aid), ‘Bantuan Wang Ehsan’ (monetary aid), Fishery and 
Agricultural Aid that did not satisfy many of the affected people.  91% of my 
research sample stated that the amount of ‘Wang Ehsan’ was not enough and 
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70% complaint about the late distribution of ‘Rumah Tsunami’. The 
ineffectiveness of government’s disaster response affected communities, 
which created a pool of discontent that contributed to an indirect political 
tsunami (in the case study areas) in 2008. 
This chapter laid the foundation for the next chapter exploring the frustration 
and dissatisfaction of affected communities that led them to vote for the 
opposition party in 2008 election in contrast to 2004. This change was a 
manifestation of local discontents (on other recurring issues such as rising 
cost of living, racial and religious issues, corruption allegation and misused of 
public fund as argued by other researchers such as Case (2010), Ming 
(2008), Chew (2015), Ghazali (2009) and Tay (2008) in the case study areas 
exacerbated by the tsunami, which my data captures. The tsunami is, I would 
argue, a significant, and possibly the main catalyst, indirectly triggering a 
political change that led to the political transformation (in the case study 
areas) in Penang in 2008 General Election. 
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Chapter 5: The Tsunami’s Indirect Effects on Politics   
 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the political consequences of the disaffection 
generated by the maladministration of the aid and indirect effects on politics in 
the case study areas. I consider the dissatisfaction of affected people on post-
tsunami response and recovery programes as indirect factors that contribute 
to the 2008 election because there are other factors influenced the voters 
such as rising cost of living and unaffordable housing price. I offer an 
alternative explanation of the unpredicted election results (at local level) that 
indirectly associated with the tsunami because other researchers concentrate 
on difference aspects such as a study by (Chew, 2015). This argues that the 
concept of people’s sovereignty (ketuanan rakyat), proposed by the 
opposition parties, as compared to Malay sovereignty (ketuanan melayu), 
which put the special recognition (such as allocation of scholarship, housing 
lots, and business permits) on the Malay and Bumiputra (sons of soil) 
communities that uphold the ruling parties led the non-Malays and young 
voters (particularly in the urban areas) to vote for opposition parties. Chew 
suggests that this Malay sovereignty “intensifying issues of corruption, 
nepotism, favouritism, cronyism, human rights abuses, rising cost of living and 
rising incident of crime that lead to major swing of votes into opposition in 
2008” (2015, 223).  
Approximately 85% of respondents in my case study indicated that their 
evaluation of the government’s programmes was very important in influencing 
their voting preference.  The result of this change (voting for for the opposition 
coalition) in preference was that the tsunami affected constituencies shifted 
their support from the ruling party coalition, the National Front (Barisan 
Nasional-BN), to the opposition coalition, People’s Alliance (Pakatan Rakyat-
PR).  This implies, to say the least, a relationship between the government’s 
performances and voting in 2008 in the tsunami affected areas: 70% of 
sample described their voting as a ‘protest vote’, which can be expressed by 
the term ‘tsunami politics’, a term used in Malaysian politics to indicate the 
protest. The failure of Prime Minister Abdullah’s administration to successfully 
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manage post-tsunami events and its subsequent dramatic defeat in 2008 
General Election was criticised by many quarters, in particular by the former 
Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir. I shall now discuss the political scenario before 
the tsunami struck in 2004. 
Politics before the Tsunami 
Political developments between 1998 and 2004 encouraged the Malaysian 
politics to move towards a two-coalition party system: the ruling BN and the 
opposition PR. The 1998 Reformation Movement provided an opportunity for 
opposition parties to create platform for a coordinated and systematic coalition 
led by Anwar Ibrahim. As a charismatic leader, Anwar succeeded in unifying 
and harmonising three main opposition parties with contrasting ideologies: 
PKR (liberalist), DAP (Socialist) and PAS (Islamist). The 1998 reformation 
movement, popularly known in Malaysia as ‘Reformasi’, could be regarded as 
a precursor to the development of the opposition political struggles that later 
exploded as ‘tsunami politics’ in 2008. Continuing the tsunami metaphor, the 
1998 ‘Reformasi’ was the first wave that produced the ‘political earthquake’ in 
the 1999 election, in which the opposition coalition PR posed a stiff 
competition to BN and increased its Parliamentary seats to 23% from 16% (in 
the 1995 election) and shook the domination of the BN in state legislative 
elections in two states and formed a new state government in Kelantan and 
Terengganu (for the first time since independence) (Ghazali, 2015). 
The momentum of ‘Reformasi’ was contained by the BN’s political strategies 
in 2003 when UMNO supervised the transition of power from Dr. Mahathir to 
Abdullah Badawi as the Prime Minister and the President of UMNO. This 
transition gained public support in 2004 due to the positive image of Abdullah 
as a ‘clean’, transparent and accountable person. His pledge in the 2004 
election campaign to establish a more democratic government by promising 
freedom of press and human rights captured the hearts and minds of a 
majority voters and he won a landslide victory in the 2004 election, with 90% 
of Parliamentary seats.  The PR, apparently discredited by BN’s victory, was 
activated by ‘Reformasi’ movement in 1998 with series of street 
demonstrations that often descended into violence, and subsequently became 
inactive and dormant.  
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The test of the Abdullah administration’s performance came nine months after 
the election, when the tsunami hit and caused massive damage to property, 
infrastructure and loss of life. 
(Case, 2010) argues that the baseline for an unexpected outcome of the 2008 
Malaysian General Election differs from that the literature suggests, which 
centres on the lost control of dominant ruling parties over public resources, 
fading patronage, and decreasing popular support for elites. Instead, in the 
Malaysian case, despite the ruling alliance party having control of resources, 
the unpredicted election results can be attributed to intensifying popular 
discontents among the party (in particular UMNO) members with regards to 
cronyism and favouritism. As for the voters in general, the dissatisfaction 
caused by allegedly electoral manipulation, corruption, and misconduct 
incompetent cabinet ministers, a rising cost of living and inflation, 
unemployment rate, increased and impacted on electoral loyalties. The public 
outcry over the disparities within and between   ethnic groups lead to public 
protests organised by Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections (or BERSIH) in 
2007 and 2008. In a front-page editorial, The New Straits Times (2008: 1), 
that “the people have long been disgusted with the kind of boorish and loutish 
behaviour that UMNO leaders have exemplified because of their grip on 
power since independence in 1957” (Case, 2010, p. 143). As a consequence, 
the 2008 election demonstrates that the ruling party lost substantial Malay 
support with 5% swing to the opposition. Ming (2008) suggests that the ruling 
alliance party- Barisan Nasional (National Front) got Malay voters 58%, 
Chinese 35% and 48% Indian. (Chin & Huat, 2009) argue that the 2008 
election demonstrates the disapproval and rejection of the alleged 
authoritarian of UMNO led ruling alliance r, in particular under the premiership 
of Dr. Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003), who accused by the opposition, abuse 
of power, dictatorship, curbing the freedom of parliament, media freedom and 
undermining the rule of law (by interfering with the judiciary  There were three 
significant public protests in 2007 prior to the election that contributed to  the 
unprecedented outcome of the 2008 election. First, the V.K Lingam (a lawyer 
with strong ties with politicians) video clip case, was unveiled by the 
opposition party (PKR) in August 2007,to demonstrate the issue of judicial 
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integrity  with regard to the appointment of Federal Court judges, of which he 
acted as the ‘playmaker’ and ‘broker’. This case led two thousand Malaysian 
Bar Council members to march on the Prime Minister’s Office in the 
administrative city of Putrajaya to protest at political interference with the 
judiciary. Second, a  rally of fifty-thousand people (mix-ethnic and mostly 
young urban protesters) organised by BERSIH and opposition parties on 10th 
November 2007 protested against  unfairness in the election process such as 
the allegation of ‘phantom voters’ and gerrymandering. Third, the protest 
organised by the Hindu Rights Action Force (HINDRAF), saw thirty-thousand 
Malaysian Indians gathered in Merdeka Square and marched towards Kuala 
Lumpur City Centre building (KLCC - the tallest twin tower in Malaysia) to 
show solidarity in protesting the alleged discrimination against  Malaysian 
citizens of Indian origin.  
In post-election analyses, UMNO blamed the BN’s components of MCA, MIC 
and GERAKAN of not fully explaining government policies, in particular 
regarding special privileges of Malays and Bumiputra which were laid down in 
the Federal Constitution. Likewise the component parties blamed UMNO for 
raising up the sensitive issues of ‘Ketuanan Melayu’ (Malay Sovereignty) 
during the UMNO General Assembly that was described by the opposition as 
a double standard policy and treating other ethnic groups as a second class 
citizens. The Opposition countered with the concept of ‘Ketuanan Rakyat’ 
(People’s Sovereignty), which emphasis on the equal treatment of every 
citizen regardless of ethnicity, which influenced the non-Malays and middle 
class voters. The next section explores the alternative explanation of the 2008 
election results at local level, in particular in the tsunami affected areas in 
Penang, whether the tsunami and its aftermath response influence the voters. 
Indirect Political Effects 
This section discusses the indirect political effect of the tsunami in the 
affected areas in Penang. However, due to time and resources constraints, I 
focus only on my case study areas and the analysis is not seeking to 
generalize to the Penang and Malaysia because the effect of tsunami is 
localised and case specific. 
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There is evidence from the case study the relationship between the 
government agencies’ tsunami response and the 2008 election (Figure 5.1), 
65% of the respondents indicated the government’s 
 
 
performance was very important and 20% important, a combined figure of 
85%, compared to only 15% who stated that they were not important to their  
decision to vote.  
Figure 5.2 gives ethnic group in relation to party vote and whether voting was 
influenced by the government’s performance. Some 78% of Indian voters 
considered government’s performance ‘very important’ and 22% ‘important’ in 
influencing their votes in the 2008 election. Some 59% of Malays stated 
government agencies’ response was very important and 22% important. For 
other ethnic groups (Chinese and others), 100% stated government’s 
efficiency and effectiveness during rehabilitation was very important. This data
Figure 5.1:  The Importance of Tsunami’s Response and Recovery  
                     Programmes in Relation to Voting Decision 
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therefore, implies a strong relationship between the voters’ evaluation of 
government performance and their voting behaviour in 2008, which influenced 
voters to cast a protest vote against the ruling party, by voting the opposition. 
Some 75% of my research sample.  This conclusion was supported by the 
Secretary and former Deputy Secretary of NSC in the interviews who stated 
that the popular disappointment with the government’s late response to the 
tsunami, prompted voters to vote for the opposition. 78% of Indian 
respondents  affected by the tsunami claimed that the performance of 
government agencies during the tsunami response and recovery influenced 
their decision to vote  for the opposition,  implies  a perception of ethnic bias  
and a perception of failure by the government leading to a decision to punish 
the governing party at the polls for failure, which derived from the 
dissatisfaction and frustration of tsunami affected people that led to the 
Figure 5.2:  The Importance of Tsunami’s Response and Recovery  
                     Programmes in Relation to Voting Decision by Ethnicity 
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emergence of ‘tsunami politics’ in Penang. The implication is that discontent 
with the recovery programmes stimulated political change. 
With regards to the parties’ respondents supported in the 2004 and 2008 
elections, votes for the opposition coalition increased substantially (Figure 
5.3) from 5% in 2004 to 25% in 2008 election and maintained the same 
percentage differential in 2013. This suggests the change in voting patterns is 
reinforced. Table 5.1 gives a detailed analysis of the relationship between the 
2004 and 2008 elections. 75% voted for the BN in 2008 and 25% voted for the 
PR.  Of the 75% who voted for the BN, 79% of them were loyal to the BN and 
voted BN in both 2004 and 2008. Out of the 25% who voted for the PR in 
2008, 20% of them swung from BN and 5% remained loyal to the PR in both 
elections. This implies that 20% of BN voters swung to PR in the 2008 
election. Thus, 1 in 5 voters changed allegiance, a very large shift in the 
context of Malaysian politics: Further, 70% of respondents stated that protest 
was the reason they voted for the PR in the 2008 election (Figure 5.4).  
Respondents protested government because of dissatisfaction and frustration 
with the government’s response and the post-tsunami rehabilitation 
programmes: 50% of all respondents believed government agencies arrived 
late.   
With respect to the recovery programmes, 40% believed allocations of aid 
favoured certain political and ethnic groups but a smaller percententage, 20%, 
believed the distribution of aid was influenced by nepotism and cronyism. This 
is in line with the high percentage of 65% (very important) and 21% 
(important) of respondents who stated that the government’s response and 
recovery programmes influenced their decision on which party to vote for in 
2008 election. 
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of Which Party Respondents Vote for in 2004, 2008 and 2013 General Elections 
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Table 5.1: Cross-tabulation of Which Party Respondents Voted in 2004 and 2008 Elections 
 
 
Which party did you vote in 2008? 
Total 
 
BN: UMNO, 
GERAKAN, MCA, 
MIC 
PR: PKR, DAP, 
PAS 
 
Which party 
did you vote 
in 2004? 
BN: 
UMNO, 
GERAKA
N, MCA, 
MIC 
% within which 
party did you vote 
in 2004? 
79% 21% 100% 
% of Total 75% 20% 95% 
PR: PKR, 
DAP, 
PAS 
% within which 
party did you vote 
in 2004? 
 100% 100% 
% of Total  5% 5% 
Total % within which 
party did you vote 
in 2004? 
75% 25% 100% 
% of Total 75% 25% 100% 
 
Pearson Chi-Square 0.012 at 95% confident level. 
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Figure 5.5 shows that 100% of the families below the official poverty line 
(income below RM9,600 a year) voted PR as a protest against the ruling 
party. On the other hand, 78% of the high income groups voted for the 
opposition because they no longer trusted the BN’s leadership. This suggests 
that discontent was uniformly high across income groups.  
 
Figure 5.6 provides the reasons respondents voted for a party by ethnic 
group. It shows that the Malays were divided between a protest vote and lack 
of trust in the party’s leadership: 46% and 54% respectively. A majority of 
Indian respondents (48%) changed votes because they did not believe in or 
trust the ruling party. Indians, interviewed during the course of the research, 
claimed many Indians felt frustrated about the Malaysian Indian Congress 
Figure 5.4:  Reason of Voting Different Party in 2008 General  
                     Election 
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Figure 5.6: Reasons of Voting Different Party in 2008 General Election  
by Ethnic 
 
Figure 5.5:  Reasons of Voting Different Party in 2008 General  
                     Election by Income Group 
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(MIC) which was one of BN’s components, which was also late in providing 
assistance to ethnic Indians and broke their promises on monetary aid. Again, 
we see a sharp fall in trust and by extension loyalty, which erodes previous 
electoral behaviour.  
 
Figure 5.7 compares the voting pattern of respondents by ethnic group in 
2004 and 2008. It shows that the ethnic Malay vote for BN dropped from 
100% in 2004 to 89% (-19%) in 2008 and ethnic Indian’s vote for BN 
substantially decreased from 78% to 22% (+56%) between 2004 and 2008. 
Malay votes for the opposition coalition parties increased by 11% in 2008 
election and Indian votes for the PR increased by 56% in 2008.  The BN 
enjoyed strong support from Malays and Indians until 2008 when 11% and 
78% of them respectively shifted to the PR and this pattern was sustained, 
becoming permanent in the 2013 election. This was a seismic shift in Malay 
and Indian political history because traditionally both were loyal supporters to 
the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and the Malaysian Indian 
Congress (MIC), two of the strongest parties in the BN’s coalition in every 
election since independence. The substantial swing of Malay votes, according 
to my research, was due to a protest vote (30%) and no longer trusting the 
UMNO leadership (10%) that suggest a rejection based on the parties’ 
effectiveness in delivery, because of cronyism and nepotism (40%) and 
doubts over the integrity of the leadership (20%). Indians voted for the PR in 
the 2008 elections because they no longer had confidence in the MIC party 
leadership (10%) or its policies and principles (10%). Interviews with Indian 
respondents revealed that all who voted for the opposition believed that the 
MIC had failed to deliver its promise to improve living conditions and this led 
them to vote against the MIC in the 2008 election as a protest vote (40%).  
 
Figure 5.8 shows that there was an increase in the  votes of the middle 
income group who voted for the PR in 2008 election with 61% from family 
income of RM24,001 to RM48,000 (compared to 2004 election when, 26% 
voted for PR).  The discontent over the tsunami response also influenced 
government civil servants’ votes that swung substantially from BN (26%) to 
PR (49%). This indicates that government servants, who have been known as  
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Figure 5.7: Voting Pattern by Ethnic Group in 2004, 2008 and 2013 General Election 
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Figure 5.8: Voting Pattern by Income Group in 2004, 2008 and 2013 General Elections 
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loyal supporters of the ruling party since independence, have also shifted to 
PR because they no longer trust the leadership. Further analysis by age 
group demonstrates that the middle aged (41 to 50 years) doubled their 
support for PR from 21% (2004) to 41% (2008) and this was sustained in 
2013 with 43%. 
 
There was evidence of indignation and discontent with the government’s slow 
progress in distributing disaster monetary aid and allocating the tsunami 
resettlement house, voicedout in the mass media. Online newspapers also 
reported that about 21 affected fishermens’ families in Pulau Betong and 
Sungai Batu, Balik Pulau, claimed that they received no monetary aid or 
financial assistance from the government after more than a year of the 
tsunami. Many of them who lost their boats and fishing equipment only 
received donations from the public and tithe contributions RM200 from the 
Majlis Agama Islam Pulau Pinang (MAIPP) or Penang Islamic Council. Some 
of them alleged that there was discrimination in  distributing the disaster 
assistance and questioning where was the donation money from the public to 
the disaster fund being allocated (Mohd Nor, 2005). UMNO allegedly 
dominated and controlled the allocation process that exposed to the 
mismanagement, nepotism and cronyism as previous cases of discrimination 
in Kedah and Penang, where the personnel at the distribution centre allocated  
disaster aid with priority to UMNO members (Mohd Nor, 2005). 
Reporting by Utusan Malaysia (a Malay language newspaper) revealed that 
tsunami affected populations were still occupying temporary houses in 
Tanjung Bungah although the development of permanent ‘tsunami houses’ 
had been completed on 27th February 2007. They were promised t the new 
houses but thiss had not materialized because the negotiations about the 
housing price between Penang State Government and Federal Government 
was still in progress. The then Chief Minister of Penang, Mr. Koh Tsu Koon 
reported that the State Government proposed the price is RM42,000 (£7,636) 
but the Federal Government insisted to put a higher price of RM52,000 
(£9,454), that led to stalemate in the discussion (Utusan Malaysia, 2007). 
   
117 
 
A second newspaper, Harakah Daily (owned by the opposition party, PAS) 
reported in 2007 that 39 families in Tanjung Bungah were still waiting for the 
‘tsunami houses’ from the government after their previous applications were 
not granted on the grounds that they were staying with other families at their 
old house and the temporary house. They argued that the government should 
conduct due diligence in determining and ensuring only affected local 
residents will get the new houses and to avoid the previous mistake of 
allocating the temporary houses to the ineligible persons such as to a tenant 
instead of an owner (Said, 2007). 
The tsunami affected population in Penang were reported by Malaysiakini (an 
independent online newspaper) that they made up their mind to vote for the 
opposition in the next election in 2008 as a protest vote at the alleged 
mismanagement of tsunami relief fund and the three year failure of the 
government to keep their promise of allocating the ‘tsunami houses’ . They 
claimed that the Prime Minister Najib had promised to resettle them in   new 
permanent houses three previous years earlier. Some of them pointed out 
their loyalty to the ruling party, Barisan Nasional (BN) had now changed to the 
opposition, Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) or Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), 
two main parties in the opposition coalition, as a protest because the 
government had only transferred one quarter of RM10,000 total cost of 
houses’ repairs. Others openly declared that they would vote for PAS in order 
to make sure UMNO will lose in the next election because of their resentment 
over the mishandling of RM85 million tsunami funds contributed and donated 
by public. No one knew where the money was distributed, as revealed by the 
2006 Auditor General’s Report, that established millions of public donations 
for tsunami fund were mismanaged, resulting in low quality of ‘rumah tsunami’ 
or tsunami houses, development contracts were not properly managed, and 
tsunami housing projects were delayed (Malaysiakini, 2008). 
Four years after the tsunami hit, affected villagers remained hostile because 
the promised ‘tsunami houses’ were not allocated to them, even though the 
construction of the houses were completed. They were tired of waiting and 
were given no hope in getting the houses (Sapidin, 2008). My fieldwork 
(information from the officer in charge of disaster management at the NSC 
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Penang Office) establishes that the construction of ‘tsunami houses’ were 
delayed for over a year because of  the looting and vandalism of construction 
materials, bad weather conditions, and the developer’s problems. However, 
some of the affected population, as reported by Utusan Malaysia (Malay 
language newspaper), claimed that the developer never  provided a  proper 
explanation of the development progress and issues such as terms of 
agreements, mode and schedule of payment and compensation for the old 
houses to be demolished were unanswered, which potentially led to confusion 
and public disquiet  (Sapidin, 2008). For those who already obtained the 
houses, there were complaints about the low quality of the houses. 
 
In 2014 Utusan Malaysia (Malay language newspaper) reported that some of 
the affected people had still not received houses after ten years (Utusan 
Malaysia, 2014). The affected people manifested their anger and 
disappointment about the promised house allocation and some refused to be 
interviewed because of their anger, losing trust in anybody who promised their 
voices will be heard. They even mentioned that they do not want the houses 
anymore and instead will stay at their current houses even though the tsunami 
hit the areas; they would rather die than run away. Others felt they were being 
mocked, fooled and betrayed by the government because many government 
representatives, particularly the ruling party’s politicians, promised the houses 
would be allocated, but this had not yet being materialised ten years after the 
tsunami. One of the affected villagers pointed out that politicians used to 
promise 400 people would be resettled in a new housing area but they have 
waited over ten years for the promise to be fulfilled. This was the worst hit 
location where 126 residents struck by the tsunami but they still had not 
obtained the house (Utusan Malaysia, 2014). 
The data from this fieldwork, corroborated by interviews and newspaper 
coverage, suggests the following conclusions. First, the political change in the 
case study areas in terms of voters who voted for PR in 2008 was massive; 
changing from 5% in 2004 to 25% in 2008 election and covers every level of 
the samples’ profile. Second, the political change was unexpected and 
unprecedented, as confirmed by the interviewees, that there were no 
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indications that the BN would suffer loss of a two thirds majority and lost 
control of 5 states included Penang to the opposition until the last night of the 
election campaign, when the Chinese businessmen’ switched support to PR, 
but they did not expect the drastic loss of the two thirds majority. Third, this 
change was sustained in 2013 election, which suggests it has been 
reinforced. This argument corroborated by all the interviewees who 
unanimously agreed that political change will sustain, and becomes a new 
trend in Malaysian politics. Fourth, the main reason why voters shifted from 
BN to PR was because of a protest that resulted from frustration and 
dissatisfaction with the tsunami response and rehabilitation programmes, 
which exacerbate the pre-existing and long standing issues of racial and 
religious tensions, rising cost of living and allegation of ‘kleptocracy’ that 
eroded trust in the hitherto dominant party coalition.   
Conclusion 
The factors that affect political behaviour in the aftermath of disasters include 
factors of long-standing such as rising cost of living, unaffordable housing 
prices, rising crime and corruption, accusations of nepotism and cronyism, 
and the mismanagement of public funds. The parties were already vulnerable 
to, or even subject to, serious stresses and disruptions before the natural 
disaster struck.  Natural disaster therefore accelerated developments and if 
the government fails to respond effectively and address the expectations of 
different groups, and there is the perception of racial bias in its actions, then 
trouble will develop. I argue that the government did fail to respond 
adequately (50% of my sample agreed) and there was evidence of ethnic 
tensions before the tsunami’. I argue that the political change (in the case 
study areas only) of the 2008 election was indirectly triggered by tsunami, 
where 86% of my respondents stated that their dissatisfaction with the 
government’s response and recovery programmes influenced them to vote for 
opposition in the 2008 election. Therefore, it is sensible to assume that the 
frustration and dissatisfaction regarding tsunami response, relief efforts and 
recovery programmes that triggers the shift to ‘tsunami politics’. However, it is 
worth pointing out at this stage that the stress generated by tsunami politics 
were kept under control and institutionalised by the effective functioning of 
   
120 
 
Malaysia’s political institutions and electoral process. Even though these 
voters were subject of the discontents as outlined in this Chapter, it seems 
that without the tsunami the discontents would not have been transformed into 
active voter change, other than over a much longer period of time. I argue that 
the tsunami triggered and accelerated ‘indirect’ political change in my case 
study areas. 
There are many examples of how dissatisfied voters turn to the opposition 
party as a consequence of a poorly managed disaster and relief response. As 
the contrasting U.S cases of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy, and the 
case of earthquakes in Haiti and Chile, demonstrate an understanding the 
political and social fabric in disaster stricken areas is a key factor in disaster 
politics. However, the extent of impact of disaster on politics depends on the 
nature of the political landscape prior to the disaster, which is unique to a 
particular country, as well as the post-disaster response. It is depending on 
the multiple and complex interaction of politics, socio-economic conditions, 
demographic, and environmental insecurity. The case studies in Penang 
describe a society characterised by conditions of political and social tension, 
high exposure to natural disasters, urbanisation, a complex demography, and 
a pluralistic society (multi-ethnic, cultural, multi-language, multi-religion and 
socially and spatially or geographically segregated). This resulted in dramatic 
political change and accelerated a long term transformative adaptation of 
disaster management mechanism that will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 6: Transformative Change and Adaptation 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the transformative adaptation programmes introduced 
and developed by the Malaysian Government in response to the 2004 
tsunami that transformed the existing structures and mechanisms of disaster 
management. In designing these programmes, the Government took into 
account the reaction and feedback of the tsunami affected people and the 
public outcry concerning the weaknesses of the existing programmes.  
 
In the preparedness stage, the government’s transformation efforts are 
focused on setting up a nationwide Malaysia Tsunami Early Warning System, 
empowering communities living in disaster prone areas through Community 
Based Disaster Risk Reduction Programmes (CBDRR), and in a longer term, 
formulating a new Disaster Management Act and establishing a new National 
Disaster Management Agency (NADMA). In terms of mitigation, the focus is 
on embedding disaster mitigation in development planning. While in the 
response stage, government realised the weaknesses of the NSC Directive 
No. 20 was its failure to cater for ‘unknown’ and unprecedented events, such 
as a tsunami. Hence, the NSC Directive was amended to include a tsunami 
response. This followed by formulation of a new Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOP’s) for a tsunami that spell out detail procedures for 
response and recovery. The following sections discuss in detail these 
transformative adaptations. 
 
Transformation after the Tsunami 
Within a month of the tsunami, the Malaysian Government formed a Disaster 
Management Committee at federal level chaired by the Deputy Prime 
Minister, comprising the Department of Meteorology, the Department of Public 
Works, the Welfare Department, the Department of Irrigation and Drainage, 
and the Remote Sensing Agency, with the National Security Council as the 
secretariat.  The main task of the Disaster Management Committee was to 
conduct a post mortem on the tsunami response, and plan for the recovery of 
the affected areas.  The most discussed problem was the absence of a 
tsunami early warning system and the coastal areas without any physical 
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protection (such as levees or vegetation, particularly mangrove swamps) that 
suffered greater damage. The Committee agreed to form two technical 
committees to develop long term tsunami preparedness programmes. These 
were the Tsunami Early Warning Committee (led by the Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Innovation), and the National Special Task Force for 
Rehabilitation of coastal areas, steered by the Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Environment, which was to discuss in detail tsunami relief management 
and early warning, and, review NSC Directive No. 20 to develop tsunami 
standard operating procedures (SOPs), and Community Based Disaster Risk 
Reduction (CBDRR). We will now consider these programmes in more detail.  
The government, through the Disaster Management Committee, formulated 
long term programmes that can be grouped into technical and non-technical. 
In term of technical programmes, first, the installation of tsunami early warning 
systems in the tsunami vulnerable areas; and the second, focused on the 
development of permanent housing and relocation known as ‘Rumah 
Tsunami’  as discussed in the previous chapter.  
In term of non-technical programmes, first, streamlining structures, 
mechanisms, and standard operating procedures (in particular, updating NSC 
Directive No. 20 to include dealing with tsunamis ); second, introducing 
National Platform for Disaster Management that incorporates disaster risk, 
preparedness, mitigation, response, and rehabilitation in the existing planning 
and development plans, rules and regulations at each level of government 
administration involving various stakeholders (Center for Excellence in 
Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance, 2016). This National 
Platform initiated and supported by the then Deputy Secretary of NSC as he 
pointed out in an interview on 7th August 2014. The National Platform also 
streamlines the communication between government agencies, and, between 
government and vulnerable populations.  
Third, the Government also planned to table Disaster Management Bill in the 
Parliament in 2014 to strengthen the disaster management agencies, such as 
the power to use appropriate means to evacuate threatened communities, 
prosecute those responsible for the amplifying the disaster, such as those 
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undertaking illegal farming, logging and development that contributed to  
landslides or floods in the particular areas, and empower the vulnerable 
communities on disaster preparedness (Berita Harian, 2014).  
Fourth, the NSC organises and coordinates capacity building in vulnerable 
communities by, after 2008, adapting the Community Based Disaster 
Management (CBDM) model from the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre 
(ADPC), with the main focus on community based disaster risk reduction 
activities. In terms of public education and awareness of disaster 
management, the government launched various programmes such as those 
by the Ministry of Education(with cooperation from UNESCO) to conduct 
emergency preparedness programmes for school teachers, declaring  26th 
December  as National Disaster Awareness Day, publishing  Public 
Awareness Guideline on Disasters, and organising public seminars, road 
shows, and drills. The next section discuss in details the integration of 
disaster risk reduction into development planning. 
Embedding Disaster Mitigation in Development Planning 
Malaysia subscribed to international cooperation in reducing disaster risk by 
adopting the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) in November 2005 through 
the National Disaster and Relief Management Committee Meeting chaired by 
the Deputy Prime Minister. HFA was launched in Hyogo, Japan on January 
2005 during the United Nations World Conference on Disaster Reduction 
(WCDR). The Asian Conference on Disaster Reduction took place in 
September 2005 in Beijing, to formulate an implementation plan of HFA for 
Asian countries.  
 
In an effort to comply with HFA, Malaysia started to implement HFA strategies 
involving the mainstreaming disaster risk reduction in development policies 
and planning by establishing a National Platform for Disaster Management, 
which is a complex guideline to integrate and incorporate disaster risk 
assessment, preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery into various 
plan, rules and regulations such as the Malaysian Five Year Development 
Plan (coordinated by Economic Planning Unit), Spatial Planning Policy, 
Structure and Local Plans, including disaster risk mapping (managed by the 
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Town and Country Planning Department), Shoreline Management and 
Coastal Rehabilitation managed by the Drainage Irrigation Department (DID) 
and Forestry Department9. For example, disaster prevention and mitigation 
programmes as part of coastal rehabilitation proved to be very effective in 
reducing the tsunami wave due to mangrove forests acting as natural buffers 
as in Balik Pulau (Penang) and in contrast to Kuala Muda (Kedah) which 
lacked mangrove swamps and where the tsunami wave swept inland  
(Abdullah et al., 2005). Another example of the effectiveness of mangrove 
forest was that the houses in Padang Slim village (Kedah) were spared by the 
tsunami because of 50 meters of mangrove swamp. Therefore, the National 
Disaster and Relief Management Committee decided to intensify coastal 
vegetation and increased replanting programmes and protecting mangrove 
forest.  
 
Another aspect of disaster prevention are the Drainage and Irrigation 
Department’s (DID) guidelines on ‘set-back’ for coastal development. The set-
back is a gap of non-development maximum 400 meters from mangrove tree-
line for mud beaches and 60 meters for sandy beaches without coastal 
protection (such as a retention wall).  During the 2004 tsunami many houses 
in Kuala Muda, Kedah would not have been so severely damaged if 
development had been in compliance with the guideline. Another example is 
of a government training centre in Pasir Panjang, which  was inundated by the 
tsunami wave because the centre is only 30 meters from the beach (Abdullah 
et al., 2005). However, this guideline is not practical for Penang due to the 
scarcity of land and has been opposed by developers. It implies that the 
mangrove forests were successful in breaking up the tsunami wave, but the 
60 meter setback is not suitable for implementation on Penang. However, the 
setback guidelines could be accompanied by coastal defence systems such 
as a retention wall. There are a few laws relating to disaster prevention in 
Malaysia such as the Land Conservation Act 1960, the Environmental Quality 
Act 1974, the Road, Street, Drainage and Building Act 1974, the Local 
                                                          
9 Interview conducted with the former Deputy Secretary NSC, Che Moin Omar and the Principal 
Assistant Secretary, Disaster Management Division of NSC Putrajaya, Norhisham Kamarudin on 7th 
August 2014 and5th August 2014 respectively. 
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Government Act 1976, the Occupational Safety and Health Act 1994, and the 
Uniform Building By-Laws 1984. Before the 2004 tsunami, there were several 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) on specific types of disaster, such as 
flood, industrial disasters, forest fire/open burning and haze, oil, gas and 
petrochemical disasters, that generated the National Contingency Plan for Oil 
Spill Combat, Drought, Pandemic/ Endemic Preparedness Plans (on revision) 
(Kamarudin, 2014). 
DRR was also embedded in land use planning and development at various 
stages. This initiative led by the Town and Country Planning Department and 
implemented through the National Physical Plan (National Level), the 
Structural Plan (State Level), the Local Plan, and Special Area Plans (Local 
Level) incorporated zoning for Environmental Sensitive Areas, geo-hazards, 
natural protection such as mangroves, Integrated Water Resources 
Management (IWRM), and Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM). The 
Malaysian ‘11th Five Year Development Plan’ (2016-2020) embodying 
physical and socio-economic plan, embeds DRR by targeting improvements 
to the quality of life and promoting sustainable growth in order to achieve 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG). 
Development of the Tsunami Early Warning System 
The Disaster Management Committee identified an urgent need to develop a 
national tsunami early warning system. The resulting Malaysian National 
Tsunami Early Warning System (MNTEWS) was developed by the Malaysian 
Meteorological Department to cover near shore areas.  MNTEWS consists of 
three elements: data and information collection, data processing and analysis, 
and the dissemination of results (these also include a network of tsunami 
sirens). MTEWS can  detect earthquake tremors that may lead to tsunami 
waves using  three buoys  installed near Rondo Island in Sumatra (December 
2005), Peninjau Island on the South China Sea (March 2006), and near 
Sipadan Island (August 2010). These disseminate early warnings of tremors 
through satellites and are received by an earth station in Cyberjaya, then 
forwarded to the MNTEWS centre at MMD in Petaling Jaya for analysis, 
followed by announcements in the mass media (especially television), fixed 
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telephone lines, and Short Messaging System (SMS) to the vulnerable 
populations within 12 minutes of the first detection of tremors (Umar, 2007).  
 
Tsunami alerts are also sent to disaster management agencies, particularly 
National Security Council, and first responders (such as police, fire and 
rescue, medical services, civil defence, marine police, coast guards) and the 
Welfare Department. As part of the dissemination, 23 tsunami sirens 
throughout Malaysia, in which 4 of them were built in Penang Island (at 
Tanjung Bungah, Batu Ferringhi, Teluk Bahang and Pasir Panjang) in 2010 
(Figure 6.1) (Saw, 2012). The Malaysian Tsunami Early Warning Systems 
(MTEWS) is able to detect the possibility of a tsunami whenever an 
earthquake occurs in Sumatra, the Southern Philippines, or the South China 
Sea. The MTWES then disseminates the early warning information to the 
public, in particular to the tsunami vulnerable communities, via various 
channels such as fixed-line telephones, Government Integrated Radio 
Network (GIRN), the Malaysia Emergency Response System (MERS) hotline, 
television, radio and social media (Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp groups) 
(Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance, 
2016, p. 46). 
 
According to the Penang State Executive Councillor, Phee Boon Poh, disaster 
management agencies in Penang conduct tsunami drills and exercises twice 
a year in order to keep them prepared and educate the public about tsunami 
emergency response procedures, such as the safest routes to the evacuation 
centres and their location. The exercises and drills are in accordance with 
National Security Council (NSC) Directive No. 20, which spells out that the 
once the Malaysian Meteorological Department (MMD) has detected a 
credible tsunami threat, it will issue a warning and inform the State Secretary 
and the Chief Minister of Penang, who then will set up a disaster committee to 
coordinate an inter-agency response involving police, civil defence, fire and 
rescue departments, hospitals, local councils, and coast guards. Foreign 
embassies and consulates will also be notified enabling them to take action 
and inform their citizens. Police and local council enforcement teams will be 
immediately mobilised and sent to the tsunami prone areas to keep people 
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Figure 6.1: Location of Tsunami Sirens in Penang Island, Malaysia. 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Saw (2012), Imagery from Digital Globe, Google 2016. 
 
Batu  Ferringhi 
Teluk Bahang 
Pasir Panjang 
Tg. Bungah 
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away from beaches and urge them go to the nearest evacuation centres 
(Mok, 2014). However, Councillor Phee notes that there were several cases 
where the disaster management agencies did not get cooperation from the 
public during the drills and this hampers the response process. Non-
cooperation was partly due to misunderstanding by the public of what 
procedures to follow in the event of a tsunami, as in the case of 2013 tsunami 
drills, when the public left their cars on the streets and rushed to Gurney 
Plaza as soon as they heard the sirens. This caused traffic congestion with 
many people trapped in the cars. Some coastal residents and business 
owners (of restaurants, souvenir shops, and tourism services) ignored the 
sirens and refused to leave their homes and shops because they were afraid 
of their shops being looted  (Mok, 2014). Some people in Penang even went 
to the beach to find out what was happening (Interview with the former Deputy 
Secretary of NSC: 7th August 2014). From my observation during the 
fieldwork, there were no visible signboards with information about tsunami 
evacuation centres and the safest routes to get there. In their absence the 
public may be confused and panic because of no clear directions and 
guidelines on tsunami response and evacuation. 
The tsunami drills and exercises in Penang were run by MMD in 2015 at a 
popular tourist beach of Batu Ferringhi; it started with 15 minutes of tsunami 
sirens at 12.30pm. The public ignored the alarms and continued their activity 
as normal. When they were asked why they did not respond to the sirens, 
they said that they would only run away if they saw a tsunami wave coming  
(Lee, 2015). This implies that the drills and exercises have not achieved their 
objective of educating the public about the danger of a tsunami. I argue that 
this situation also stemmed from false tsunami alarm in 2007 that made the 
public less confident with the sirens. MMD had technical problems when 
relaying the message of tsunami in 2007, which caused it to disseminate false 
information about an earthquake and tsunami that derived from a faulty 
seismology intranet system and a defective fax machine. The false warning 
delivered a statement that the devastated tsunami will hit coastal areas in 
Penang, Kedah and Perlis as a consequence of earthquake in Padang, 
Sumatera, Indonesia (The Sun Daily, 2007). 
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I argue that the people in the tsunami vulnerable areas are complacent,  
thinking of a tsunami as a once in a lifetime event, therefore they do not take 
the drills seriously, and will only take action when the real tsunami threat 
happens, thus putting themselves in danger, jeopardising and delaying 
evacuation efforts leading to loss of life. The impact and consequences on the 
population would be severe if the first responders did not effectively manage 
to evacuate the affected people within the time frame before the tsunami 
wave reached them. I argue that if this scenario took place, the government 
would most likely be heavily criticised, even though part of the problem is 
caused by the population’s lack of confidence in the early warning systems 
and the regular drills, exercises and public awareness programmes. However, 
the political impact of the next tsunami are likely to be less significant than the 
last incidents in 2004. 
Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDRR) 
CBDRR is part of the Community Based Disaster Management (CBDM), 
multi-agency activities coordinated by the National Security Council started in 
2010 in an effort to build local capacity through identifying and minimising 
disaster risks. Its main objectives were to develop public awareness of 
disaster risk, create a platform to disseminate disaster information so that 
vulnerable communities would be better prepared for disasters and creating 
resilient communities.  
 
Public awareness campaigns were conducted by the National Security 
Council and the Department of Meteorology in 16 vulnerable locations 
throughout Malaysia after 2010. In order to evaluate the level of public 
awareness and effectiveness of the campaigns,  568 questionnaires were 
completed (Zainal et al., 2011). A majority of participants (60%) were aware of 
the impact and risk of earthquakes and a tsunami after 2004 and a majority 
(more than 60%) of participants acquired a basic knowledge of the threat, 
such as the differences between a tidal wave and a tsunami wave (which is 
indicated by a sudden retreat of sea and followed by high speed wave) after 
attending the awareness programme. More than half (53%) of participants 
obtained their information about the Malaysian Tsunami Early Warning 
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Systems (MTEWS) through the mass media particularly television; and, more 
than half are aware of early warning sirens, the location of their evacuation 
centre, and the actions to be taken in the event of a warning. 
 
Prior to the 2004 tsunami, the awareness programmes focused on flooding 
since this is the most common disaster in Malaysia, in particular the monsoon 
floods that occur every year between November and February. The 
population in the coastal areas had no knowledge of a tsunami and its impact. 
Since 2006, the NSC has organized series of public education and awareness 
campaigns on earthquakes and tsunamis in collaboration with other agencies 
such as the Malaysian Meteorology Department (MMD), the Drainage and 
Irrigation Department (DID), and the Town and Country Planning Department 
(TCPD). In 2007, the awareness programme changed to The Public 
Awareness Campaign on Earthquake, Tsunami and Extreme Weather 
Hazards, which takes place annually, and is focused on the earthquake and 
tsunami prone areas in East Sabah and the North West Peninsular of 
Malaysia. Until 2010, the awareness campaign took place in 35 locations and 
involved more than 5,000 participants and included the vulnerable population, 
representatives of NGO’s, private companies, and the media. The most 
important objective of the awareness campaigns was that people understood 
the danger of a tsunami and could  recognise the tsunami siren and evacuate 
safely  (Rahman, 2012). 
In order to get information on the effectiveness of government awareness 
programmes, 1,600 questionnaire forms were distributed to participants at 16 
locations in  Penang; Teluk Bahang (18), Sg. Burong (31) and Penaga (13), 
where 568 forms were completed (Zainal et al., 2011). Participants were from 
vulnerable populations in coastal areas, village heads, and disaster 
management agencies officials. The main objectives were to assess 
participant’s knowledge, their awareness level of the tsunami sirens, the 
extent of dissemination of earthquake and tsunami information, and 
comments on the awareness programme. A very high majority  (91%) had a 
basic knowledge, 47% gained it from television, and 31% from newspapers, 
and magazines (13%) (Zainal et al., 2011).  In terms of disaster risk, 67% of 
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participants pointed out that they had learned about the risks as a result of 
attending the awareness programmes. However, only 33% of participants had 
experienced, or observed, the tsunami wave  but of these a majority  (67%) 
only saw the tsunami in television coverage (Zainal et al., 2011). With regards 
to the development of MNTEWS, 64% of participants were aware of it, of 
these 53% obtained their knowledge through television. Television played a 
crucial role in providing updates on earthquakes, and 50% acknowledged 
television as their main means of acquiring information, radio (25%), friends 
(12%) and SMS (9%). The most influential television networks were Radio 
Television Malaysia (RTM) with 40% viewer, followed by TV3 (37%), Astro 
(9%), NTV7 (5%), TV9 (5%) and 8TV (4%).  
The awareness programmes achieved one of its main objectives(to educate 
participants about early warning), with 56% knowing how to respond, 60% 
knowing what to do when they heard the tsunami siren, and 56% knowing 
they have to go higher place away from the beach and wait for  agencies to 
guide them to the evacuation centre. The NSC and MMD claimed that the 
disaster management officials who attended the awareness programmes had 
adequate knowledge of how to respond according to NSC Directive No. 20 
(Zainal et al., 2011).  
My research sample confirmed the findings of Zainal et. al. 82% of my 
respondents pointed out that there was no warning before the tsunami struck 
their areas (Figure 6.2). Another 14% claimed there was a warning with 
majority of them (64%) identifying verbal command and instructions from 
police to go to the evacuation centres and 18% received warning from police 
and civil defence loud speakers (Figure 6.3). However, one-third or 35% did 
not understand the warnings, all of them were Indian, and this was the result 
of a language barrier because the instruction from police was given in Malay, 
of  65% who claimed understand the command and instruction, all were 
Malays. However, the level of understanding among respondents has 
dramatically increased over the 10 years since the tsunami, in which 94% 
stated that they will go to higher ground as compared to only 25% in 2004 
(Figure 6.4). In terms of the tsunami siren, 96% claimed that they are still 
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learning about it and 4% still did not understand it, a majority of them are from 
the older  
 
 
Figure 6.2: Tsunami Warning from Government Agencies 
during the Tsunami 
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Figure 6.3: Type of Tsunami Warning 
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Figure 6.4:  Comparison of Action Taken by Respondent to the Tsunami Warning during 2004 Tsunami and 10 Years After 
                     Tsunami 
 
 
During 2004 Tsunami 10 Years After Tsunami 
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generation, age between 41 to 50 (62%) and 51 to 60 (38%) as compared to 
42% younger generation age between 20 to 40 (Figure 6.5).  
 
Age is important in determining the level of understanding. The younger 
generation are better exposed to a wide range to information about the 
tsunami threat, particularly through the internet. With regards to knowledge of 
evacuation plans, 80% of my sample knows the tsunami evacuation plan, 
which includes emergency routes and the location of the evacuation centres. 
However, 20% of respondents had no knowledge , and a  majority of them are 
in the middle age group between 31 to 50 years old (84%), claiming that they 
have heard about evacuation plan but never receive further information about 
it. This suggests that government agencies should expand disaster outreach 
programmes to every aspect of demographic profile, focusing on age.  
In general, 54% of my sample was confident of government’s preparedness 
programmes to manage another tsunami and 46% are very confident. In 
terms of the awareness level of the tsunami threat after 2004, 90% of 
Figure 6.5: Level of Understanding after 10 Years of Tsunami 
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respondents stated that they understand the dangers. However, 10% were 
still unsure, which consists of a near majority of business owners (49%) and 
41% are private sector employees. In terms of the relationship between the 
level of education and method of acquiring information about tsunami threats 
(as shown in Figure 6.6 and 6.7); out of 52% who learned from television and  
 
internet, 84% of them have secondary level of education. Meanwhile, out of 
45% who gained knowledge about the tsunami from the government’s 
awareness programmes, 73% of them have primary school level of education. 
This suggests primary school leavers’ respondents prefer receiving direct 
information from the government. With regards to the type of communication 
influences the respondents, the majority of the sample identified television 
(33%) and information delivered during government awareness programmes 
(30%), and only 15% mentioned the siren (Figure 6.8).  
Further analysis by age group revealed that 75% of middle age group (41 to 
50 years) relied on television, 67% of younger generation (20 to 30 years) 
Figure 6.6: Tsunami Learning Platform 
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Figure 6.8: Type of Communication Mostly Influenced Respondent 
 
Figure 6.7: Tsunami Learning Platform by Education Level 
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depend on the siren and police instruction, and 50% of the older generation 
(61 years and above) identified the siren as the main warning.  
These results suggested that television and government awareness 
programmes are the most influential source of information (Figure 6.9). 42% 
of my sample were satisfied with the early warning systems (Figure 6.10) but 
68% made several suggestions as to how to improve the systems, such as 
more tsunami drills (8%), the tsunami siren must be louder and clearer (8%), 
but  30% gave “no comment”. This maybe because, for example, they were 
not sure, lacked information, or were afraid to voice any comment due to 
suspicion of the researcher as a government’s agent (staff from disaster 
management agencies). These low levels of satisfaction, remember, ignited 
frustration and anger towards government and the ruling party. The NSC, as 
the coordinating body for disaster management in Malaysia, faced major 
challenges in dealing with a new type of disaster because of the current 
standard operating procedures that spell out among others, flowcharts of 
specific disaster response, which includes roles and responsibilities of 
disaster management agencies such as Police, Fire and Rescue Department, 
Marine Police, Coast Guards, Welfare Department and medical services that 
did not cover a tsunami.  
In the light of the 2004 tsunami, disaster management mechanisms and 
structures as laid down in Directive No. 20 were not clearly presented on the 
scene of tsunami events especially in Penang. This, perhaps, accounted for 
the delay in providing immediate response to the affected people. This 
argument is corroborated by the NSC Secretary (the then the Chief of Staff to 
the then Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi) during an interview on 7th August 
2014. He claimed he accompanied Prime Minister Abdullah during the visit to 
the affected areas, after the Prime Minister shortened his holiday in Europe 
and immediately returned to Malaysia (his flight landed directly at Penang 
International Airport). There was no NSC official around the visit and in fact he 
described the NSC as not being in the picture (there was no clear mechanism 
or structure of disaster management), and the tsunami relief was administered  
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Figure 6.9: Type of Communication Mostly Influenced Respondent by Age Group 
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Figure 6.10: Suggestions to Improve Tsunami Early Warning System 
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directly from the Prime Minister’s office. The then NSC Secretary lost his post 
in 2005, in part because he was associated with the poor performance of NSC 
in the early stages of the response to the tsunami. 
An effective tsunami response systems is constituted of  well prepared, 
efficient disaster management agencies and educated and knowledgeable 
publics that act accordingly when they hear tsunami sirens (Ho, 2007). 
However, due to the rarity and low possibility of a tsunami strike, the 
Malaysian population in general are complacent and do not pay serious 
attention to the tsunami sirens. Even in the most exposed and experienced 
country with regard to tsunamis, such as Japan which holds frequent tsunami 
exercises and drills, many Japanese were still trapped on the road because 
many of them tried to escape by car when tsunami hit the eastern Japan in 
Fukushima in March 2011. This implies that tsunami preparedness requires 
extended, repeated, comprehensive and integrated efforts from every 
government agency, civil societies, and full cooperation from individuals to be 
alert, prepared and take action altruistically (Hamzah, 2012). To achieve this, 
the tsunami warning siren should be loud and clear, and a unique sound, so 
people will be able to differentiate it from police and ambulance or other 
emergency warnings. Followed by announcement by loud speaker by police 
asking the public to cooperate and follow the evacuation routes within a 
maximum evacuation time. The sequence of action to be taken by the 
affected population should be understandable with simple explanation by 
picture or graphics placed on information board in public areas. The routes to 
evacuation centres must be clearly marked and the evacuation and relief 
centres made known to public, the chain of command among disaster 
management agencies should be swift and efficient (Yasin, 2009). 
Amendments of the NSC Directive No. 20 
NSC Directive No. 20, is the executive order signed by the Prime Minister to 
be served as the main document that outlines the structures and mechanisms 
for disaster management in Malaysia. It is the government’s effort to 
coordinate disaster response based on level of administration (district, state 
and federal) and seriousness of the disasters. In the aftermath of the 2004 
tsunami, the government realised the urgent need to revise the NSC No. 20 to 
   
142 
 
reflect the new types of disaster and respond to the affected people’s reaction 
that blamed the disaster management agencies, for their late arrival after the 
tsunami. The amendment gave the Malaysia Meteorology Department (MMD) 
an important role for the development and deployment of the Malaysian 
Tsunami Early Warning Systems. MMD has given the task of detecting, 
analysing and disseminating information regarding the tsunami warning to 
disaster management agencies and the public, in particular to the vulnerable 
populations.  
 
The amendment take into account the need to enhance and build the capacity 
of the public to be self-resilience by reinforcing roles and responsibility of the 
Civil Defense Department (Jabatan Pertahanan Awam Malaysia-JPAM) and 
the People’s Volunteer Corps (Sukarelawan Rakyat Malaysia-RELA) . The 
Government encouraged the population, in particular people living in disaster-
prone areas to register and join either JPAM or RELA because both are 
voluntary managed by communities, as suggested by the literature (see 
Chapter 2) a close-knit community with established volunteer group or force is 
far more resilient because the community is able to response, cope and 
recover from disaster quickly without waiting for external assistance.  To 
further enhance resilience and reduce vulnerability, the NSC required the 
conducting Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction programmes, which 
the NSC coordinated with the MMD, the Town and Country Planning 
Department, District Office, and other relevant agencies. The new Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOP’s) for a tsunami also formulated in order to 
compliment the new amendment. This is discussed in the next section.  
 
New Standard Operating Procedures (SOP’s) for Tsunami 
The new SOP’s for tsunami were developed in order to streamline the 
mechanism, procedures, command and control of tsunami response. Its main 
objective is to ensure an efficient and effective response that concentrates on 
the response time (arriving time of first responder’s agencies such as fire and 
rescue, civil defense and medical services), on seamless evacuation 
processes to the temporary shelters and immediate access to basic needs 
such as clean water, food and clothing for the affected people. The SOP’s 
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spell out the roles and responsibilities of agencies, such as NSC (later 
replaced by National Disaster Management Agency-NADMA since 2015) as 
the main coordinator, Police as the incident commander and public order, Fire 
& Rescue Department as the coordinator for first responders, the Welfare 
Department as coordinator for temporary shelters, and the Department of 
Information for liaising with the media. The Department of Meteorology 
provides early warning of a potential incoming tsunami based on analysis of 
the integrated Malaysian Tsunami Early Warning System (MTEWS) that 
gather data from buoys floating on Andaman Sea and South China Sea. 
 
At the regional level (South East Asia), the government’s disaster 
management agencies led by NSC (taken over by NADMA in 2015) enhance 
cooperation with neighbouring countries; Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, 
Brunei and The Philippines in providing tsunami early warning information 
through ASEAN (Association of South East Asia Nation) platform. Regular 
preparedness and response training conducted within ASEAN framework for 
disaster risk reduction with external expertise from Japan and USA (Pacific 
Tsunami Early Warning Centre). The main components of the training and 
exercise are creating awareness among agencies’ officials and disaster-prone 
communities to be alert on tsunami warning siren and standard operating 
procedures (SOP’s) for efficient and effective response. 
A New Disaster Management Bill 
To further strengthen disaster management in Malaysia, the government 
started after 2010 discussions and engagement with relevant agencies, 
stakeholders and the public (in particular the disaster vulnerable communities) 
with the idea of formulating a new Disaster Management Bill after to replace 
executive order of NSC Directive No.20 . The objective, among others, is to 
tackle issues regarding the evacuation that provide the legal provision to the 
NSC to enforce compulsory evacuation of vulnerable and potentially affected 
people to temporary shelters. However, this new Act was disapproved by 
opposition political parties and human rights NGO’s on the basis of human 
rights and civil liberties. Opposition parties and NGO’s believe the probability 
is that the agencies concerned (particularly NSC) will act beyond their 
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mandate or abuse their power in managing the evacuation process. Based on 
my experience as the Director of NSC State of Penang Office, I suggest that 
the legal provision for mandatory evacuation or resettlement of disaster 
vulnerable communities is highly practical and necessary that volunteer 
evacuation faces the problem of securing cooperation from the affected 
people because many do not believe in early warning until they see the 
disaster by which time it is too late to evacuate. This situation puts the 
government in a dilemma on whether to force them to evacuate or leave them 
to face the disaster. This dilemma put the discussion of the Bill on stagnant 
without any progress until today.  
 
However, recently the government has initiated a new law in order to 
overcome this deadlock by introducing National Security Council (NSC) Act 
(2016). The Act passed with simple majority after heated debate and strong 
opposition by the opposition parties. The NSC Act provide legal provision for 
the NSC to declare an “emergency area” in the disaster affected areas and for 
the military to take part in the response and evacuation process and the 
Federal government are able to speed up delivering aid. I argue, based on my 
experience as a civil servant, NSC Act can be viewed as a two-edge sword 
because the definition of “emergency areas” is prerogative of the authority (in 
this case, the NSC) that could be leading to ultra-virus or abuse of power. To 
do this I propose that the NSC should develop a clear criteria for an 
emergency declaration. 
 
A New National Disaster Management Agency (NADMA) 
As a long term initiative to beef up disaster management in Malaysia, the 
government established National Disaster Management Agency (NADMA) on 
31st December 2015, a new agency in the Prime Minister’s Department. 
Government realises the weaknesses of previous disaster management 
structure and mechanism, in particular during the 2004 tsunami is 
preparedness and mitigation aspects as portrayed by my research sample 
and supported by elite interviews and triangulated using reports in the mass 
media regarding the unpreparedness of agencies’ concern. Therefore, the 
government decided to set up specific agency dealing with disaster 
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management that gave birth to NADMA whose main functions are: first, as a 
national focal point of disaster management at district, state, national, regional 
and international level. Second, to formulate disaster management policies, 
strategies, directives and action plans; third, to monitor and perform auditing 
on disaster management agencies for continuous improvement; fourth, to 
manage deployment of SMART (Special Malaysia Disaster Assistance and 
Rescue Team) previously under the purview of NSC since 1994 when 
disaster strike. Fifth, to manage KWABBN (and disseminate immediate ‘Wang 
Ehsan’ (compassionate money) and long term monetary aid (for repairing or 
rebuilding damaged houses) to affected people. Sixth, to coordinate disaster 
management exercises and drills for officials and communities through 
Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDRR) initiatives. Seventh, to 
coordinate external disaster and humanitarian aid from regional and 
international agencies (NADMA, 2017).  
 
This new set up is an expansion of the Disaster Management Division of the 
National Security Council. The main purpose of creating NADMA is to 
separate the disaster management function from NSC so that NSC will focus 
only on national security issues and NADMA concentrates on managing 
disaster for better and more effective preparedness, mitigation, response, and 
rehabilitation. NADMA has been operating at full capacity only since 1st 
January 2016 and has effectively in managed several monsoon floods 
(Utusan Online, 2016). 
 
Conclusion 
Malaysia is exposed to natural disasters and the 2004 tsunami had a 
transformative effect. Disaster management structures and mechanism were 
streamlined to offer an integrated and holistic approach in order to face new 
challenges and better respond to them. This requires reviewing and 
harmonising current disaster management related laws, regulations and 
policies that are segregated in nature.  Malaysia also has several specialist 
mechanisms to handle different type of disasters, Malaysia also created an 
institutionalised National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction in 2013 (as part 
of Hyogo Framework requirement). This was part of the effort to “bring 
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together government agencies and private sectors into one platform for a 
better coordination”. (Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & 
Humanitarian Assistance, 2016, p. 68).  
In summary, the Government of Malaysia adopted a two-pronged adaptation 
strategy to meet the tsunami affected peoples’ expectations and discontent at 
the weaknesses of response and recovery. First, strengthening structure and 
mechanism of disaster management by reviewing existing establishment and 
procedures as stated NSC Directive No. 20. The government embedded 
disaster risk reduction strategies in development planning, in which new 
physical development and land use must comply with a strict development 
control and regulation, such as preserving environmental sensitive areas. In 
light of 2004 tsunami, the government developed the National Tsunami Early 
Warning Systems. NSC Directive No. 20 was also amended and new SOP’s 
for a tsunami were formulated to enhance the response.  A new agency, 
NADMA established in 2015, specialises in disaster management and a new 
Disaster Management Bill has been debated in Parliament. Second, the 
government has engaged communities by building capacity for self-resilient 
through Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDRR) programmes. 
CBDRR emphasises creating and inculcating awareness, preparedness and 
mitigation culture amongst the public, in particular to those living in the 
disaster vulnerable areas. The main objective is to reinforce the resilience of 
communities in the event of disaster. The final Chapter is the concluding 
chapter that provides overview of research objectives, questions and its 
answers and summarising this dissertation. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Introduction 
This dissertation has examined the unprecedented impact of the 2004 
tsunami on disaster management in Malaysia, an event that transformed the 
structure, mechanism and procedures of disaster management To 
summarise, Chapter 1 provides the background for the research,.  A suitable 
methodology is the mix-methods approach, using a case study approach, 
because the impact of disaster is localised, case based, and context specific. 
In order to understand disaster and the underlying concepts of risk, 
vulnerability, resilience and their impact on government and local politics, 
Chapter 2 discusses the existing literature and provides definitions of key 
concepts.  
Chapter 2 develops these concepts further and focuses on the effects of the 
disaster on local politics. It is sensible and logical to assume that frustration 
and dissatisfaction regarding the tsunami response, relief efforts, and 
recovery programmes triggered a shift in local politics, in the case study 
areas. Chapter 3 discusses the government’s disaster management policies 
and the response after the tsunami. The government introduced various 
response and rehabilitation programmes that failed to satisfy many of the 
affected people and so   Chapter 4 focuses on the affected communities’ 
reaction to the government’s programmes.  The evidence demonstrates 
reaction to government responses to the 2004 tsunami, which were perceived 
by the population as late and biased towards certain groups, and with an 
element of mismanagement. The reaction of the population can be 
summarized as anger, discontent, and disappointment. Chapter 5 then 
examines the political effects (limited to the case study areas only) of the 
government agencies’ perceived inefficiency in responding to tsunami. The 
communities channeled this resentment through elections that led to political 
shifts (from the ruling party to the opposition) for the first time in 39 years. 
From the government’s perspective, this resentment led the government to 
embrace transformative adaptation, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.  
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Chapter 6 examines the transformative adaptation initiated by the 
government. The government accommodated by formulating various new 
measures,  such as the amendment of NSC Directive No. 20, new SOP’s for a 
tsunami disaster, a new policy requiring development planning take into 
consideration of disaster risk reduction (such as strict building codes and 
regulation pertaining the development of environmental sensitive areas) , new 
Malaysia Tsunami Early Warning Systems (MTEWS), new disaster 
awareness and education programmes, and activities such as  Community 
Based Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDRR) that focus on educating and 
empowering local communities in managing disaster, 26th December was 
declared as a Disaster Awareness Day, and eventually, and a  new National 
Disaster Management Agency (NADMA) was created and new Disaster 
Management Bill was passed by Parliament. Chapter 7 reviews the research 
objectives, its corresponding questions and its answers or research findings. 
The Research Questions 
The research objectives and questions are given in Chapter 1. Table 7.1 
shows the relationship between research objectives, research questions and 
results.  The general aim of research is to explore how natural disasters can 
trigger transformative change. The dissertation has three objectives and three 
questions 
The first objective explores the tsunami as an unprecedented event that 
placed great stress on the government’s response and recovery programmes.  
Did the tsunami act as triggering factor that influenced the government to 
transform disaster management structures, mechanisms, policy and 
procedures in order to rectify the weaknesses perceived by the affected 
communities after the Tsunami? The question is 
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Table 7.1: Matrix of Research Objectives, Research Questions and its Answers. 
Research Objective Research Question Answers/Findings 
First Objective: 
To explore the tsunami as an 
unprecedented event that place 
stress on the government’s disaster 
management machineries.  
First Question: 
How did the government respond 
to the 2004 tsunami? 
The majority of tsunami affected voters (50%) described that 
the government respond to the tsunami was slow and arrived 
late and 4% perceived no coordination among agencies.  
 
200 affected people sent a petition setting out their 
dissatisfaction on the management of the tsunami rehabilitation 
programmes to the Penang State government (BN).  
 
Allegations of nepotism, cronyism and favouritism as perceived 
by 60% of the sample.  
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Table 7.1 (cont.): Matrix of Research Objectives, Research Questions and its Answers. 
Research Objective Research Question Answers/Findings 
Second Objective: 
To examine affected population’s 
feedback and reaction towards 
government’s response and 
recovery programmes, and indirect 
effects to the local politics. 
 
 
Second Question: 
Is there any evidence of a high level 
of population frustration and 
dissatisfaction towards the three 
main programmes:- 
c) Distribution of ‘Wang Ehsan’ 
(Emergency Monetary Aid); 
d) Allocation of ‘Rumah Tsunami’ 
(Tsunami Housing Scheme); 
and, 
c)    Distribution of fisheries 
assistance. 
 
 
91% of affected voters who received ‘Wang Ehsan’ voiced out 
that the money was not enough.  
70% respondents complained that the ‘tsunami houses’ were 
distributed very late and the process was slow.  
Affected voters who received ‘fisheries assistance’ (RM 1,000 in 
financial assistance for repairing their boats and RM 3,000 to 
buy new boats) claimed that the money was not enough to repair 
their boats and fishing equipment.  
85% stated that the government’s failed in response and 
recovery programmes influenced them to vote for opposition in 
2008.  
70% of the sample described their voting as a ‘protest vote’.  
Seats won by opposition drastically increased from only 2 seats 
(2004) to 29 seats (2008) as contrast to seats won by BN 
decreased from 38 (2004) to 11 (2008).  
Popular vote for opposition in Penang keep increasing from 
36.7% (2004), 58.9% (2008) and 67.8% (2013).  
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Table 7.1 (cont.): Matrix of Research Objectives, Research Questions and its Answers. 
Research Objective Research Question Answers/Findings 
Third Objective: 
To examine the tsunami as the 
trigger for the transformation of 
disaster management structure and 
mechanism in Malaysia. 
Third Question: 
Is there any evidence that the 2004 
tsunami triggered a transformative 
adaptation to the disaster 
management mechanism? 
The transformative adaptation in managing disaster is 
triggered by the interaction between the government’s 
response to disaster (2004 tsunami) and the affected 
population’s reaction that lead to structural and mechanism 
transformation such as amendment of NSC Directive No. 20 to 
include detail definition of tsunami,  new SOP’s for tsunami that 
spell out roles and responsibilities of agencies’ concern, 
embedding disaster risk reduction strategies in development 
planning, shift the focus from response to preparedness 
through awareness and education, development of Malaysian 
Tsunami Early Warning System; and in a longer term, 
expansion of Disaster Management Division of NSC into a new 
agency dedicated for disaster management, National Disaster 
Management Agency (NADMA) and formulation of Disaster 
Management Bill. 
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centred on the effectiveness of the government’s response to the 2004 
tsunami and the reaction of the affected population. The evidence from the 
fieldwork (Chapter 4) indicates that the majority of tsunami affected voters 
perceived the government’s response as slow and late, and often with little 
coordination. With regards to distribution of monetary assistance (Wang 
Ehsan), 91% of affected voters who received ‘Wang Ehsan’ believed the 
money allocated was insufficient. In terms of the tsunami housing programme, 
70% respondents complained that the houses were distributed very late and 
the process was slow. Affected fishermen (25% out of 68% who received 
‘fisheries assistance’) claimed that the money was not enough to repair their 
boats and fishing equipment. Of the 68% who received fisheries and 
agricultural assistance, 25% were not satisfied because the amount was 
insufficient. About 200 affected people submitted a petition setting out their 
dissatisfaction on the management of the tsunami rehabilitation programmes 
to the Penang State government. However, the petition did not have any 
visible effect (Horton et al., 2008). 
The second objective is to examine the extent of dissatisfaction and 
frustration of the affected people with the government’s response and 
recovery programmes and how this led to the change in the government’s 
disaster management policy. The corresponding question concentrates on the 
discontent and resentment of local communities with the government that 
acted as a manifestation of wider and pre-existing social tensions. The 
fieldwork found that 85% of respondents stated that the government’s failure 
in their response and recovery programmes influenced them to vote for the 
opposition in 2008.  Nepotism, cronyism and favouritism were identified by 
60% of the sample. 
The third research objective is to examine the tsunami as the trigger for the 
transformation of disaster management in Malaysia. Is there any evidence 
that the 2004 tsunami triggered a transformative adaptation to the disaster 
management mechanism? The transformative adaptation in managing 
disaster was triggered by the interaction between the government’s response 
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to disaster (2004 tsunami) and the affected population’s reaction that lead to 
changes  such as the amendment of NSC Directive No. 20 to include  
tsunami,  new SOP’s for tsunami that spell out roles and responsibilities of 
agencies’ concern, embedding disaster risk reduction strategies in 
development planning, shift the focus from response to preparedness through 
awareness and education, development of Malaysian Tsunami Early Warning 
System; and in the  longer term, the expansion of Disaster Management 
Division of NSC into a new agency dedicated for disaster management, 
National Disaster Management Agency (NADMA), and the formulation of 
Disaster Management Bill. This degree of change can be described as 
transformatory. 
 
Impact  on Government  and Local Politics 
Disasters, the government’s response, and local politics are inter-related as 
disasters produce discontent over government response and recovery efforts 
that may lead to political turmoil. Much of the current literature suggests that 
the impact of a disaster on government and local politics often depends on the 
pre-disaster political, social and economic condition of the affected population. 
This includes the resilience of a state’s institutions to crisis, as portrayed by 
examples from the United States, Germany, Turkey, Pakistan and Haiti. The 
pre-disaster conditions exacerbate the aftermath if disaster occurs in 
conflicted areas, where natural disasters often become catalysts of political 
tension in those states already prone to political tensions. Where disasters are 
unpredicted or previously not experienced (as was the case with the 2004 
tsunami) the effect on the government and politics can be even greater 
because preparations may be ineffective as they were designed for a different 
types of event.  In ‘routine emergencies’ (such as floods), government’s 
disaster management agencies tend to perform effectively due to their 
familiarity with this type disaster. However, Samuels  argues that “novel 
emergencies, demand ‘adaptive leadership’ to respond across key functions: 
communications, coordination and resources allocation” (p. 9). Disasters are 
therefore stress factors and may trigger transformative change.  This research 
explores the complex interaction of a disaster and a potential transformation 
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that take place in response to the affected communities reactions and 
feedback on the government’s capability to manage disasters. 
The main attributes that the literature suggests are (Chapter 2): first, 
disasters, place pressure on government’s response machinery and the 
reaction of the population depends on the pre-disaster’s state of affairs in the 
affected communities. Second, the element of risk that constitutes the 
vulnerability and resilience of the affected population and the resilience of 
political institutions plays a crucial role in determining the impact of a disaster. 
Third, transformative change and adaptation can be differentiated from 
incremental change, the former takes place rapidly and brings substantial 
change, whereas the latter happens at a gradual pace with fewer immediately 
observable effects. In this respect, the changes in Malaysian disaster 
management took place swiftly from 1997 to 2012 with significant outcomes, 
such as amendment of NSC Directive No.20, new SOP’s for Tsunami, a new 
Tsunami Early Warning System, and drastic change in policy that extend DRR 
into development planning, increasing of DRR awareness and education 
programmes, setting up the National Disaster Management Agency 
(NADMA), and a Disaster Management Bill.   
In essence, a disaster is a product of interactions between natural hazards 
and human activities in populated areas. The disaster risk depends on the 
probability and vulnerability level of the area and community and this consists 
of political, social, economy and geo-physical conditions. Therefore, risk, as 
suggested by the literature, can be summarised as orienting around the 
function of disaster probability and community vulnerability. In Penang, my 
case study shows that the vulnerability levels were potentially quite high due 
to factors such as communal politics and ethnic segregation that lead to 
ethnic tensions and possible conflicts. This produced ‘disaster state’ 
conditions that are sensitive to unexpected events (such as the tsunami) that 
tests the ability of government and community to respond. The Penang case 
revealed ethnic preferences and bias in the response and recovery 
programmes, as perceived by the affected population that believed the 
government was giving priority to certain ethnic and political groups. This led 
to accusation of nepotism, cronyism and mismanagement of relief fund. 
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The existing disaster management structure and mechanism in Malaysia was 
designed to manage ‘traditional’ natural disasters, in particular monsoon 
flooding. Institutions were not prepared for an unusual and unprecedented 
disaster such as tsunami. Therefore, the response was often late and 
uncoordinated (Chapter 3). The reaction of the affected people is 
conceptualised as depending on the complex interaction of politics, socio-
economic conditions, demography, and environmental insecurity. The case 
studies demonstrate a vulnerable community, characterised by conditions of 
political and social tension, high urbanisation rate, and a pluralistic society 
(multi-ethnic, cultural, multi-language, and multi-religion) but one that is 
socially and geographically segregated and then subjected to a major natural 
disaster.  
 
Tsunami related issues that underpin the frustration and dissatisfaction of 
affected communities werebased on three government’s programmes 
(coordinated by NSC); ‘Bantuan Wang Ehsan’ (Monetary Aid), ‘Rumah 
Tsunami’ (Tsunami Resettlement Housing), and; Fisheries and Agriculture 
Assistance. The analysis shows that a majority of the affected people were 
unhappy with the three programmes because of the late delivery of 
assistance, bureaucracy, nepotism, cronyism, and favouritism. However, the 
Malaysian governmental authorities were intact and functioning after the 
tsunami and managed to govern, avoiding large scale and violent 
demonstrations despite serious hostility. The affected populations chose 
democratic channels to voice their resentment through voting in elections. 
This case study offers an understanding of specific nature of the impact of 
natural disaster that is localised, case base and context specific. The tsunami 
is, I would argue, a significant catalyst, in triggering the transformation in 
government’s disaster management as (Chapter 5). Next section identifies the 
research key findings. 
 
First, the research shows that the transformation in managing disaster was 
triggered by the interaction of the government’s response and the population’s 
reaction. Second, the 2004 tsunami can be seen as a triggering factor that 
culminated in the government’s transformation programmes as a response to 
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the affected communities’ feedback on the weaknesses of the government’s 
actions. Third, the indirect political impact of disasters on local politics 
depends on the maturity of the democracy in the affected communities 
because the political process shapes the responses to a disaster’s 
consequences.  
The political impact of any disaster is filtered through the political institutions 
of a country, its social and economic conditions, and its government’s 
effectiveness, which combine to constitute the country’s resilience in the face 
of risk and vulnerability. The legitimacy of political institutions may be as 
important as government effectiveness in understanding post-disaster politics. 
The legitimacy of the ruling party, for example, can be saved if the response 
to disasters perceived by the affected population meets their expectation and 
the disaster management officials are proven efficient. This in turn “can be an 
important device to bolster the legitimacy of any government and to rescue a 
regime from eminent demise” (Schenk & Mamelshagen, 2012, p. 9). To some 
degree the importance of legitimate political institutions has been recognised 
by post-Hyogo disaster management, with its emphasis on the involvement of 
communities in disaster preparation and management. Moreover, according 
to the Secretary and the former Deputy Secretary of NSC, Malaysian society 
and its institutions have ‘matured’, Malaysia’s greater wealth enables it to 
invest in enhanced resilience. Therefore, they argue, although ethnic relations 
in Malaysia are described as ‘smouldering’ with isolated and sporadic cases 
of ethnic tensions they will not become fully activated as in the ‘Arab Spring’. 
According to the former Penang Representative of Teluk Bahang 
constituency, the 13th May tragedy will not be repeated. However, I argue that 
a large scale and nationwide disasters are still capable of generating a similar 
level of disruption (as suggested in Chapter 2) unless the transformative 
counter-measures put in place after 2004 to prevent it. Forth, in Penang, the 
PR continued to dominate the Legislative Assembly after the 2013 election 
with 75% seats (30) that increased from 73% (29 seats) in 2008, whereas BN 
only secured 10 seats. In the next section I move on to discuss the research 
questions and its’ answers. 
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The dissertation argues that the discontent and resentment of tsunami 
affected communities was not mobilised for several reasons. First, liberal-
democratic political institutions and processes are embedded in society; the 
first democratic election took place in 1955 and the party system was well 
developed. Thereafter, the voters expressed approval or disapproval towards 
government or opposition through the election process. Thus, the existence of 
a functioning and mature political process (in particular the elections) served 
as a safety valve.  Second, the political system and governance proved to be 
robust and resilient. Bujonez et.al define political resilience as “the ability of 
the state to maintain a functioning government apparatus that provides quality 
public services, and formulates and implements policies that are perceived to 
be credible and legitimate” (2013, p.14).  These resilient political institutions 
proved able, despite some operational shortcomings, to deliver their functions 
and mitigate the disaster risks, to respond, to begin recovery operations, and 
secure public order. In a similar vein, (Carriere, Miller, Covarrubias, & 
Lansford, 2013) argue that  “political resilience is the ability of government 
institutions to provide a political framework to community resilience that is the 
capability to anticipate risk, limit impact, and bounce back rapidly through 
survival, adaptability, evolution, and growth in the face of turbulent change” (p. 
76). In contrast, a less resilient system might possibly collapse under the 
impact of unexpected disaster possibly leading to active political violence. 
The key political institutions consist of the ruling government, the political 
parties, civil service and other government institutions. According to Bujonez 
et.al 
In conflict affected states, weak national institutions and 
fragmented political identities undermine the formation of a 
robust governance system. In such a scenario the political 
system will be highly vulnerable to any unexpected events and 
crisis such as civil unrest and coup d’état, which would 
negatively impact its ability to mitigate, adapt and recover that 
may lead to a partial or complete collapse of the political order 
(p. 14).  
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The government’s legitimacy is, however, endangered when it is perceived to 
favour a particular ethnic or party group, which leads to antagonism between 
the government and population, and the population may even challenge the 
government’s legitimacy. As Bujones et.al argue “…a fragile or conflict-
affected state is often characterised by a lack of effective political processes” 
(Bujones et al., 2013, p. 15). Some 70% voted for the opposition as a protest 
and 20% did so to demonstrate their loss of trust in the ruling government 
(Chapter 4). Therefore, governments should be inclusive in addressing the 
affected population’s demands, and strive to be impartial in an effort to 
minimise complaints and protest in order to sustain political stability. Evidence 
from the fieldwork shows that a functional and workable democracy in 
Malaysia proven to be able to manage the stress caused by the tsunami, in a 
social and political context characterised by inter-ethnic group tensions and 
accusations of mismanagement in the distribution of aid. 
 
Summary 
Undoubtedly, the 2004 tsunami brought significant changes to Malaysian 
disaster management. The motivation for changes were driven by the 
aggravation of discontents and weaknesses of the disaster management 
agencies’ responses. Based on my research I argue that the tsunami and its 
aftermath amplified the stresses flowing from existing issues but the impact on 
government’s disaster management policies and its indirect effect on local 
politics (but limited to the my case study areas) were dependent on the 
complexity of the respective population and its resilience.  
I argue that the novelty of my research lies in: first, the introduction of new 
areas of study, in the interaction of disasters and the disaster management 
policy, structure, mechanism and procedures; second, the indirect effects of 
disaster to local political landscape in the case study areas; third, the extent of 
the impact depends on the existing political and socio-economic condition of 
affected communities and the willingness (in particular, political will) of the 
government to accommodate the r feedback from the affected people. In case 
of Malaysia, the political will to transform the disaster management came from 
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the highest level, the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister, 
accelerating the transformation. 
I conclude that disasters bring about massive changes and even 
transformative effects, but to understand how disasters impact on 
government’s, detailed case studies on affected local communities and 
interviews with disaster management officials and local politicians need to be 
conducted. In Malaysia, issues related to the disaster mainly focus on late 
response and mismanagement in delivering of recovery programmes such as 
lack of transparency, bureaucracy, nepotism, cronyism and favouritism, as 
such the disaster produced stress  that triggered dissatisfaction and 
resentment. Thus, the government responded by initiating various 
transformative adaptation on disaster management to ensure efficient and 
effective governance. 
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Appendix 1.1: List of Interviewees 
1. Dato’ Seri Dr. Hilmi Yahya 
The then Deputy Chief Minister of Penang and Member of Parliament 
of Balik Pulau (2004 Election);  
 
2. Mrs. Siti Faridah Arshad  
2004 Member of State Assembly of Telok Bahang (2004 Election);  
 
3. Datuk Mohamed Thajudeen Abdul Wahab 
Secretary of National Security Council,  
 
4. Datuk Che Moin Umar 
Former Deputy Secretary of National Security Council  
(Who was the person in charge of coordinating Government agency’s 
response during 2004 tsunami); 
 
5. Mr. Norhisham Kamarudin 
Principle Assistant Secretary of Disaster Management Division, 
National Security Council; 
 
6. Mr. Mohd Rizuad Mohd Azuddin 
Head of Perkasa Youth Wing, Penang Chapter; 
 
7. Representative of ‘Tsunami House’ residents at Tanjung Bungah, 
Penang (Choose to be anonymous). 
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Appendix 1.2: Interview Questions 
A. Dormant CPE: Before 2004 Tsunami  
 
1. In your opinion, what are the long standing issues and problems from 
ethnic perspectives? 
a) Malays……………………… 
b) Chinese……………………. 
c) Indian………………………. 
 
2. How do you describe the state of intra-ethnic relations (how frequent 
clash and tension)? 
a) Malay-Chinese………………………… 
b) Malay-Indian…………………………… 
c) Chinese-Indian………………………… 
 
3. How do you describe the state of communal politics and political 
struggle in Penang? Please specify. 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
B. Activated CPE: During the Tsunami 
 
1. How do you explain the ethnic reaction to the government’s tsunami 
responses? 
a) Malay………………………………….. 
b) Chinese……………………………….. 
c) Indian………………………………….. 
 
2. What were the issues and problems during response and relief? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
3. Any intra-ethnic tension or clash? 
a) Malay-Chinese………………………… 
b) Malay-Indian…………………………… 
c) Chinese-Indian………………………… 
   
176 
 
 
4. Any public anger, frustration and dissatisfaction? Why? 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
5. Any issues and problems during recovery phases in pertaining to the 
following assistance: 
a) Bantuan Wang Ehsan Bencana (Disaster Monetary Aid) 
 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
 
b) Rumah Tsunami (Tsunami Housing Scheme) 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
c) Agricultural and Fishery assistance 
 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
 
6. Any discrimination according to race or ethnic bias? Please specify. 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
7. State of political struggle? Any political turmoil? Please specify. 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
C. Deactivated CPE: Post Tsunami phase- Community Based Disaster 
Risk Reduction Programmes (CBDDR). 
 
1. How effective the following programmes? 
a) Disaster Awareness Programme 
 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
b) Tsunami Early Warning Systems and Drills 
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……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
2. What are the principal means that your agency uses to communicate 
with the public during the response? 
………………………………………………………………….……………… 
 
3. Does your agency have a public awareness campaign to increase the 
general populations understanding of natural hazards? Please explain. 
 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
4. Do your agency exercises disaster preparedness practice drills which 
include the public? Please explain. 
 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
5. How do your communication warnings to the public? 
a) Direct to the public via media 
b) Via disaster management system 
c) Via other government officials 
d) Others (please specify)…………………………………… 
 
6. In your opinion, what do you need to improve warnings services and 
public response? (Select all that are relevant) 
a) National Coordination Committee 
b) Greater availability of data 
c) Better telecommunication 
d) More accurate warnings (less false alarms) 
e) Better dissemination 
f) Enhanced public awareness of risks 
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g) Enhanced public education to understand and respond to warnings 
specifically targeted at schools, government departments, other 
organizations (please specify)…………………………… 
h) More effective decision-making processes within government 
i) Improved trans-boundary cooperation 
j) Others (please specify)…………………………….. 
 
D. Impact of Tsunami on Politics 
 
1. In your opinion, why there has been drastically changed in political 
landscape of Penang after the tsunami? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
2. Did you anticipate the political change in 2004? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
3. Why did voters change the State Government from Barisan Nasional 
(National Front) in 2004 to Pakatan Rakyat (People’s Alliance) in 
2008?  
……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
4. Was it because of the impact and influence of public anger and 
dissatisfaction on tsunami response and recovery programmes?  
 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
5. How strong do you agree that the frustration on tsunami response 
and recovery influenced voters to vote against Barisan Nasional? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
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Appendix 1.3: Questionnaire Form 
Part A: State of Communal Politics before 2004 Tsunami 
1. How would you describe the state of ethnic relations in your community 
before the tsunami? 
A. Good 
B. Bad 
C. No particular problems 
 
2. Was there any ethnic clash in your community? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
 
3. If Yes, How often? 
A. Constantly (more than 12 cases a year) 
B. Occasionally (6 to 12 cases a year) 
C. Seldom (1 to 5 cases a year) 
 
4. If disaster occurred in your community, would you help your neighbours 
based on ethnic preference? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
5. Did you satisfy with the performance of Member of Parliament and 
Member of State Assembly in your area before the tsunami? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
 
6. If No, Why? 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
7. Have you ever heard about tsunami? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
 
8. If Yes, did you know how to respond to it? 
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A. Yes 
B. No 
 
9. Was there any government’s tsunami awareness programme prior to 2004 
tsunami? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
 
10. If Yes, did you understand it? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
 
Part B: Tsunami Experience in 2004 
11. Was there any warning at the time of the tsunami from any government 
agencies (for example, police, fire& rescue department, civil defence)? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. Don’t recall 
 
12. If yes, what type of warning (please tick any that you recall)? 
A. Siren 
B. Loud speaker announcement  
C. Verbal commands from police 
D. Verbal instruction from coast guards 
E. Others (please specify) 
 
13. Did you understand it and able to interpret these warning? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
 
14. If Yes, how did you interpret and respond to any warning? 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
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15. If No, Why? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
16. In your opinion, was the warning understandable by the public? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
 
17. If Yes, please explain how did the public respond to it? 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
18. If No, Why? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
19. How would you describe government agencies respond to the 2004 
tsunami in term of response time? 
A. Quick and rapid 
B. Slow and arrived late 
C. Don’t know 
11.  Do you think relief was administered impartially? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
 
20. If No, Why? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
21. Do you think all communities were treated equally in the immediate post-
tsunami relief period? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
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22. If No, Why? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
23. How would you describe the state of ethnic relations immediately after 
the tsunami? 
A. Improving 
B. Deteriorating 
 
24. How would you describe the state of ethnic relations in the ten years 
since the tsunami? 
A. Improving 
B. Deteriorating 
 
25. Do you think post-tsunamis reconstruction efforts were administered 
impartially? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
 
26. If No, Why? 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
27. Do you think all communities were treated equally in the post-tsunami 
reconstruction period? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
 
28. If No, Why? 
 
………………………………………………………………………………….... 
29. Do you think was there any coordinated effort by the communities to 
save their lives? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
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30. If Yes, please explain  
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
31. If No, do you know why? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
32. Do you think was there any coordinated effort by the communities to 
promote post-tsunami reconstruction or did they rely on the public 
authorities? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
33. If Yes, please explain. 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
34. If No, do you know why? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
Part C: Government’s Response and Recovery Programmes 
 
I) ‘Bantuan Wang Ehsan Bencana’ (Monetary Assistance for Disaster 
Relief) 
 
35. Did you receive ‘Bantuan Wang Ehsan Bencana’? If Yes, go to question 
number 36. If No, go to question number 38. 
A. Yes 
B. No 
 
36. If Yes, did you satisfy with the amount? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
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37. In No, please explain? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
38. In your opinion, why you did not receive ‘Bantuan Wang Ehsan’? 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
39. In your opinion, was there any ethnic bias in distribution of ‘Bantuan Wang 
Ehsan’? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
 
40. If Yes, please explain how did you experience it: 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
II) Allocation of ‘Rumah Tsunami’ (Tsunami Housing Scheme) 
41. Did you receive ‘Rumah Tsunami? If Yes, go to question number 42. If No, 
go to question number 44. 
A. Yes 
B. No 
 
42. Did you satisfy with the house?  
A. Yes 
B. No 
 
43. If No, please explain? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
44. In your opinion, why you did not receive ‘Rumah Tsunami? 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
45. In your opinion, was there any ethnic bias in distribution of ‘Rumah 
Tsunami? 
A. Yes 
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B. No 
 
46. If Yes, please explain how did you experience it: 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
III) Distribution of Fisheries and Agricultural assistance 
47. Did you receive Fisheries and Agricultural assistance? If Yes, go to 
question number 48. If No, go to question number 50. 
A. Yes 
B. No 
 
48. Did you satisfy with the amount?  
A. Yes 
B. No 
 
49. If No, please explain? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
50. In your opinion, why you did not receive the Fisheries and Agricultural 
assistance? 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
51. In your opinion, was there any ethnic bias in distribution of Fisheries and 
Agricultural assistance? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
 
52. If Yes, please explain how did you experience it: 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Part D: Evaluation of Government’s Tsunami Risk Reduction 
Programmes 
 
I) Tsunami Early Warning System and Tsunami Drill 
 
53. After 2004, government frequently ran awareness programmes that 
included tsunami drill. What is your level of understanding now after 10 
years of the tsunami siren? 
A. I am learning about the siren and understand it. 
B. I still do not understand the siren. 
 
54. If your answer is A, please explain how did you learn about the siren? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
55. If your answer is B, please explain why? 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
56. Can you differentiate the tsunami siren from police, ambulance and civil 
defence? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. Don’t know 
 
57. If No, Why? 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
58. If you heard tsunami siren, what would you do? 
A. If there is a confirmed tsunami threat and I heard the tsunami siren, 
then I will go immediately to the higher ground and wait for further 
instruction from government agencies especially the police. 
B. I will do nothing because of false alarms in the past. 
C. Others (please specify). 
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59. Do you know about tsunami evacuation plans such as emergency route 
to a safer place and the designated temporary evacuation centre in 
higher ground? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
 
60. If, No, Why? 
A. Never heard about it. 
B. I heard but never receive information about it. 
C. Have some information but not very clear and do not understand. 
D. I know about it but I am confused because no proper and clearly 
signage of emergency route towards the evacuation centre. 
E. Others (please specify). 
 
61. In your personal opinion do have confidence in the measures put in 
place by government to deal with another tsunami? 
A. A great deal 
B. Some 
C. None at all 
 
 
62. After 2004, do you understand and are aware of the threat of tsunamis? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. Not sure 
 
63. If Yes, which type of communication mostly influenced you? 
……………………………………………………………………… 
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Part E: Suggestion to Improve the Tsunami Response and Recovery 
64. What are your suggestions to improve the following: 
A. Tsunami Early Warning. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
B. Bantuan Wang Ehsan Bencana (Monetary Assistance for Disaster 
Relief) 
 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
C. Allocation of ‘Rumah Tsunami’ (Tsunami Housing Scheme) 
 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
D. Distribution of Fisheries and Agricultural assistance 
 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
E. Ethnic relation during the tsunami response 
 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
F. Ethnic reconciliation during the tsunami recovery 
 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Part F: Voting Behaviour 
65. Are you a member of a political party? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
 
66. If yes, which one and for how long? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………. 
67. Have you been a member of any other party? 
A. Yes 
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B. No 
 
68. If yes, which one and for how long? 
 
……………………………………….. 
69. Why did you leave that party? 
 
………………………………………. 
70. Did you vote in the 2004 General Election? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
 
71. If Yes, for which party did you vote: 
A. BarisanNasional: UMNO, GERAKAN, MCA, MIC 
B. Pakatan Rakyat: PKR, DAP, PAS 
C. Independent Candidate 
 
72. Why did you vote that party? 
 
……………………………………………………………. 
 
 
73. If you vote for difference party as compared to previous election, why did 
you change?  
 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
74. Did you vote in the 2008 General Election? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
 
75. If Yes, for which party did you vote: 
A. BarisanNasional: UMNO, GERAKAN, MCA, MIC 
B. Pakatan Rakyat: PKR, DAP, PAS 
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76. Why did you vote that party? 
 
……………………………………………………………. 
77. If you vote for difference party as compared to previous election, why did 
you change?  
 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
78. How important was the tsunami and subsequent events in your decision 
to vote for a different party? 
A. Very important 
B. Important 
C. Not important 
 
79. Did you vote in the 2013 General Election? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
 
80. If Yes, for which party did you vote: 
A. Barisan Nasional: UMNO, GERAKAN, MCA, MIC 
B. Pakatan Rakyat: PKR, DAP, PAS 
C. Independent Candidate 
 
81. Why did you vote that party? 
 
……………………………………………………………. 
82. If you vote for difference party as compared to previous election, why did 
you change?  
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Part G: Demography 
83. Age group 
A. 20-30 
B. 31-40 
C. 41-50 
D. 51-60 
E. 61 & above 
 
84. Gender 
A. Male 
B. Female 
 
85. Occupation 
A. Government  
B. Private 
C. Business 
D. Unemployed 
 
 
86. Educational Level 
A. University Degree 
B. Secondary School 
C. Primary School 
 
87. Ethnicity 
A. Malay 
B. Chinese 
C. Indian 
D. Other 
 
88. Annual Family Income 
A. Below RM9,600 (below poverty line) 
B. RM9,601 -  RM24,000 
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C. RM24,001 – RM48,000 
D. RM48,001 – RM60,000 
E. Above RM60,001 
 
 
Thank you for your kind cooperation. 
